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Th e Manifestation of Identities in 
a Plural Post-Secular Europe
Johan Leman, Erkan Toğuşlu and İsmail Mesut Sezgin
Global – local identifi cations
In 1969 the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth published his Ethnic 
Groups and Boundaries. In his words, it is not cultural stuff  that creates social 
borders, but fl exible social borders which create culture. He was not the only 
one, though, to ask for attention to be drawn to the constructive chemistry 
which takes place in ethnic boundary creation. Leach (1954), prior to the time 
of Barth, had already emphasized the constructive and fl exible character of social 
boundaries. And also Moerman (1965) had taken a similar approach, fi nding 
the earlier approach adopted by Weber (1922) to be insuffi  cient, and instead 
contending that ethnicity is a useful concept.
However, people who studied in the 1960s and who completed their fi rst 
fi eldwork undertakings in the 1970s will remember how the range of their research 
fi eld changed dramatically from the 1990s on. Th e context started changing 
very fundamentally. Globalization created a new horizon. By the beginning of 
the 1990s, one of the fi rst interesting theorists of the global, Roland Robertson 
(1992), had reacted to McLuhan’s homogenizing ‘global village’ concept (1962) 
by opposing the idea that globalization would lead to homogenization. In his 
words, it was not homogenization that would be the outcome, but glocalization. 
He predicted a search for fundamental truths (religious and nationalistic) as well 
as what he called a particularization of the universal. In this logic, globalization 
would not de-ethnicize religion. Of course, the global would have an impact 
on it, since the tools and instruments would belong to the world of the global. 
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But this would lead in some cases to local enclaves of religious and national 
identifi cation, stretching even as far, on more than one occasion, to religious 
fundamentalisms. It is about specifi c ethnic-religious dynamics in such a cluster 
of processes in today’s Europe that the authors of this book will bring us some 
empirical information and the results of their refl ections.
What Robertson did not foresee, perhaps because it was not that active at 
the beginning of the 1990s, is that the global, with its transnationalism and 
transnational social movements, would also become the site of the beginning 
of a lot of ‘in between’ trans-border median spaces (in Barth’s 1994 phrasing). 
Barth proposed to distinguish three levels of processes that evolve by themselves: 
a micro (or personal) level, a macro level (of ‘state policies’), and a median level, 
where processes “create collectivities and mobilize groups for diverse purposes 
by diverse means” (Barth 1994:21). Th e impact of the global on the median level 
(where the internet has become an important factor) is very clear from the mid 
1990s on, not least among religious identifi cations. “What happens is that the 
inner boundaries inside the transnational faith communities are removed. Th is 
de-territorialisation, so typical of virtual communication in the Web, leads to 
the enlargement of existing communities which adhere to the same branch of a 
religion” (Leman 2009: 199). In 1974 Barth also accepted that cultural practices 
as such may have an impact on the way social processes develop (see also Cerroni-
Long 2007), an idea that should be taken into consideration when studying 
today’s ethnic-religious developments in Europe.
Th ese developments bring us to the core of the issues that the reader will fi nd 
considered in the chapters of this volume. Th e religions that will be treated are: 
Islam (in most chapters), Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism (this last as viewed 
through the eyes of the Indian Spanish Dalit community). Islam will be the 
focus, and this is not surprising since, surely from ‘nine eleven’ (2001) on, it has 
been Islam and Muslims that are at the heart of the debate on multiculturalism 
in Europe. Th e fi elds that have been studied are situated in Turkey, Germany, 
France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Poland, Norway, Sweden and Belgium, but 
also Europe in general.
Main interests
Th e book we present is concerned with looking at the extensive phenomena 
of identifi cations in Europe at the beginning of the 21st Century. Th e 
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identifi cations  will reveal themselves to be expressed in various alternative 
forms of religious-ethnic manifestation and they will overlap with migrants, 
students, religious fi gures, multicultural politics and lifestyles. Th e book is 
not just about identity; rather the chapters analyse the issues relating to the 
question of identifi cation and the expression of identity in multiple forms 
in new glocal, transborder contexts. It explores the concrete experiences and 
positions of subjects in terms of transborderless and trans-ethnic communities, 
for example Polish Tartars, Belgian Turks or German Muslim Turks, .... From 
a political-science perspective, Brubaker’s idea of ‘ethnicity without groups’ 
relevantly poses the question of changing the characteristics of ethnicity in 
relation to religion, symbols, nation, territory, memory, institutions, networks, 
categories and schemes (Brubaker 2004: 4). Such complex identifi cations cannot 
be encompassed by just race-ethnicity, gender and religion alone; the multiple 
cultural-situational-political elements can also produce identities which are 
shaped by the new circumstances of de-territorialization. 
Identities are developed in relation to one’s nation, religion, gender, class, 
language, and daily life practices. Th ey are not fi xed/static and they are constructed 
in many, complex ways. Identity is about similarity, diff erence, recognition and 
representation in the public area (Helicke 2002). It is constructed through 
the interaction between diff erent frames, schemes, symbols and cultures. Th e 
concept of identity is over-used and has expanded so much that it has lost its 
specifi city. For this reason, in this book the emphasis is on the manifestation of 
identities in a plural Europe, where some identities are becoming more visible. 
Th rough the lens of post-migrant societies, we will try to analyse the mobility of 
identities in some specifi c religious communities and groups. 
It is important to note that in post-migrant societies alternative, marginal 
identities may also become a part of the mainstream identity. In order completely 
to understand this re-localization of the mainstream, we need also to look at 
the blurring of boundaries such as those between orthodoxy-heterodoxy, local-
global and individual-community. Th e use of information technology and the 
advancement of mass media have transformed the character of the mainstream 
identity. In other words, a particularization of the universal has appeared. Th e 
identities have been pluralized, fragmented and de-territorialized during the last 
decade. It is not clear where the boundaries exist and where they are recreated 
into new forms of identifi cation. Th e blurred identity raises concerns about the 
problematic nature of boundaries and borders between various ethnic-religious 
groups, as well as within the same ethnic-religious communities. 
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Th rough the fi ndings and refl ections from the various chapters, we will try 
to make three main points: 1) the emergence of transnational and translocal-
glocal identities and communities is tied to the logic of globalization and the 
network society (Castells 1996). In these networks, the multiple loyalties and 
de-territorialized identities are formed during daily life practices, discourses 
and policies. 2) Transnational subjects (Muslims, Jews, youth, female, 
political activists…) have a direct infl uence and impact on the discussion of 
multiculturalism. Th e new multiculturalism is post-secular, more trans-migrant 
coloured and border widening. 3) Th e new communities having de-territorial 
identifi cations pose some challenges to the existing political-social models 
of society which re-activate an indigenous anti-migrant and anti-religious 
formulation of reaction to the new multiculturalism. Th e new communities 
brought into play the old-new hostilities and confl icts in the public sphere, 
especially in relation to religious ones. 
Some questions will arise on more than one occasion and will be answered in 
a variety of ways. What is the impact of social and economic transitions on the 
globalization processes, and on ethnic and religious identifi cations? What are 
the roles of transnational social movements in these macro-processes? What are 
the challenges for the classic ethno-religious identity debate? In our conclusion 
(chapter 12), which will also be our fi nal refl ection, we will pick up the idea that 
the ethnic-religious identifi cations are changing due to trans-border and glocal 
intersections, relating more broadly to the global.
Th e authors – sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and other 
social scientists – are from a variety of diff erent countries. Th is international 
and interdisciplinary background has nourished their refl ections, as the reader 
can plainly observe from the quality of the presentations. It also puts the editors 
and the authors for some challenges: what does an author in a precise discipline 
mean by words such as ethnic identifi cation; globalization, glocality and 
transnationalism; multiculturalism and being a post-migrant; the secular and 




For our defi nition of ethnic identifi cation we opt for an anthropological approach. 
Ethnic identifi cation will then always give some weight to a “subjective, symbolic 
or emblematic use… of any aspect of culture, in order to diff erentiate… from 
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other groups” (Brass 1991: 19). It will do so on the basis of “a feeling of continuity 
with the past, a feeling that is maintained as an essential part of one’s self-
defi nition” (De Vos 1975: 17). Doing this, it will provide “reservoirs for renewing 
humane values” (Fischer 1986: 176). It is not “the cultural stuff  that it encloses” 
that fundamentally determines the borders, but it is “the ethnic boundary that 
defi nes the group” (Barth 1969: 15); this boundary is primarily social in nature. 
Th is brings us once again to Leach (1954) and Barth (1969). Ethnicity is self-
ascribed and fl exible and is not imposed by others. Ethnicity, as a kind of self-
identifi cation, concerns the “categories of ascription and identifi cation by the 
actors themselves” (Brettell 2007:10). Boundaries are places of social interactions 
“that mark diff erence and shape identity” (Brettell 2007: 10-11). Very oft en ethnic 
processes use kinship terminology as a kind of glue in the group. While ethnicity 
may have become marketable (Comaroff  and Comaroff  2009), it has also 
become absorbed in religious median structures, namely in faith communities. 
Research shows that such religious communities very oft en have their origins and 
ethnic connotations in specifi c countries and shift  into religious, de-ethnicized 
movements once they leave their countries of origin (due to migrations) and 
become integrated in a more global context. Th e fi ndings in this book will show 
that this has become quite common in the European post-migrant landscape and 
in the West in general.
What is striking is the immigrants’ normal developing momentum, the rate at 
which they settle themselves, which is applied with respect to fi elds as diverse as 
the labour market, housing culture and existing regulations, and to the already 
existing cultural context in the country of destination. Schools ensure that 
their children and grandchildren will hasten this process further. An emotional 
attachment to the region of origin over several generations is maintained and 
reinforced in some cases, especially through their private culture, but also by 
religious structures. In other situations they create something new. Commitment 
to the country of origin as well as the creation of something new brings about the 
resulting loyalties, ethnic, supra-ethnic, meta-ethnic (Leman 1999). 
But even indigenous people, for whom ‘home’ – where their parents, grand-
parents and earlier generations have lived – is not a neutral space but full of 
aff ections, do not remain inactive. We may expect that some among them will 
use features that allow them to distinguish themselves from migrants and their 
latter generations. Th ey can rely on a long historiography that they, not without 
some arbitrariness, claim to occupy. For their ethnic compositions, the anti-
migrants will go in search of historical matrices and historical emblems in their 
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‘own home’ and of ‘cultural stuff ’ in the essentialized cultural past of the (mostly 
Islamic) migrants to convince themselves that multicultural cohabitation is 
impossible. 
 
Globalization, glocality and transnationalism
 
We are aware that the notions of ‘globalization’, ‘glocality’ and ‘transnationalism’ 
each in itself may cover a lot of slightly diff erent processes. Th ey require more 
precision when applied to very concrete situations. With the defi nitions that 
we will propose we want adequately to cover the clusters of realities which the 
authors will refer to in their chapters, though giving each notion a more precise 
content when needed. 
Globalization in our text is “what happens when the movement of people, 
goods, or ideas among countries and regions accelerates” (Coatsworth 2004). 
Th e “global society [is] a network society” (Castells 1996), with a “global 
interconnectedness, suggesting a world full of movement”, and in this sense it 
becomes a complex mixture of processes which oft en also produce confl icts, 
disjunctures and new forms of inequality (Carling 2006; Giddens 1999: 15-18). 
Th ere are economic factors at work, but at least so important are the social 
“contacts and linkages” (Xavier Inda and Rosaldo 2001:2). 
As some social scientists tell us about the diffi  culty of naming and describing 
the social locations of migrants, we prefer to use transnational and glocality as a 
response to globalization and mass media communication. When the global is the 
“macroscopic aspect of contemporary life,” glocalization becomes its “conjunction 
with the local, in the sense of the microscopic side of life” (Robertson 1993: 
173). But at the same time, “many immigrants today build social fi elds that cross 
geographic, cultural, and political borders” and “we defi ne ‘transnationalism’ 
as the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social 
relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch, Glick 
Schiller and Blanc Szanton 1994: 6). Researchers have studied transnational 
identity formation in economic, social, political and religious areas (see Basch, 
Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2002; Faist 2000; 
Fraser 2007; Vertovec 2003). 
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Multiculturalism and being a post-migrant 
 
We subscribe to Baumann’s point of view that “multiculturalism is not a 
patchwork of fi ve or ten fi xed cultural identities, but an elastic web of crosscutting 
and always mutually situational, identifi cations” (Baumann 1999: 118). But where 
migrants have a myth of return ideology this is no longer the case with most of 
the second generation, or with almost all of the third generation ‘migrants’ who 
are really no longer migrants (see, among many other authors, Ali and Holder 
2006). Nevertheless they continue for some generations to develop a relationship 
with the country of provenance of the fi rst generation that remains diff erent 
from the feelings of the classic tourist (Wagner 2008, 2011), and in the country 
where they are born they most of the time have also to struggle to be recognized 
by others no longer as migrants but as full citizens on an equal basis. Th at is why 
we call them ‘post-migrants’. In the case of the Polish Tartars (chapter 6), we 
will even speak of a post-‘post-migrant’ situation, since the relationship with a 
home country of provenance does not exist at all and fi nds support only in the 




“Th e shift  to secularity … consists, among other things, of a move from a society 
where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which 
it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest 
to embrace” (Taylor 2007: 3). Charles Taylor refers to mainline secularization 
theory as a point of view that “sees religion shrinking further and further” (2007: 
766). Rodney Stark sees fi ve arguments and/or characteristics among social 
scientists who support secularization theories: (1) modernization as a “causal 
engine dragging gods into retirement”, (2) a “primary concern with individual 
piety, especially belief ”, (3) “it is science that has the most deadly implications 
for religion”, (4) “once achieved (secularization) is irreversible”, (5) it is a global 
process, and it concerns not only Christianity (Stark 1999: 252-253). Stark 
however remarks that secularization theory “never was consistent with empirical 
reality” (Stark 1999: 249). Taylor also foresees “another future, based on another 
supposition” (2007: 768). He expects a double move: “[s]ome will want to move 
further ‘inward’, towards a more immanentist position … and some will fi nd the 
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present equilibrium confi ning, even stifl ing, and will want to move outward” 
(2007: 770). 
Habermas refl ects on this second move. Looking at European continental 
countries, he describes modern societies as ‘post-secular’, referring to a change 
in public-private consciousness (Habermas 2008). In his view, these changes 
come from three phenomena: the global confl icts that are presented as religious 
strife, the gaining of religious infl uence in national-international politics and the 
movement of people, specifi cally the immigration of people of faith.1 Th ese three 
phenomena transform the public secular consciousness which delegates religious 
identity to the private sphere. All European societies have faced this change of 
consciousness in the last two decades and they simultaneously remain diverse 
and plural societies; however, there is a slight change in the fact that we have 
more religiously pluralistic societies. In this plurality, the fl ow of people who keep 
their religious affi  liations, beliefs and identifi cations creates religious chains of 
memory (Hervieu-Léger 1996). Th e implication of newcomers’ religion, beliefs 
and their visibility is, according to Habermas, challenging the modus vivendi 
in continental Europe that exists between citizenship and cultural-particular 
diff erence which ought to take into consideration the observance of the plural 
identities in Europe. Th is modus vivendi has been drastically questioned, as 
we see in debates on multiculturalism in Europe, where secularism was highly 
determined during the 20th century by French ‘laïcité’, much more than has been 
the case in the Anglo-Saxon world.
Th is recasting of religious change in continental Europe requires more studies 
in the fi eld to show how traditional-modern-transnational religious loyalties and 
identifi cations are resurfacing. Th is indeed has an impact on secular continental 
Europe, referred to now as a post-secular. It is an important objective of this book 
to present empirical fi ndings and refl ections that may nourish the debate.
Redefi ned boundaries in post-migrant societies 
Th e fl ow of ideas and migrant people at the end of the 20th century and the 
beginning of the new millennium does not attenuate the role of existing borders. 
In his seminal work, Barth, whom we have already discussed, tried to show that 
the borders distinguish between two distinct things through ethnic-cultural 
markers such as dress, food, and language (Barth 1969: 14). Boundaries mark 
the limits of group awareness. Th e dispersal of people coming from the same 
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group (ethnic, religious or cultural) in such diversity invites us to examine in 
what way boundaries are fabricated and reformed. Th us, the locally constituted 
ethnic identity, aft er spreading out into new geographies, is dis-corporated 
from the existing/original identity. Immigration and mobility are giving rise 
to the possibility that individuals will exchange one identity for another, even 
though the boundary between two groups is maintained in terms of cultural 
diff erence. Crossing borders, real or imaginary, is part of a dis-corporation and 
displacement of the identity issue. Th e borders may be rigid or fl uid, but they are 
always changing, transforming and challenging the existence of fi xed identities. 
Th e variety of ethnic-religious communities poses some challenges, such as 
adaptation to new cultures, loyalty to the practices of parents.
A consciousness marked by dual or multiple loyalties and identifi cations 
may arise. Th e coexistence (specifi c or not) of several identities of the migrant 
communities maintains a new hybrid identity. As Cliff ord (1994) points out, 
these immigrant communities strengthen solidarity and connection among 
themselves. Th is connection makes a diff erence.
Th e intersection of religion, identity and ethnicity is a complex phenomenon 
and raises very important questions in public debate. Th ere is no accepted clear 
defi nition of the relationship between ethnicity and religion. In recent times, 
scholars have begun to pay more attention to the intersection of ethnicity and 
religion, particularly as a consequence of mass media, the use of the Internet, the 
use of communication, mass immigration and the fl ow of people. Th roughout 
this book, the reader will observe the diff erent ways of using symbols, narratives, 
networks and schemes which  emerged as clusters of ethnic-religious practices 
and discourses. In post-migrant societies a growing number of people defi ne 
themselves in terms of these multiple symbols and schemes of identity (Caglar 
1997: 169). Th ese clusters of practices and discourses defi ne ethnicity in terms of 
recognition. “What cognitive perspectives suggest in short, is that race, ethnicity, 
and nation are not entities in the world but ways of seeing the world” (Brubaker 
2004: 81). 
Th e ambiguity concerning a re-defi nition of identity through new discourses 
and practices becomes more puzzling when seen through the lens of trans-border 
identifi cation and transnationalism. In considering these multiplicities, three 
chapters (Dinç, Lum and Nimni) set out the challenges to the endurance of 
religious-ethnic identities. Th e relational construction of other social dimensions 
such as lifestyles, gender, festivities (Lum, Juchtmans) forces ethnic-religious 
identity into ongoing change and transformation. In our view it was very interesting 
johan leman, erkan toğuşlu and ismail mesut sezgin18
to insert a chapter on a non-Muslim community (Lum), so that the reader should 
be very aware that most of what is written about Muslim communities also 
remains valid for other, non-Muslim minorities of non-Christian provenance 
in Europe. Th e new communities, including the virtual ones, with particular 
reference to the religious and ethnic settlement in the new lands, are created 
thanks to globalization and the Internet (Leman 2009). Th ey are between states 
and borders, neither here nor there, but they are present and active in both. 
Glocal and transnational ethnic-religious identities
Aft er Vertovec, but also aft er other authors, the concepts of transnationality and 
glocality gripped social scientists’ attention for a while. Th is means indeed that 
it can be a part of the theoretical base to approach the changing characters of 
identities and structures, and of the everyday networks and practices emerging 
in daily life (Vertovec 2002). In these new networks, we leave migration behind 
to depict the problem of in-between situations in terms of transborder and post-
secular societies and communities. It should be noted that the appearance of 
transnational ethnic-religious identity is coming to terms with questions and 
problematics around mobility, multicultural hybridity, hyphenation (namely 
double ethnic identifi cation) (Caglar 1997), and other creative practices which 
are the keywords to explaining how being in a state of glocality throws objects, 
identities and ideas into fl ux (Mercer 2008). In post-migrant societies, this fl uidity 
is rehearsed, re-articulated and re-shaped along with ethnic-religious creativity.
A closer look at the study of this problematic religious identity in translocal and 
transborder cases shows some particular challenges in describing and formulating 
the new boundaries of identifi cation. Firstly, we have the non-fi xed elements of 
religious life and the dynamic shared meanings, symbols and attachments used in 
diff erent ways by religious people and religion itself in non-bounded and framed 
situations. Many features of religious life ar e implicitly lived and hard to defi ne 
as public expressions (Levitt 2001). “Th ey are deeply felt but oft en diffi  cult to 
express,” says Levitt to describe this fi rst challenge of the transnational religious 
identity. Some public expressions and visible patterns of religion in public space 
do not explain religious feeling as an identity or an ideology. Th us, framing a 
religious identity in a given space and time is (a thin) problematic, not just about 
an expression (Hetherington 1998). 
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Th e second challenge comes from the mobility of people and issues relating 
to migration. It is manifested as a question of maintaining the adaptation and of 
the sustainability of this form of identity in new circumstances. Th e process of 
adaptation is crucial and a considerable research question in transnational religious 
identity (Vertovec 2002). Here attention to a religious change and transformation 
has gained signifi cance among migrant Muslim communities in Europe (Cesari 
Figure 1 - Religious Composition of Immigrants in the European Union
*Population estimates are rounded to ten thousands. Percentages are 
calculated from unrounded numbers and may not add to 100 due to rounding.
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2007). Host-home country relations aff ect and change the religious identity 
of religious communities (Helicke 2002). Migration and mobility generate 
alternative places and patterns of identifi cation, so that religious identities and 
symbols are reshaped across national borders. Transnational religious identity 
however is not post-national and it does not make us deny the nation-state. But 
the host-home country incorporations give more impetus to this new spectrum 
of religious identifi cations. Th e identifi cation issue is reinforced by the search 
for an authentic experience among young migrants in their new lands in Europe. 
Post-secular Europe, immigration and religious identity
Th e new arrivals recast religious identity and secular space in Europe. Immigration 
still continues, and as reports show, in the future for example people who 
identify with the Christian tradition are likely to continue to move and arrive in 
Europe in larger numbers. Th is means that the traditional religious identity may 
reappear. It is also useful here to consider the ways in which religious identity in 
Europe has been transformed due to the arrival of immigrants since the 1960s. 
Th e new immigrants and their descendants (second and third generation) diff er 
both from the native population and the host societies in terms of their religious 
practices. By the way, it is also interesting to note that according to the fi ndings 
of the report by the Pew forum on Religion and Public life, Europe has more 
Christian than Muslim immigrants. Th e report states that the United States is 
the primary destination for Christian and Buddhist migrants (Pew Report 2010). 
Th e report also identifi es most Christian immigrants living in Germany and Italy 
as coming from other European countries. A similar picture is also valid for the 
United Kingdom, whereas in Spain it was found that there was a large Christian 
migrant population from Latin America (Pew Report 2010: 28).
Religious identity is relied upon in order to maintain ethnic boundaries 
and culture among immigrant communities in Europe. With this in mind, the 
major themes that were explored by researchers were the fl ow of people in post-
migrant societies who were concerned with adaptation, adjustment, negotiation, 
diff erentiation and institutionalization (congregational form) of identities. 
Warner identifi es these four types of themes involving religious identity among 
the immigrant communities (Warner 1998). According to other research 
(Young and Ebaugh 2001), there are other themes in the recurrent studies on 
the nexus between immigration and religion. Th e fi rst is the reformulation 
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of religious identity that is reshaped by returning to theological foundation 
sources. Th e second, as pointed out by these scholars, the claim for a more open 
and universalist discourse rather than an exclusivist one, is really grounded in 
the immigrant activities. In some cases, there is a move from the purely ethnic 
institutionalization of religious identity to more cosmopolitan inter-ethnic 
religious gatherings. But mostly the immigrant communities transplant and 
settle their religious heritage and baggage in their new lands to continue and 
foster their transnational links with creating new spaces (Metcalf 1996), living 
in their ethnic enclaves. For these new-comers in the host land, their religion is a 
central site to remember, to rehearse the connection with the cultural-historical 
past, meaning that it is an important source of social capital.
As a consequence, nowadays, the ‘pre-existing’ secular character of the public 
sphere that emphasizes secular citizenship in the public realm is questioned on 
the one hand, with the overlapping of the ethnic-national and religious identity 
and the new transborder ones, while the religious identifi cation is maintained 
‘as it was before’ in political debates and discourses in the migrant countries in 
Europe. In many European countries, on the other hand, referring to religious 
heritage, signs and symbols of religion in the public domain (for example the 
crucifi x in Italian public schools, public holidays, reference to Judeo-Christian 
principles) remains a question of identity which reveals the functional roles of 
cultural norms and traditions (Casanova 1994; Göle 2011). 
Rethinking multiculturalism: will it be post-secular 
and borderless?
It is commonly assumed that public life is plural and basically secular in Europe. 
Multicultural policies have been used to manage cultural-religious diversity 
in the public sphere. At the same time, there has been rising doubt about 
multiculturalism; more recently its ‘death’ has been celebrated in most political 
speeches.2 Th ese kinds of discourses question the concept of multiculturalism. 
Th e rhetoric against multicultural policy in Europe is largely shared by politicians 
and by public opinion (Kymlicka 2012; Prins and Slijper 2002). Arguably, 
multiculturalism is in perpetual crisis. Th e backlash from multicultural policy 
has been analysed in recent studies ( Jopke 2004; Vertovec and Wessendorf 
2010). Nevertheless, the crucial question is formulated as what kind of pluralism 
and diversity is possible and manageable. During the 1990s a number of scholars 
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made such philosophical and political contributions on multiculturalism 
(Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1994; Werbner and Modood 1997).
Th ere are many forms of ethnic-religious and cultural pluralism, and according 
to diff erent understandings many states develop political models to manage 
cultural and political diversity from assimilation to separatism (Vertovec and 
Wessendorf 2010: 3-4). Grillo argues that in post-industrial societies three modes 
of pluralism have emerged: multicultural pluralism, institutional pluralism and 
hybridity (Grillo 1998: 189). Th ese policies and forms oscillate between two 
main arguments: proponents of homogeneous, monocultural societies and the 
heterogeneous, plural model of societies (Goldberg 1998: 20). Th e argument 
against multicultural society resides in the logic of the necessary requirement 
to form a community, a society. Th e idea of homogeneity is based on two logics. 
First, homogeneity is a natural condition, exemplifi ed by a socio-biological 
claim. Secondly, historically people fi nd and select their category according to 
their tradition, customs, history and past. Homogeneity serves this continuity 
of a historical past and identity (Goldberg 1998: 21). A homogeneous society 
and culture provide tools and means to preserve the virtues and values of the 
society and the group. To maintain cultural boundaries it is essential to maintain 
and refer to common values that have been historically transmitted. Th e reaction 
observed against migrant people who change and transform the character of 
public life, its values and symbols refl ects a popular attitude in Europe today. Th e 
questions in the multiculturalism debates embody concern about identity issues 
and their visibility in the public sphere (Farrar, Robinson and Sener 2012; Garner 
and Kavak 2012). Exploring the multiculturalism debates in Europe permits us 
to see in what way transnational and transcultural identities will be formulated. 
Multiculturalism is marked by the post-secular notion of public space. In this 
sense the rise of multiculturalism as a political ideal and liberal theory seeks to 
provide public recognition and support for the accommodation of non-dominant 
groups, to protect and empower ethnocultural groups (Kymlicka 2001). In the 
meantime the multiculturalism question has shift ed from cultural-political 
peculiarities to freedom of speech, equality, democracy and state neutrality 
which centres on language and indigenous people. Th e multicultural society 
settles a balance between minority and majority ethnic-religious groups to aff ord 
rights to newcomers, migrant communities, and minority religious groups. It 
is important to acknowledge an immediate problem of the pendulum motion 
of multiculturalism: republican multiculturalism is blind to religious diversity 
and religious presence in the public realm. In this vein, the focus on neutrality, 
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freedom of speech, equality, including the rights of the minority ethnocultural 
groups, seems to us to reveal a certain secularist blindness and bias. Hence, the 
public sphere’s neutrality does not extend to religion. Modood objects against 
such non-recognition of religion in the public area (Modood 2007: 26). For him, 
it is impossible to defend the argument that the multicultural state model cannot 
be implemented in relation to religious groups (Modood 2007: 30). 
We argue that the public sphere should be adapted, where needed and where 
it may be positively embedded in view of a realistic and positive pluralism, to 
provide greater access to and circulation of religious identities, rights and 
claims. In schools and other public institutions, in order to respect non-ethno-
centric neutrality, one should take religious diversity into consideration and 
accommodate religious holidays, dress, and dietary-ritual restrictions without 
creating parallel societies and communities. We need a reformulation of multi-
culturalism which does not have an anti-religious secularist bias and is open to 
intercultural dialogue that brings diff erences together. It is important to note 
the idea of diff erence which “has to be considered in terms of how the negative 
element, the stigmatic diff erentiating from others, can be undone by bringing 
to bear upon it an extended concept of equality and a sense of belonging with 
others” (Modood 2007: 36). Th e defence of diff erence is linked with the question 
whether multiculturalism has its limits. 
For the opponent who also defends the limits, multicultural policies generate 
home-grown terrorism, creating space for religious fanatics, and they threaten 
the nation’s harmony and identity. Th e security oriented discourses and critics 
developed by far-right wing parties oppose to the themes of integration. Also, 
some national movements and parties have oft en initially argued that such forms 
of recognition of diff erence are divisive of social harmony. However, the following 
chapters enable us to identify the distinctness of a religious-ethnic group as a 
feature of society just as the status of class and gender. Th e contemporary post-
immigrant and post-secular formation of identities in western societies can be 
better understood in terms of hybridity and multiple identifi cations. Even such 
identities are usually expressed in self-designated hyphenations such as German-
Turkish Muslims, Polish Tartars. Th is indeed will be one of the themes of this 
book and will be developed in three chapters (Lum, Dinç, Warminska).
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Content of the book
Th is book is divided into two parts. In the fi rst part, post-migrant interactions/ 
identifi cations and a range of the wider issues that are associated with identity 
questions are explored. Th e second part is entitled non-migrant, and anti-Islam 
interactions and identifi cations, and this part looks at the specifi c issues of non-
migrant and anti-Islam settlement and organizations. 
Part one comprises fi ve chapters. In the fi rst, Dinç analyses the articulation 
of Islamic identities with wider society. Th e interpenetration of Islam within 
the European public sphere brings to the surface new debates on secularity, 
the sacred and intimacy. A sense of Islamic individuality appears which loses 
its traditional links and patterns and can be described as a transnational Islam 
which transgresses borders. In this process of individual choice of Muslims in 
Europe, Islam becomes one of the markers and aspects of the Muslim identity. 
Dinç describes a realization of hybrid identical patterns of Muslim youth in 
Germany that also demonstrate the diff erences with their parents representing a 
traditional Islamic identity. Dinç argues that experiencing this distance from their 
social and ethnic origins or an emotional engagement with their ethnic-cultural 
background accelerates a religious pluralism anchored in democratic plural 
German society. Th e transnationalization of an Islamic sense of identifying with 
such a network, organization and movement engenders the de-territorialization 
of Islam from the home country, on the one hand, and a strong connection and 
ties with their ethnic-national culture on the other hand. Th is chapter presents 
the neo-fundamentalist, the religious ethical exclusivist, the neo-Muslim and fi nally 
the classic associational identity as ideal-types of identity of devout post-migrant 
Muslims.
Juchtmans explores how Turkish children from an Islamic background 
compromise between home (a Muslim environment) and school (non-Muslim 
culture) in Flanders, Belgium. Muslim children interact at school with diff erent 
people, who are increasingly made up of diverse populations, where they adopt 
acculturation attitudes that can be distinguished as problematic (anomaly) and 
non-problematic. School is perceived as a place of domination where a common 
non-denominational or Catholic identity is off ered to the students through 
secular-religious rituals (such as “Santa Claus”, Christmas, Mother’s Day and 
Father’s Day, carnival, etc.) inscribed in a Flemish heritage and culture. Mostly, 
the children participate in these festivities and adopt positive attitudes between 
home and school. Th e position of Muslim children in relation to school is 
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complex and cannot be directly compromised and accommodated. Th e chapter 
indicates that being Muslim children in home-school raises particular challenges 
in recognizing religious diversity and acceptance of secular norms and values in 
school. Multiculturalism becomes a way of being.
A third chapter deals with theoretical issues on immigrant salient identities in 
Europe to make some comparisons. Meciar’s chapter deals with two interconnected 
topics - the identity of an immigrant and the process of adaptation. First, the 
author briefl y introduces some shift s in theorizing identity (with the focus on 
immigrant identity) that were caused by the narrative turn in social sciences, and 
presents a discussion on acculturation and the adaptation process. Secondly, an 
analysis of adaptation diffi  culties is further introduced via the real-life stories of 
immigrants from 8 countries of the European Union. Th e analysis follows several 
frameworks of adaptation diffi  culties from the immigrant’s subjective point of 
view: legal and social status, the labour market and work permits, the recognition 
of qualifi cations, the education and learning culture, housing, interpersonal 
confl icts, stereotypes and misunderstandings. Th irdly, the chapter attempts to 
outline how the adaptation issues (both, successes and diffi  culties) infl uence the 
formation of an immigrant identity. 
What is developed in the three fi rst chapters about Muslims is not just a 
Muslim issue. Th at is why we wanted to integrate here in this place in the book 
Lum’s chapter on Dalit Indian youth. Lum’s contribution includes elements on 
negotiating intra-ethnic and intra-religious identity which is problematic, as 
is shown in an example of the Ravidassia, considered among the lowest of the 
low in the regional caste of the Punjab. Lum’s chapter affi  rms that mobility and 
immigration present challenges to the endurance of casticism among Ravidassia 
in Spain. Within the migrant community among the second generation of 
Ravidassia, the youth try to manage multiple identities, ethnic-religious and 
caste-like ones. Religious practice urges them towards ambiguous religious-
ethnic identifi cation processes identifi ed by Ravidassia as pride, intercaste mixing 
and being in Spain. Th rough daily life and music, the youth claim a new language 
about their caste system. Consequently, the Ravidassia youth negotiate their 
ethnic-religious minority identity with public infl uences in Spain. When the 
caste system is diluted via interaction with Spanish natives, the cultural juggling 
creates zones where multiple identities start to emerge. Th ese zones lead to more 
open, tolerant citizens and plural societies.
But to what kind of plural European society will these migrations bring us 
in the longer term? A possible result of all these dynamics may already be seen, 
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perhaps, in the case of the Polish Tartars, a small ethnic community living in 
Poland. Katarzyna Warminska describes a façade of multiple identities and of 
pluralistic society in which Tartars enjoy having bi-cultural identities oscillating 
between Tartar Polish ethnic identity and Tartar Muslim loyalty. Being Muslim, 
Tartar and Polish at the same time is challenging for this small group in the sense 
of cultural and religious otherness in relation to Polish society. Th is otherness 
conceived in a positive manner creates a cultural, symbolic and social capital 
to Polish Tartars to affi  rm their distinction from Polish natives. Warminska 
points out that they address the past and history to recast the Tartar identity in 
Poland for the preservation of group awareness. Having multiple identities is not 
mutually exclusive; rather it strengthens their loyalty to the host society through 
remembrance of the past.
Th e second part, non-migrant interactions/identifi cations,  again has fi ve 
chapters and starts with Legrand’s contribution. Moving from Germany, Belgium 
and Poland (in the fi rst Part) to Europe in general, within it also Austria and 
the Scandinavian countries, his chapter analyses Muslim visibility and European 
anxiety about the ‘growing number of Muslims’ in two ways. In the fi rst part, he 
presents ‘anti-Islamization of Europe’ activism, including actors and events. In 
the second part, he explores the dialogue-counter dialogue process around some 
institutions and organizations to look at cultural-religious diversity and plural 
identity with Muslims in secular-Christian Europe.
In the next chapter, Harry, who focuses on Norway, also calls attention to 
the rise of nationalist movements and parties, scrutinizing the interaction 
between nationalism, religion and politics against multicultural politics. 
Th e socio-political analysis of Anders Behring Breivik’s attacks expresses this 
opposition to multiculturalism, a hate of diversity and defending a vision of a 
Christian European community. Harry argues that the resurgence of religion 
in far-right politics is not an expression of old-fashioned traditionalist views 
but rather a contemporary refl ection of the role(s) of religious identities. In 
this context, it is not a question of the manipulation of religion by far-right 
parties. It is  the symbolic and cultural role of religion that is a serious part of 
a Norwegian historical memory that today shapes a political opposition to 
diversity policies. Upon close inspection of patterns of secularism in Norway, 
Harry argues that aft er Muslims became a target in integration debates, the 
discourse of far-right parties shift ed from a secular to a religious one. Th e 
reference to Christianity as a marker of identity works as a set of memorization 
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and essentialization. In both processes, individuals are disaffi  liated from the 
pluralistic sense of society. 
In the next chapter, Murat Sevencan opens a debate on the current transfer of 
national sovereignty to supra-national identities which generate a nationalistic 
discourse and policies. In order to map the contours of contemporary political 
transformation of European identity within the context of national identity, 
this chapter revisits and refl ects on the transfer of sovereignty in Europe. For 
Sevencan, the notion of multiple identities, which is not just a normative 
assertion but also an empirical claim, is divided into six categories of identities 
built from four levels of identifi cation. 
In the last two chapters in this second part, Allen’s and Nimni’s, the authors 
challenge some restrictive interpretation of liberal secularism in Europe. Nimni 
details how religious minority groups organize within their religious-ethnic 
groups to establish a voice through religious courts. Th e Muslim sharia courts 
and the Jewish Beth Din are considered a space in which to denote autonomy and 
self-participation in the public sphere. Th e chapter exposes the relative autonomy 
of religious marriages in a secular area to discuss religions’ role in secular policies 
and legal pluralism in the UK. However, as also the former chapters show, some 
challenges are surely justifi ed, but it does not mean that we want to go too far in 
the plea for more openness. More openness, yes, but in a reasonable way.
Th e last chapter by Chris Allen tries to understand the crisis of multiculturalism 
in Britain following recent debates on terrorism, security, integration and social 
cohesion. He remarks that the London terrorist attacks of 7/7 have catalysed the 
‘death of multiculturalism’. He underlines that most of the debates circulating 
about Muslim integration and the crisis of multiculturalism have become 
synonymous with Islamophobia. He defi nes two categorical stances of anti-
Muslim, anti-Islam ideologies that are in existence. Th e fi rst emerged from the 
far-right organizations. It is well structured and more explicit. Th e second is 
more implicit and non-structural. Th is rhetoric has more informal settings and 
networks that are behind this anti-Islamic discourse that is nourished mostly by 
secular liberal thinking and ideology. 
Our conclusion will refl ect on the fi ndings of the previous chapters and the 
refl ections of the various participants in this debate. 
Finally, we want also to mention the input from the two reviewers of our 
publication. We cannot say that these refl ections and this book are their work, 
but they certainly formulated very helpful suggestions that improved the quality 
of it.
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Notes
1 See more what Habermas says on post-secular society: Habermas, J. Notes on a post-secular 
society, http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html accesdate 10/03/2013.
2 In 2008, the British PM said “Multiculturalism had dangerously undermined Britain’s 
sense of identity and brought about cultural apartheid”. In 2010, the German chancellor 
claimed that the multicultural model of society had failed and the idea of people coming 
from diff erent background living together side by side did not work (Th e Guardian, 
17 October 2010).
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New and Old Identity Patterns 
of Religious Young Muslims in Germany
Cüneyd Dinç
Th e purpose of this chapter is to develop a descriptive typology of various identity 
patterns of young devout post-migrant Muslims in Germany by reviewing the 
literature about Islam in Germany and evaluating the self-description of various 
religious groups. It is assumed that, fi rst, the emotional relationship between 
devout post-migrants and the societies of their (grand)parents and, second, their 
rejection/acceptance of German society and therefore their readiness/refusal 
to struggle for the recognition of their religious diff erence in Germany shape 
these identity patterns. Th e diverging characteristics of these two dimensions 
establish four distinct identity patterns. Two of them – classical associational and 
religious-ethnic/exclusionist identity – are classical forms of identity, whereas the 
other two – Neo-Muslims and Neo-Fundamentalists – are new developments. 
Th ese four identity patterns dominate the self-identity of young devout post-
migrants. Th ereby we can observe that newer identity patterns diff er from 
classical ones fi rst in the change of the loci of identity constitution. Th e classical 
mosque association has assigned this role to more informal associations, with the 
internet as a main source of identity constitution. In addition, the new identity 
patterns are infl uenced by global trends in the Islamic world and local agendas. 
On the other hand, classical identity patterns are infl uenced by the agendas of 
the societies of the parental generation. 
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Introduction
Th e last decade has changed the relationship between Islam and German society. 
Muslims in Germany have abandoned their former invisible backyard praying 
rooms. Representatives of Islamic interest organizations have started to negotiate 
with German authorities about Islam’s political and legal accommodation, 
including topics like Islamic education, halal meat, the role of the headscarf, 
the construction of Mosques, etc. (Rosenberger and Sauer 2008). In other 
words, Islam has become more and more visible in German public life. Th is 
‘interpenetration’ (Göle 2005) of Islam with European and especially German 
society within the frame of a new post-secular society (Habermas 2008) has 
unleashed public discussions about German identity in relation to Islam and 
Muslims in Germany. Is Islam part of Germany? How much of Islam – as a source 
and symbol of ‘Otherness’ – can German society tolerate (Dolelzal, Helbling and 
Hutter 2010)? 
On the other hand, these public discussions also forced Muslims in Germany 
to re-evaluate their relationship with German society and their own identity in 
that country. Th e third generation of post-migrant young migrants especially 
have never shared the migration experience of their parents and are now forced 
to decide who they are (Mushaben 2008a, 2008b). 
Moreover, Islam in the European diaspora has also changed, losing its ties to the 
traditional structures and authorities, which had the monopoly of interpreting 
the religious scriptures. Th is disembeddedness of Islam has developed new forms 
of Islamic religiosity as a matter of personal choice and individualization (Göle 
2006: 126). Th us, new forms of Islamic understandings and interpretations 
have emerged, forcing devout post-migrant Muslims to choose one of these and 
combine it with their ethnic or German identity (Nordbuch 2010). 
Th e modest purpose of this chapter is to describe emerging signifi cant new 
identity patterns of these young devout post-migrant Muslims in Germany by 
developing a typology of ideal-typical and signifi cant identity patterns, through 
reviewing and re-evaluating the academic literature about Muslims in Germany. 
It is assumed that this typology can be constituted along two dimensions: 
(1) the emotional relationship of these young Muslims with the home countries 
of their ancestors and (2) their readiness to struggle for the recognition of their 
religious diff erence in Germany. Moreover, these two dimensions result in a 2*2 
matrix, with four ideal types, which in turn are manifestations of major options 
for post-migrant identity construction. Th ough these four identity options are 
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not the only identity patterns of devout migrants, it is believed that they are 
the dominant ones within a hybrid identity assemblage of German, Islam and 
Ethnic identities (Foroutan and Schafer 2009). Th erefore, these four ideal types 
of identity provide us with valuable information about the emergence of new 
identity patterns of Islamic youth in Germany, and how many global and local 
trends have an infl uence on identity constitution. 
Considering these points, this chapter consists of two sections. Th e fi rst discusses 
the conceptual and theoretical preliminaries, while the second presents the ideal-
typical identity patterns on the basis of the considerations of the fi rst section. 
Th e public visibility of Islam and the search by young 
post-migrants for identity
Th e relationship between Islam and non-Islam (as the religion of the Others in 
Europe as well as in Germany) is characterized by the fact that Islam becomes 
visible by claiming, expressing and performing its religiosity in the European 
public space, which in turn challenges European secular modernity. Th is in turn 
results in the re-evaluation of both German and Muslim identities. European and 
German societies are forced to ask how far they can absorb and integrate a foreign 
religion and culture without destroying the foundations of Western existence. 
On the other hand Muslims in Europe and Germany are asking themselves how 
they can live their devout lives in a non-Islamic environment. In addition, they 
are also forced to decide who they are. Are they Muslims, Germans or Turks, 
Bosnians, Albanians, etc. or all these?
Young third generation Muslims are in a diffi  cult position. As post-migrants 
they lack the migration experience of their parents and any real physical 
relationship with the societies of their ancestors (Mushaben 2008a: 509; 
Foroutan 2010: 11). Moreover, post-migrant Muslims aged between 15 and 29 
have experienced diff erent forms of disintegration. First, they are disintegrated 
on a socio-economic level, i.e. they lack access to educational and occupational 
opportunities. Second, on a personal level the society in which they live forces 
them to deal daily with their own identity. German society compels them to 
decide whether they are loyal to German society or to the original culture of their 
(grand-) parents (Foroutan and Schäfer 2009: 12-13). Th us, while post-migrant 
Muslims do not know any other life than that in Germany they realize that they 
are not really part of German society.
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In addition, religion plays a very important role in the lives of these young 
post-migrants. According to the Bertelsmann Religion monitor 41 per cent of 
Muslims regard themselves as highly religious, compared with 18 per cent of 
Germans (Bertelsmann 2008: 13). Comparing the various Muslim generation one 
can assume an intergenerational stability of religious values, i.e. young Muslims 
are as religious as their parental generation (Diehl and Koenig 2009). So it is no 
wonder that especially devout post-migrant Muslims are particularly aff ected by 
the public discussions about Islam’s role in Germany. 
Finally, these young Muslims do not live in the same religious cultural 
environment as their parental generation. Research on Muslims in Europe 
demonstrates that religious identity is still for them a focal reference point for 
identity and political engagement  (Bouzar 2001; Jacobsen 1997; Mushaben 
2008a). However, third generation Muslims have a stronger personal commit-
ment to personal piety as a matter of personal choice, and hence do not share 
the traditions and concepts with which their parents grew up (Gale 2009; 
Mushaben 2008a; Nordbruch 2010; O’Toole and Th ileman 2008). Hence, Islam 
shares with other religions in Europe the experience of disembededness, which 
results in a democratic opening of the interpretation of religious texts to the 
public at large (Khosrokhavar 1997; Roy 2004; Salvatore 2004; Tietze 2001b). 
Islam is constructed, reinterpreted and carried into public life through political 
agency and cultural movements, not through religious institutions. Islam in 
this European socio-religious environment becomes a kind of social imaginary 
through which Muslims construct their belonging to Islam (Göle 2006: 124-126). 
Religious pluralism in Germany and Europe has transformed Islam into a multi-
option identity device.
Th e combination of socio-cultural disintegration experiences and the public 
discourses about the role of Islam in Germany forces young devout Muslims, 
who express their “Otherness” in public more than others, to evaluate their 
relationship with German society and to develop a new identity as Muslim within 
German society. Two important factors have an infl uence on this new identity 
constitution. First of all, the aforementioned heterogenetic, de-traditionalized 
and de-territorialized nature of Islam in Europe provides diff erent identity 
options for these young Muslims. Th ese can include a more radical option 
whereby the young Muslim decides to retire from public life and to associate 
himself with radical Islamic groups, like the Salafi st movement. In contrast, 
the same young Muslim can decide to fi ght for his right as a German Muslim 
to be diff erent within the legal framework of citizenship (Schiff auer 2007: 83). 
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Finally, he can focus his identity on an imaginary picture of the culture and 
tradition of his origins but still be more or less involved in German society 
(Allievi 2005; Foroutan and Schäfer 2009; Mandaville 2009; Roy 2004).
Second, it can be assumed that identity constitution does not happen in an 
isolated environment, but is a product of socialization within organizations. For 
many religious Muslims mosque associations and cultural centres are places where 
cultural identity as a Muslim and also ethnic identity are constituted, shaped 
and lived (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007; Frese 2002; Meng 2004; Şen and Sauer 
2006). For instance, Şen and Sauer (2006) assume that 23% of all Muslims in 
Germany are members of such an organization. On the other hand both authors 
demonstrate that over 40% of Muslims visiting the mosque are not members of 
those mosque associations. 
Since the events of 9/11 research about Muslims has also increased in German 
social sciences.1 While in the beginning security related questions about the 
relationship between Islam and terrorism dominated the research, this was 
supplemented in the second half of the fi rst decade of this century by a research 
about diff erent areas of Islam and Muslims, like Islamic organizations and their 
members (Meng 2004; Schiff auer 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Tietze 2001a), on 
religiosity, religious praxis and the importance of religion in the everyday life of 
Muslims, especially on diverse sub populations like young Muslims (Heckmann 
et al. 2000; Heitmeyer, Müller and Schröder 1997; Worbs and Heckmann 2003), 
young Muslim women (Boos-Nünning and Karakasoglu 2005a, 2005b, 2006; 
Karakasoglu-Aydin 2000; Nökel 2002) or young Muslim men (Frese 2002). In 
addition, this qualitative research was supplemented by some quantitative studies 
about life worlds of Muslims in Germany, undertaken by public and private 
bodies (Albert 2010; Bertelsmann 2008; Brettfeld and Wetzfeld 2007; Goldberg 
and Sauer 2003, 2004; Haug et al. 2009; Şen and Sauer 2006; Wipermann and 
Flaig 2009).
On the other hand, some social scientists like Kiefer (2010) or von Wensierski 
and Lübcke (2006, 2010) undertaking research about Muslims in Germany 
with a more descriptive focus have started trying to categorize the various 
manifestations of Muslim life and identity in Germany by developing typologies. 
For instance Michael Kiefer developed a category where he diff erentiated 
between (1) non-religious young Muslims, (2) fundamental, i.e. very strongly 
oriented on religious traditional norms, (3) nationalistic – Islamic, and fi nally 
(4) activist-islamistic identity patterns. Focusing on various interviews with 
young Muslims about their lives, von Wensierski and Lübcke discovered (1) an 
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Islamic biography, with a focus on the Islamic religious lifestyle, (2) a secular and 
non-religious biography, (3) a pragmatic Muslim biography, with a strong focus 
on tradition, (4) a subcultural Muslim biography, focusing on a more hedonistic 
artistic lifestyle, and fi nally (5) a criminal Muslim biography, characterized by 
strong disintegration and criminal experiences.
While these descriptive categorization attempts are important in order to 
present a more detailed picture of young Muslims, the eff orts to categorize 
all young Muslims by using one single typology has some fl aws. First of all, 
the disintegration experiences between religious or devout and non-religious 
young Muslims are not the same. For example, non-religious Muslims, not 
demonstrating their religiosity – their ‘Otherness’ – in public, are not confronted 
with forms of exclusion by public discourses about the role of Islam in Germany. 
Second, the identities of young Muslims are diverse. A single categorization of 
devout Muslims in only Islamic or traditional categories is not able to display 
these variations. Finally, religious identity patterns are not static, but fl uid. Th eir 
constitution is infl uenced not only by local, but also by global trends and social 
movements like Pop Islam or the Muslim Brotherhood (Gerlach 2006). 
Considering all these points a stronger focus on identity patterns of only 
devout religious post-migrant Muslims will be more fruitful and valuable for 
academic research. Th ree points must thus be taken into consideration. First, 
such a categorization of identity patterns of young devout Muslims must refl ect 
the heterogeneity of various Islamic religious ways of life in Germany. Second, it 
must also consider the various identity options for them, which are in turn forms 
of self-refl ection towards two important points: (1) their own mental relationship 
with German society and (2) their religious and ethnic background. Finally, 
it must be realized that Islamic religious identity is shaped by the existence of 
religious organizations in Germany, i.e. people constitute and share their identity 
in relation and day to day interaction with similar people. 
Taking these three points into consideration, this chapter will develop a typology 
of young Muslim identity patterns. Th erefore, the article fi rst will re-evaluate and 
review the aforementioned existing and fragmented academic literature about 
young Muslims in Germany. Th e focus of this secondary analysis is on the (self-) 
description of young Muslims’ identity. Th e results of this secondary analysis are 
used to construct a typology which integrates all these separate descriptions of 
young Muslims in general, and Muslim subgroups in particular, into a broader 
descriptive framework, i.e. the typology of identity patterns. In this vein, 
this typology is developed round two dimensions. Th e fi rst asks how much 
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young Muslims connect their own Islamic identity with the culture or ethnic 
background of their parents. We can assume that this can have two forms: fi rst, 
the religious identity of young devout Muslims can be territorialized, i.e. their 
religious identity is connected with the ethnic or traditional background of their 
parents. Th ese people are living and constituting their identity within a distinct 
transnational space, where the locus of activity is the traditional mosque. Identity 
and socio-political activities are focused on agendas, institutions, organizations, 
etc. which transcend national borders and lie outside Germany (Bowen 2004; 
Mandaville 2007, 2009). In the majority of cases, answers to religious questions, 
religious agendas and targets are formulated outside Germany. One example 
is the national ethnic mosque associations in Germany, like DİTİB, VIKZ, 
IGMG. Muslims and especially young Muslim people who are active in these 
organizations formulate their identity within these structures and have a strong 
connection to the agendas of the parental organization abroad. 
Second, the religious identities of young devout Muslims can be 
de-territorialized, i.e. their religious identity can be totally cut off  from the 
traditional and ethnical background of their parents and grandparents. Th ese 
people are living in a more trans-local space of identity constituting, i.e. they 
share similar ideas about Islam and follow trends in the Islamic world, but act 
more according to local issues (Gerlach 2006: 11; Mushaben 2008a: 513). Th ey 
develop their own agendas which deal with their own situation in Germany 
as post-migrants, whether in a more radical or in a more moderate way. What 
is important is that these Muslims focus more on the idea of Muslim identity 
than on ethnic identity. Th ey are Muslims in Germany and not just Turkish, 
Albanian, Arab Muslims in Germany. In many cases they are not active members 
of traditional Mosque organizations, but establish new forms of organizations, 
less hierarchical and open to all Muslims. Th e internet plays a very important 
role as a virtual sphere for information seeking, where they can gather and discuss 
with like-minded people (Mushaben 2008a: 516).
Th e second dimension of the typology asks about the readiness of young 
Muslims to struggle for the recognition of Muslims within German society. 
Devout Muslims can opt to struggle for the right to be diff erent, believing that 
their future is in Germany and no longer in the traditional society of their parents. 
For them Islam must become an accepted way of life in Germany (Schiff auer 
2007: 16). As Muslim citizens in Germany these young men and women try to 
fi nd a dialogue with other non-Muslim groups and try to explain their way of 
life to them. For instance, the ‘Open Mosque Day’ on which traditional mosque 
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associations open their doors to the public is such way of building trust among 
non-Muslims.
Contrary to this option young Muslims can decide to reject such struggle for 
recognition. Th ey can believe that the non-Muslim majority will never accept 
their way of life, and decide to retreat from German public life, regarding 
German society as wicked and corrupt. Th us, they will start to create their own 
living space, where they are safe from the ‘infi dels’ and ‘temptations’ outside their 
world, living their own understanding of Islam (Nordbruch 2010: 37). 
A typology of identity patterns of young devout Muslims 
in Germany
Th e aforementioned theoretical and conceptual preliminaries in the second 
section are the basis for constructing a typology of signifi cant ideal-typical 
identity patterns of young devout Muslims in Germany. In this perspective, the 
chapter assumes that these identity patterns represent signifi cant options of 
identity construction of devout post-migrant Muslims, who evaluate their own 
identity within the context of public discourses in Germany about the role of 
Islam. Figure 1 presents this typology in a 2*2 matrix constituted round the two 
dimensions of the territoriality/de-territoriality of Islam versus the acceptance/
rejection of German society. 
Th e fi rst identity pattern is the neo-fundamentalist identity, which is organized 
within the Salafi  movement or older organizations like Cemat ul Tebliğ (Roy 
2004: 232). Th e major characteristics of this identity pattern are that they declare 
the western way of life to be decadent and corrupt and therefore try to protect 
themselves from its infl uence. Moreover, they also consciously demonstrate 
their Otherness by following a radical interpretation of Islamic rules, like strict 
diet rules, dress codes, and strict gender segregation. In addition, they will 
isolate themselves from other Muslims, accusing them of being corrupted by 
the western way of life. For them, the Islamıc Umma is the best of all worlds 
(Nordbruch 2012: 46). Th us, most young Muslims identifying themselves as 
Neo-Fundamentalists gather together with like-minded peers and live in an 
isolated parallel society (Abou-Taam 2012). Due to the fact that these groups 
have very few separate mosques in Germany, the locus of identity constitution 
is the internet. Here distinct websites are sources of identity construction, for 
instance www.einladungzumparadies.de. 
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Figure 1 - Identity patterns of devout post migrants Muslims in Germany
(Invitation to Paradise), where they can watch the sermons of German-speaking 
Imams (Ekkehard 2010; El-Tahawy 2008). Groups like the Salafi  are especially able 
to give young Muslims a voice of protest and provide them with easy answers, for 
they have experienced cultural and structural exclusion by German society. On 
the other hand, Neo-Fundamentalist Muslims are also not interested in the issues 
and agendas in these societies (Roy 2004: 243-244). Th ey do not see themselves 
as Turks, Arabs, etc. but as Muslims in Germany who speak German with each 
other. While they connect their own local situation in Germany with the global 
situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, their actual focus is still Germany, aiming for 
the total conversion of German society by missionary work (Abou-Taam 2012; 
Nordbruch 2010: 32). 
Th e second identity pattern is the religious-ethnic exclusionist identity. Like 
neo-fundamentalist Muslims these react to exclusion experiences in German 
society by retreating from it. But, unlike the neo-fundamentalists, they express 
this not by an obviously religious way of life, but by a strong focus on the 
imagined ethnic and/or religious traditional society of their (grand-)parents. 
So they strongly focus on issues and agendas of those societies and are ready to 
defend the interests and ‘honour’ of them, despite the fact that they have little 
physical connection to those countries (Nordbruch 2012: 44). Unlike the neo-
fundamentalists, they have no interest in converting German society into an 
Islamic one. One can describe their relationship with German society as one of 
indiff erence. Th ey are Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, etc. living in Germany, 
with Islam as an important source of cultural identity (Bozay 2005; Nordbruch 
2010). In the majority of cases these young Muslims are getting together in 
various ethno-religious mosque associations, like that of the Turkish nationalist 
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Grey Wolves and the Islamic nationalist Nizam-I Alem movement, which all have 
organic relationships with their political parental organizations in Turkey. While 
neo-fundamentalists’ loci of identity construction are websites in German, the 
loci of the religious-ethnic are the mosques, where imams and other ideologists 
explain the world in the language of their parents. 
Th e third identity pattern is the so-called Pop-Islamic or Neo-Muslim identity. 
Th ese young Muslims understand that they have no real relationship with the 
traditional societies of their parents, and hence identify themselves as German 
Muslims. Th ey see their future as being in Germany and want to participate in 
German society as German citizens. For them  Islam is an expression of their 
demand for recognition, a desire for participation with equal rights within the 
structures of state and society. Th e Quran serves as life guidance, as a way of 
coping with disintegration stress. Th us they want to integrate a more conservative 
understanding of Islam into German society (Gerlach 2006: 11; Mushaben 
2008a: 513). While these young Muslims try to follow religious rules, they do not 
want to be excluded due to their outlook. Th erefore they try to present themselves 
as trendy and fashion-conscious Muslims, purchasing stylish Islamic fashion from 
internet shops like Styleislam. In addition they follow a more individualistic way 
of learning their religion. While the sources of their religion can be conservative, 
they try to interpret it on their own and to fi nd ways to live life as Muslim 
German Citizens (Gerlach 2006: 73; Mushaben 2008: 513). Unlike the Neo-
Fundamentalists they do not aim to convert German society to Islam. Th e locus 
of identity constitution of Neo-Muslims is not the mosque, but self-established 
associations like MJD. In addition, the internet and special websites and forums 
like Myumma, Wymoo etc. play an important role in the constitution of this 
post-Islamic identity. Sometimes global organizations and ideas like Lifemakers 
can inspire these young Muslims, but they have no real connection with these 
organizations. Mostly they try to adapt these ideas in the German environment.
Finally, the classic associational Islamic identity is the last identity pattern, 
which can be found in the various traditional mosque associations, like DITIB, 
IGMG, VIKZ etc. and their youth organizations. Th is identity is characterized 
fi rst by strong ties with the societies of their parental generation. In many cases 
these classical mosque associations have strong ties with parental organizations 
in those countries, i.e. agendas and issues in those societies are the focus of these 
Muslims. Nonetheless these young people have strong ties with German society, 
and especially with the city in which they live; where the local mosque is regarded 
as a vital part of urban Muslim life. Th ey have a positive attitude towards German 
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society, due to the fact that they see their future in Germany (Meng 2004: 122). 
Henceforth, they react to social exclusion by German society with a more self-
confi dent expression of their claim to be Muslims in Germany, in a similar way 
to Neo Muslims. Nonetheless, for these youths the mosque is the central focus 
of identity constitution. Unlike Neo-Muslims they do not demonstrate a more 
individualistic expression of their religiosity. Th eir religious but also cultural 
identity is forged by the classical sermons of local imams, who are not from 
Germany. Many of these young Muslims were introduced to the associational life 
by their parents. Nonetheless there is still an intergenerational confl ict between 
the older generations and the young members about the function and role of 
these associations in Germany. While the later see their future in Germany and 
want to use their organization to articulate their interests, the former have a 
stronger connection to their home country. In addition, young Muslims expect 
from their associations that the associations will participate more in social life and 
not limit their activities to the realm of religion (Frese 2002: 289). Nonetheless, 
in an association like, for example, IGMG or VIKZ, both generations are bound 
together by the issues and agendas of their parental organization, and here the 
younger Members will tolerate and accept the will of the older ones. Th us they 
diff er again from their Neo-Muslim counterparts, with whom they share many 
similarities, at least about their ideas of their future in Germany (Klausen 2006; 
Schiff auer 2004, 2006, 2010). So the identity of these young Muslims oscillates 
between their traditional expressions of Islam, which they develop within 
associational life and their readiness to live in Germany. 
Discussion
Th is chapter presents the neo-fundamentalist, the religious-ethnic exclusivist, neo-
Muslim and fi nally the classic associational identity as ideal-types of identity of 
devout post-migrant Muslims. Hence, these four identity patterns can provide 
us with some important insights into how globalization can aff ect identity 
constituting. First, it is obvious that two of these identity patterns – Neo-
Fundamentalists and Neo-Muslims – have emerged in recent years. Moreover 
they are products of global trends within the Islamic World. Th e emergence of 
these two patterns is a diff erent answer to the confl ict between the West and 
Islam, societal discussion about the role of Islam in Germany being one battlefi eld 
of this discursive confl ict. In addition, these new identity patterns show us that 
cüneyd dinç46
young Muslims are trying to fi nd new forms of socialization in which the internet 
plays an important role. Even the youth organizations of the classical mosque 
associations are forced to open their own internet portals and forums, such as 
www.waymo.de which belongs to the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, 
at the demand of their younger members. In this sense, young Muslims do not 
diff er very much from other non-Muslim digital natives who interact with digital 
technology in Germany for whom the internet is a major source of identity 
construction. Last but not least, we can discover that the lingua franca of all 
these young Muslims is German, regardless of whether they identify themselves 
as German Muslims or Muslims in Germany.
Second, the chapter demonstrates that these identity patterns and their 
organizational representations are manifestations of a glocalization process of 
Islam in Germany (Robertson 1992). In this vein, all these identity patterns can 
be characterized fi rst by an amalgamation of local (German) and more global/
universal (Islam) cultures, ideas and issues. Young Muslims in Germany are 
trying to adapt their self-selected identity patterns, which serve as global Islamic 
guiding principles for their everyday lives, in their own societal environment. 
Even the radical Salafi  in Germany who wants to ‘save’ the Islamic world from 
infi dels still has his roots and is socialized in Germany. Th us, even if he visits 
Islamic countries he is still more ‘German’ than a native Turk, Palestinian or 
Pakistani in Turkey, Palestine and Pakistan. In addition, access to the internet and 
to satellite TV, as new sources of identity constructing, of post-migrant Muslims 
has especially enriched this glocalization process. Consequently, the territorial 
religious identity of the (grand-) parental generation has been emphasized by 
a more glocal and de-territorialized religious identity of post-migrants. In this 
vein, the four identity patterns are evolving within a glocal nexus of cultural 
amalgamation and trans-local belonging.
Th ird, young devout Muslims in Germany are forced to confi gure various global 
and local identities (ethnic, religious, national-state) into a new identity. Th us, it 
is safe to say that they share the same fate of being in a state of ‘in betweeness’ as 
Polish Tatars, who will be discussed in Katarzyma Warminska’s chapter in this 
book. As with the Polish Tatars, the identity of Muslims in Germany evolves 
within the nexus of their being Muslims, Turks/Arabs/Bosnians etc. and German 
citizens. However, the diff erences between the two cases are the various discursive 
strategies of identity confi guration. While the Polish Tatars are trying to establish 
a link between their 600-year historical past as ‘native’ Poles with a diff erent 
religion and the idea of Polishness, Muslims in Germany are developing diff erent 
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strategies of identity confi guration, which can range from the total rejection of 
being German to the claim to be Muslim German citizens. Th e fact that Muslims 
have more identity confi gurations indicates that Muslims in Germany have more 
options than Polish Tatars. Moreover, the emergence of various strategy options 
depends on the country context. Muslims in Germany are a big heterogeneous 
and exogenous minority compared with the small homogenous and endogamous 
minority of Polish Tatars. On the other hand ideas of being a German and being 
a Pole can be diff erent. Muslims in Germany are aware that they will never be 
part of the German nation because they are newcomers and are still alien to the 
German cultural nation. Th e Polish Tatars on the other hand have adopted Polish 
traditions and share the similar identity of Polishness with other Poles. All these 
are aspects which aff ect the number of strategy options for identity formation.
On the other hand, it becomes obvious that in a post-secular society not only 
does religion re-emerge in the public sphere, but it must also learn to coexist with 
other religious interpretations. In the case of Germany not only must Christianity 
fi nd a way of coexisting with Islam, but traditional Islam must also accept the 
existence of new forms of religious interpretations of Islam which are trying to 
shape the identity of young Muslims in Germany. Th us, Islam in Germany, as in 
other parts of Europe, also experiences a form of de-traditionalization, due to 
more democratic access to religious sculptures (Göle 2005, 2006; Roy 2004). For 
instance, Goedroen Juchtman in her chapter in this book about Turkish children 
in Flanders will demonstrate that migrants have more than one source of identity. 
Turkish children in Flanders circulate between the Muslim environment of 
their home and the secular/catholic environment of their school. Th us, they 
adopt new acculturation attitudes towards the non-Muslim culture and try to 
confıgure it with their Muslim identity, developing new forms of multicultural 
identities. Consequently, Islam in Germany is also becoming ‘post-secular’, losing 
its monopoly on lifestyle guidance, which results in the emergence of myriads of 
Islamic lifestyles and multicultural identities.
Finally, the case of young devout Muslims and the de-traditionalization of 
Islam demonstrate that post-migration societies like Germany experience a 
constant fl ux of re-shaping and re-confi guring of identities, and especially ideas 
of citizenship and multiculturalism. As a consequence, the hybrid and glocal 
nature of Muslim identity challenges ideas of a binary and essentialist belonging 
to a society (Native/Other) and of citizenship (German/Migrant). Moreover, 
it becomes clear how secular and religious sources diff erently infl uence the 
identity constructing of young migrants. Th us, if we try to answer Johan Leman’s, 
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Erkan Toğuşlu’s and İsmail Mesut Sezgin’s question in the introductory chapter 
about the future of multiculturalism, our chapter suggests the idea that host 
societies in Europe must consider the pluralist character of migrant identity and 
must open their public spheres to a new traffi  c of ideas and identities, which also 
include religious ones.
Conclusion
Th is chapter has demonstrated that the public emergence of Islam in Germany 
and Muslims’ claim to recognition are accompanied by passionate discussions 
about the role of Islam in Germany. In most cases these discussions are perceived 
by young devout Muslims as a form of cultural exclusion. At the same time as going 
through other forms of structural, occupational and educational disintegration 
experiences, young post-migrant Muslims in Germany are forced to re-evaluate 
their identity as Muslims in Germany. Moreover, this chapter has revealed that 
these people have diff erent identity options, which in turn are manifested in four 
distinct ideal-typical identity patterns. Th ese are constructed along the lines of 
the readiness of these Muslim post-migrants to struggle for recognition and their 
emotional relationship with the countries of their parental generation. Th us this 
chapter has presented the neo-fundamentalist, the religious-ethnic exclusivist, neo-
Muslim and fi nally the classic associational identity as ideal-types of the identity 
of devout post-migrant Muslims. 
However, we speak of ideal-types as heuristic tools, which only mirror an 
idealistic picture of reality. It is obvious that young devout Muslims are not 
represented just by only one of these four ideal-types. In fact young Muslim 
identities can have a plethora of shades of identity, which is manifested in their 
everyday life. For instance, while it was said that Neo-Muslims’ locus of identity 
is the internet and self-established associations, it is obvious that they also visit 
local mosques, which belong to one of the classical mosque associations. In 
addition, these young Muslims can have their fi rst introduction to religion in 
such a Mosque, but then can decide to be more active in a more neo-Muslim 
association. Th ese ideal-types can be regarded as master identity patterns, which 
constitute the major part of the more hybrid identity of young Muslims. 
In conclusion, we can say that the chapter has demonstrated that there is no 
one-dimensional picture of religious young Muslims. Nonetheless the chapter’s 
limit is its focus on only devout Muslims in Germany, which has a distinct 
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composition of ethnical background (Turkey, Balkan) with a distinct form of 
religious tradition (Sunni Islam), while other countries in Europe have other types 
of Muslim populations. Further research should try to fi nd a more comparative 
approach and to develop a picture of identity patterns in Europe. Moreover future 
research must also compare forms of identity constitution and construction 
between devout religious and non-religious Muslims in Germany and Europe. 
In this vein we can develop more elaborate identity patterns and typologies. 
Another important point is the fact that the internet, and especially virtual 
communities, is the new loci of identity constitution. While there are valuable 
contributions which analyse the relationship between virtual communities as 
sources of identity formation (Alonso and Oiarzabal 2010; Everett 2009), further 
research can focus on new elements of virtual communities like blogs, twitter and 
Facebook. Qualitative online fi eldwork can provide us with new empirical data 
to analyse and understand the discursive diff erences between the various identity 
patterns. Despite its aforementioned limits, it is hoped that this chapter was able 
to provide some valuable jumping off  points for further research about the life of 
young Muslims in Europe.
Note
1 For a broad overview of the state of research see Brettfeld, Wetzels (2007). For a critical 
evaluation see Tezcan (2003); Allievi (2005); Dinç (2011). 
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Connecting Home and School: on the 
Second Generation Muslim Children’s 
Agency in Belgian Schools
Goedroen Juchtmans
Th is chapter focuses on how second generation Muslim children of Turkish 
descent in Belgium (Flanders) move between their home and school culture and 
how they deal with competing expectations from both worlds. Th e chapter is based 
on qualitative empirical case-study work on three groups of ten-year-old children 
attending two diff erent Catholic schools. In general, the children as social actors 
adopt creative strategies to connect the two worlds. However, specifi c school and 
home contexts may interfere with children’s agency. Th e chapter argues that the 
way adults at school and at home deploy their power status and introduce ethnic/
religious symbols of diff erence is crucial in understanding this process.
Introduction
Central to much literature on migrant children is the assumption that, in 
an intercultural context, migrant children are likely to be confronted with a 
mismatch between home and outside orientations and values (Eriksen 2003). As 
the previous chapter has shown for Muslim youths in Germany, this experience 
of mismatch also has consequences for the way migrant children are shaping 
their identity. Devine (2009: 523) notes that migrant children are “positioned 
between contrasting social and cultural worlds – juxtaposing oft en competing 
defi nitions of appropriate forms of identity formation and presentation.” School 
is the primary venue in which migrant children come into contact with outside 
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orientations and values. Th is chapter explores how Turkish migrant children, 
who are attending Catholic schools in Belgium (Flanders), move between their 
home and school cultures and how they handle competing expectations from the 
two worlds.
In this chapter, I focus on the possible mismatches due to diff erences in 
religious education between home and school. Turkish migrants arrived as ‘guest 
workers’ in Belgium (Flanders) during the 1960s to meet the employment needs 
of the Belgian state. While the majority of these Turkish migrants were Muslims, 
the Belgian educational landscape had been dominated by Catholic and secular 
movements since its inception. How are Turkish second and third generation 
children in Belgium dealing with these diff erences in religious education or with 
possible tensions between these domains? How do they use their religion in that 
process? 
In the educational domain, Muslims in Belgium can rely on a legal framework 
of opportunities to practise their religion. Since 1978, Muslims have been allowed 
to choose Islam as the religious instruction option in public schools and have 
been able to create their own educational network. Interestingly however, the 
Muslim community has not as yet made use of this legal opportunity to develop 
an educational network of Islamic schools. Muslim parents therefore have to opt 
for schools within the existing educational networks. Th is situation increases 
the risk that for Muslim children religious education at school does not fi t with 
their religious upbringing at home. Furthermore, Islam is oft en presented as 
essentially ‘other’ by the media and politicians, as a threat to the secular state and 
its institutions, as fundamentalist and as an example of the oppression of women 
(Salvatore 2007; Spruyt and Elchardus 2012; Van Acker and Vanbeselaere 2011). 
Th is depiction oft en leads to stereotyping, politicization and oversimplifi cation 
of Islam, in which Muslims are treated as a homogeneous group. At the same 
time, a trend is being seen among Muslims in Europe towards a transnational 
Islam, a more visible and outspoken involvement in the public debate and a 
growing demand for opportunities for Muslims to practise their religion in the 
public domain. 
Th e complexity of children’s agency
Until the 1970s, the European research literature on children was dominated 
by developmental psychology which broadly depicts children’s life span as a 
connecting home and school 57
universally stage-like developing process wherein individual children gradually 
accumulate cognitive knowledge (Piaget), moral reasoning (Kohlberg) or 
psychosocial behaviour (Eriksen). In reaction to these studies, childhood studies 
came into being in the 1970s and 1980s as a fi eld of study with a concern “for 
the socially constructed character of childhood that involves the twin research 
foci of childhood as a socio-structural space and children’s own perspectives as 
social actors” ( James 2007: 263). Since then, a large body of mostly qualitative 
empirical research, that takes the voices of children as its point of departure, has 
emerged. Th is body also includes studies on (migrant) children and religion (for 
a review: Hemming and Madge 2012).
By considering children as social actors, researchers within childhood studies 
have acknowledged children’s competences to co-create their lives and to establish 
agency. Th is means that in moving between home and school “children are in a 
position to infl uence the outcome of the negotiation process in directions, which 
they perceive to be favourable” (Solberg 1997: 126). Or, as Mayall (2002: 6) has 
put it, children are “moral interpreters of the world they engage with, capable 
of participating in decisions on important topics.” With respect to religion, 
Hemming and Madge (2012) observe in the body of childhood studies four 
manifestations of children’s agency. Firstly, children are capable of discerning the 
religious concepts, ideas and practices that they value more. Secondly, children 
“may reconfi gure and renegotiate formal religious meanings and practices” 
(Hemming and Madge 2012: 44). Th irdly, research has shown how children 
make use of diff erent sources (religious stories, media, imagination…) to make 
sense of their lives or to renegotiate formal religious meanings and practices. 
Fourthly and fi nally, researchers conclude that children may develop complex 
religious identities that diff er from their parents’ or dominant representations 
and discourses. 
However, the way children’s agency has come to be portrayed in childhood 
research, namely as an innate capability of children, has recently been criticized as 
overly stressing the agency and autonomy of children in this process (Christensen 
and Mikkelsen 2011; Eldén 2013; James 2007; Komoulainen 2007). Th erefore, it 
risks “simplifying and reducing the complexity of children as social actors” (Eldén, 
2013). To overcome this problem an approach is needed that fully accounts for 
this complexity without returning to the previous images of children as passive, 
incompetent or vulnerable. 
A fi rst pathway to this approach has been off ered by Christensen and Mikkelsen 
(2011), who suggest that children’s agency is located, as we always fi nd ourselves in 
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place. Drawing on Casey’s theory of space, they claim that places which children 
inhabit and traverse are not neutral, but have already become a place of particular 
meaning and value by means of corporeal presence and activities. By entering 
and inhabiting these places (f.e. school), children may infl uence the particular 
meaning and value of these places, but are also infl uenced by the dominant 
meanings and values that these places already have for other people and in society 
( James 2007). Furthermore, children’s position and agency in Western society 
are historically and structurally bounded by adults (parents) and by institutions 
made for children (school). Put diff erently, the relationships between children 
and adults at home and at school are not equal in power. Adults, as members 
of the dominant group and those responsible for children’s education, have 
more power and more opportunities to shape who the children, as members 
of a non-dominant group, should be and the way in which they should behave 
(Piontkowski and al. 2002). Moreover, in the fi eld of intercultural interactions 
at school, migrant children are exposed to this non-dominant position in a 
two-fold way, because of their double-minority status (Devine 2009). To sum 
up, when researching migrant children’s agency at home and at school we need 
to take account of this double uneven distribution of power by assessing when, 
where and how adults use their power to control and coerce and how children’s 
agency and moving between home and school are aff ected by this. 
A second consideration elaborates further on the locatedness of children’s 
agency by emphasizing how each individual child enters diff erent places and 
belongs to diff erent overlapping groups with diff erent conceptions of life and 
values. So, children’s social space and agency strategies may vary not only between 
children, but also within children, as each place and even concrete situation 
may require other strategies. According to James (2007: 265), this means for 
childhood studies that “the children’s voices that appear in our texts do not 
necessarily speak about ‘children’ or ‘the child’ in abstract”. Acknowledgement 
of the cultural contexts in which children’s agency occurs and is produced is 
thus needed. In this chapter, we therefore carefully examine the cultural context 
of home (or community) and school regarding religious education in order to 
discover the changing and diff erent positions that children take in these contexts.
A third and last consideration relates to the abovementioned mismatch 
that migrant children may experience between their religious upbringing at 
home and religious education at school. If children are confronted with this 
mismatch, they get to know the society in which they grow up, as religiously 
divided. Th is experience may have diff erent consequences. Firstly, children may 
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understand the home and school domains as highly separated fi elds with strict 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Leonard, McKnight and Spyrou 2011). Th is 
understanding can aff ect their place-making and choice-making at school or at 
home. Secondly, growing up in a divided society where, for example, teachers 
and peers challenge taken for granted religious beliefs and practices may lead 
to heightened feelings of uncertainty and indeterminacy. Our interest is in 
how migrant children actively manage such situations and to what extent they 
expose themselves to risks or avoid those risks in managing religious uncertainty 
(Christensen and Mikkelsen 2008). 
To conclude, this chapter aims to show how, departing from the perspective 
of children’s agency, children of Turkish migrants in Belgium (Flanders) actively 
move between their Muslim homes and their Catholic schools and handle 
religious diff erences between the two worlds. Drawing on recent childhood 
literature, we expect that the concrete outlook of their movements and diff erence 
management will be complex as a result of power imbalances between children 
and adults on the one hand and migrants and non-migrants on the other (double-
minority position), to individual and contextual diff erences, and to heightened 
feelings of (religious) uncertainty in situations of home-school mismatches.
Method
Like most childhood studies which take children’s agency as their point of 
departure this chapter uses a qualitative empirical design that was developed 
for a recent European FP7-project (REMC). In fi ve European countries, 
Belgium (Flanders), Germany, Ireland, Malta and Scotland, in-depth qualitative 
interviews with groups of teachers, parents and children of diff erent religious 
backgrounds in case-study schools were conducted (2008-2009). 
Th is chapter uses the Belgian data for a multiple case-study work. According 
to Hemming and Madge (2012: 46), this method may “engage with the logic 
of comparison between diff erent cases, situations and social and spatial units” 
and off ers “one of the best ways of adequately refl ecting context.” Th e focus is 
on the home-school interface of three groups of ten-year-old Turkish children 
(nine children altogether), attending two diff erent Catholic schools and living 
in a diff erent community context (ranging from ethnically dense to ethnically 
mixed). In one school boys and girls are interviewed separately. Although 
both Catholic, the schools vary with regard to the religious instruction option 
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(Islam lessons or not) and the proportions of Muslim children, mostly with an 
Islamic background (from 25 per cent to 100 per cent).
Muslims and the religious instruction option in Flemish 
Catholic schools
Th e educational landscape in Flanders is marked by pillarization (Tielemans 
2006), or the existence of diff erent, separate educational networks that can be 
publicly or privately run. Catholic schools are privately run, but are publicly 
recognized and funded by the Flemish Community. Th e educational network, 
the umbrella organization of all Catholic schools, attracts the majority of 
pupils, with 60 per cent of all primary school pupils attending Catholic schools. 
A longitudinal research study (SIBO survey) indicates that over fi ve per cent 
of them have Muslim parents. Catholic schools in urban contexts, where most 
Turkish (and Moroccan) families are settled, have a higher percentage of 
Muslims. A recent survey found that in three large Flemish cities (Genk, Ghent 
and Antwerp) nearly 15 per cent of the pupils attending Catholic schools identify 
themselves as Muslim (Agirdag and al. 2011).
Given the lack of Islamic schools, Muslim parents have to opt for publicly 
run schools (organized by the Flemish Community or by cities, municipalities 
and provinces) if they want their children to attend Islamic religious education 
(RE). Opting for a Catholic school implies that their children will attend the 
compulsory Catholic RE instruction. However, a small number of Catholic 
schools with a high concentration of Muslim pupils have been allowed by 
the bishops to off er Islamic religious education as an alternative to Catholic 
education. In the diocese of Limburg, for example, the bishop agreed to the 
introduction of Islamic RE in Catholic primary schools, aimed at dealing with 
the infl ow of Muslim children into Catholic primary schools during the 1990s. 
Fift een Catholic primary schools participated in the project. In 2000, a new 
Church policy note reduced the former autonomy of schools and bishops on 
this matter by demanding that Catholic primary schools with a large number of 
Muslim children in principle off er Catholic RE only. However, even now some 
schools still off er the choice between catholic religion and Islam, most of them 
being situated in cities in the former mining region.
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Diff erences in school context
Th e school with 100 per cent Turkish children (Th e Gember School), situated 
in such a former mining region, belongs to the small group of schools that off er 
the choice between Catholic RE and Islamic RE. In the other Catholic school 
with 25 per cent Turkish children (De Tijm School), attending Catholic RE is 
compulsory for all children. At fi rst sight, the reason for this diff erence in the 
religious instruction option seems solely related to the very diff erent proportion 
of Turkish children. A further analysis of the school context, however, reveals 
another reason referring to the schools’ diff erent ‘logics of practice’ (Devine 
2012). Th ese logics are, for example, apparent in the way educational values and 
the schools’ Catholic identity are worked out in their relations with Muslim 
parents and children. In that respect, De Tijm School and De Gember School 
use very diff erent logics of practice. 
In De Tijm School, the principal and teachers considered the Turkish language 
and the Muslim heritage of the pupils to be subordinate to the school rules. For 
example, clothing that made children stand out was forbidden. Th is could range 
from ‘beachwear to clothing that is explicitly vulgar and, ultimately, the principal 
decides what is permitted and what is not.’ Th e rationale for this approach, as 
explained by the principal, shows, however, that the rule was actually directed 
at Muslims: 
“We have included this in our school rules in order to prevent young girls 
wearing headscarves to school. Th at is not allowed within the school grounds.”
In the Gember School, by contrast, the home environment of the Muslim pupils 
or individual orientation of the Muslim parent or child was regarded as positive 
and brought into dialogue with the school through parental involvement and 
a general orientation towards community involvement. Th is attitude towards 
communication as the norm explains not only why the principal of De Gember 
School supports Islam lessons at school. For him, this attitude is also a way of 
being Christian: 
“As a Christian, the key point is ‘Whatever you do for the least, you do it for 
me’. A lot of Turks, living in this neighbourhood, are underprivileged and 
outcasts. Once, they came here to survive, but they never got very far. Surely, 
as a Catholic school, you cannot close the door on them? Th at they are Muslims 
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becomes unimportant, then. For me, it is about being able to live with dignity 
and, for that, they have the right to a good education.”
In the following sections, we explore how the schools’ diff erent logics of practice 
aff ect the way Turkish children design their agency and the way they handle 
diff erences and contrasting expectations between school and home. To this end, 
we focus on the children’s positions, actions and meanings vis-à-vis two topics: 
school celebrations and the organization of the religious instruction option at 
school. 
School celebrations
Both schools chose a similar ritual repertoire for annual rites, which, from both a 
secular and a Christian perspective, form part of the socio-cultural Flemish heritage 
and have found a permanent place in many families (such as Christmas, Mother’s 
Day and Father’s Day, carnival). While both schools had a substantial number of 
Muslim pupils, Islamic celebrations did not feature on the annual school calendar, 
except a visit to the mosque aft er the Christmas celebration in De Gember School.
Both schools also expected Muslim children to be present at these rituals. Th is 
obligation was not seen by the Muslim children as a mere duty. On the contrary, 
the children, in general, liked to participate in these school rituals (and in similar 
celebrations in the sport clubs or neighbourhood), even if this implied having to 
participate in, for example, a Christmas Mass. 
“Each Christmas time, we go to the church with school. Th en, we sing a 
Christmas song or perform the birth of Jesus. Th is year, we sang Christmas 
carols for the elderly in the church. Th e elderly sang and danced with us. Th at 
was nice! (girl, De Gember School)”
Th is positive attitude indicates that the Muslim children may have perceived 
the Christian school celebrations as not ‘threatening’ their Muslim identity, 
and therefore not as a mismatch with their religious upbringing at home, even 
if this may ‘objectively’ appear so. Two explanations for the children’s perception 
are possible. Firstly, participating in a ritual at school require no more than 
passive involvement: to be present can be suffi  cient. Secondly, we remarked 
that Muslim children were especially positive vis-à-vis celebrations that drew on 
connecting home and school 63
their non-cognitive skills and bodily expressions (singing, playing and dancing). 
Performing the birth of Jesus, for example, had, therefore, not been experienced 
as an identity issue, but as a means to open up space for non-cognitive skills. Put 
diff erently, playing rather than being was, according to the children’s perceptions, 
at the core of these school celebrations.
In both schools, the school celebrations are organized and designed by adults, 
leaving little space for initiatives and agency on the part of the children. Even in 
and beyond this bounded space, however, children succeeded in becoming active 
agents: 
“I have once printed photographs of the Christmas tree. Th en, I have coloured 
one and hung it on the wall. But at that time, I was just a little child. (girl, De 
Gember School).”
In this example, the girl is actively adopting an unknown cultural element from 
the school culture at home. Th is adoption process is driven by her spontaneous 
desire to repeat at home what she enjoys at school. Bash and Zezlina-Phillips 
(2006) refer to a similar attitude in school contexts, identifying it as a mimetic 
strategy, used by migrant children to declare their membership of the group and 
to ‘blend’ in. However, in our case, the moment of adoption is put in the past 
and is connected with being a little child, unaware of doing something ‘wrong’ 
or ‘unusual’. Th is means that their mimetic strategy had become problematized 
only aft er the imitation attempt at home and aft er realizing that this imitation 
was not congruent with the home context. Th e children indicated that parents 
or community members had played a crucial role in this problematization 
process by stressing the diff erences between school and home and by suggesting 
the home as the outstanding and the sole place to ensure the Islamic upbringing 
of children. In the same vein, a mother (De Tijm School) explained why she 
agreed to her children’s participation in school celebrations: “[t]hey join in at 
school, but in their minds and hearts and at home they always remain Muslim.” In 
contrast to their parents, however, children did not consider school and home 
as separate domains, but were instead trying to connect these fi elds and keep 
moving between them. To that end, less obvious strategies than mimetic ones 
were considered useful. For example, one girl told of how her aunt had put up a 
Christmas tree at home, but had called it a New Year tree. Th is creative solution 
made it possible to adopt a ritual element from the school culture without risking 
problems, as a New Year tree does not refer to the Christian Christmas.
goedroen juchtmans64
However, not all ritual elements or practices within school celebrations were 
welcomed or could be creatively adopted. In that respect, a Muslim boy from De 
Tijm School pointed to ‘the sign of the cross’, a Christian practice that he felt to 
be highly controversial: 
“[b]efore class prayers and during celebrations, they always make the sign of 
the cross. But we don’t. My father says we are Muslims. Th erefore, we are not 
allowed to make the sign of the cross and are thus forbidden to participate.” 
Th e appearance of the sign of the cross changes the initial positive attitude of 
the Muslim boy to a problematic one. Barth’s (1969) theory can possibly explain 
why the sign of the cross functions here as a trigger in this change. According 
to his theory, intercultural interactions consist by defi nition of interactional 
processes of boundary maintenance and boundary defi nition. Following 
Barth, this boundary refers not to objective diff erences between groups, but to 
characteristics used by the actors as overt ‘signals and emblems of diff erences’ and 
as ‘diacritical features that people look for and exhibit to show identity’ (Barth 
1969: 14). In other words, for this boy the sign of the cross functions as such a 
‘symbolic boundary’ or ‘overt signal of diff erence’ and was, therefore, negatively 
emotionally loaded. Th erefore, the boy refused to make the sign of the cross, and 
started thinking in ‘we’ and ‘they’-terms.
Why is the sign of the cross a negatively emotionally charged symbol for Muslim 
children? Th e Muslim boy gives a clue, when he says that they are not allowed 
to make the sign of the cross because they are Muslims. Th us, it becomes clear 
that the sign of the cross is perceived as belonging to the core set of prohibitions 
for Muslims (as, for example, not to eat pork). Making this sign anyway is then 
felt to be crossing a border, as an act of blasphemy, which contradicts being a 
good Muslim. In her book, Politics of Piety, Mahmood (2005) states that being a 
good Muslim is not so much a question of believing in a set of dogmas as a ‘way 
of being’ (see also Jansen 2011). Following Mahmood (2005), refusing to make 
the sign of the cross does not therefore express disbelief in Jesus Christ, as this 
interpretation would stress the Western idea of religious practice as an outward 
representation of an interior mental state or belief. Instead, Mahmood claims 
that for Muslims religious practices or prohibitions have another aim or telos 
and must be primarily interpreted as fulfi lling a religious duty. By fulfi lling these 
religious duties, a Muslim becomes what he/she wants to be: a good Muslim 
( Jansen 2011). Or it is by actually refusing to make the sign of the cross that one 
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becomes a good Muslim. Th is insight also sheds an interesting new light on this 
case, because it then reveals how the refusal off ers the boy the basis and potential 
actually to achieve what he intends to be: a good Muslim. Intentions rather 
than a prescribed set of beliefs are thus crucial. While in the previous cases this 
intention was never felt to be threatened, the ‘sign of the cross’ here did threaten, 
resulting in a mismatch which was felt to be irreconcilable between the religious 
norms at home and at school. 
Provision of the RE option: Islam lessons or not?
1. Islam lessons in th e Gember School: how to deal with community infl uence?
Th e Islam lessons in the Gember School were given by a teacher belonging to 
the same ethno-religiously community as the children. Consequentially, the 
community entered the school domain and obtained space and power to infl uence 
the children’s religious education. Originally, however, the neighborhood 
and also the school was built for a diverse ethnic population of Turks, Greeks, 
Italians and Flemish subterranean mine workers and their children. Aft er the 
collapse of the mining industry, this picture underwent major changes. Greek, 
Italian and Flemish families and even a lot of Turkish families moved away. 
Hitherto, only the Turkish families with the lowest socio-economic status have 
stayed. 
Comparing the boy and girl groups interviewed, we found that religion was 
very important for both and that they liked the Islam lessons or discussing the 
best way of performing a ritual or the meaning of religious practices: 
“Islamic RE is something diff erent: it is something about us. Mathematics, 
on the other hand, is something we have to use when we are grown-up, for our 
job.” 
However, boys and girls diff ered in the way they evaluated the rules and bans of 
their own community, revealing the girls’ attitude to their Islam teacher or to 
their community as more complex.
“A: I don’t like it if the hocha (=Islam teacher) is bad tempered. He always 
shouts at us, then. 
B: But he isn’t like that.
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A: Sometimes he is very nice. At the play yard, you can already see if he is 
moody or not. If moody, he shouts and tells us how naughty we are. If he is good 
tempered, we get very nice lessons.”
In this case, the girls criticize the teacher’s behaviour while at the same time 
toning down this criticism by insisting that the behaviour is dependent on the 
teacher’s mood and not on his character. Th is complex position can be explained 
from two angles: fi rstly, as a way of handling a mismatch between the teaching 
methods of the class teacher and those of the Islam teacher and, secondly, as a 
way to avoid heightened feelings of insecurity vis-à-vis their community and 
parents. Th e fi rst explanation should be placed in the context of other statements 
by the children, who did not want more Islam lessons and preferred the more 
interactive teaching approach of their class teacher, an approach they did not 
always fi nd in the Islam lessons at school or at Koran school. In that context, 
their critical attitude may reveal their wish to integrate the class teacher’s 
methods into the Islam lessons. Th e second explanation looks at the citation 
from its community context. Living in an ethno-religiously dense school context 
and neighbourhood implies being exposed to tightening implicit social control 
mechanisms, especially for girls. Identifying yourself as Muslim and respecting 
the Islam teacher are not only taken for granted, but are also considered as strict 
community rules on which members are regularly informally supervised and 
checked by others.
“Sometimes in class a fellow pupil shouts: “Who believes in Allah?” Th en, you 
have to hold up your fi nger. Everybody does. You have to believe strongly in our 
community.”
“My mother says: If you decide to stop being a Muslim, you are no longer my 
child.”
“In our community everybody knows everything. If someone gets a car accident, 
the whole community will know the news immediately.” 
It is interesting that, in this community context, the girls choose not to adopt 
a consistently critical attitude, nor an uncritical stance regarding the teacher’s 
behaviour (as the boys did). Th is strategy had two advantages. Firstly, it avoids 
a problematic identifi cation with their religious identity and their community. 
Furthermore, it makes it possible safely to express their feelings and wishes 
regarding their Islam lessons and the preferred teaching style.
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Girls are also confronted with a range of prohibitions around their bodies, 
which go against Flemish habits for girls.
A: Nearly everything is forbidden. You are not allowed to do this or that: no 
rings, no nail polish, no earrings.
B: I have nail polish anyway. Th ey don’t see it, because it is transparent.
In this example, we see how a girl tries creatively to fi nd her way in a context that 
is experienced as limiting and restricted. By using transparent nail polish, the girl 
succeeds in opening space for what she wants without confronting the frontiers 
of the prohibition and without risking punishment. Despite the prohibition, 
the girl is thus attempting to bridge the two worlds. In that sense, she acts as a 
mediator (Withol 1998), who seeks to bridge confl icts between the values of both 
worlds. Acting as a mediator also implies that the girl does not reject her Muslim 
upbringing. Th is attitude would be ineff ective because, for all of these girls, it 
is precisely Muslim prayers and reading the Koran that provide considerable 
comfort and a buff er against insecurity and indeterminacy.
“A: If you have problems, Allah is there. You don’t see him, but even then he 
helps you when reading a piece fr om the Koran or when praying.
B: I’m afr aid of the dark. Th en, I can’t sleep. At such moments, I ask my 
mother to read the Koran. So I’m able to fall asleep and to be without creepy 
dreams.”
In that way, the case of the transparent nail polish is not an example of losing 
Muslim religion. Rather, we interpreted this case as a resistance to ethno-religious 
practices that restrict the girls’ agency or, as Abbas (2004, in Ipgrave, 2010) has 
suggested: 
“Is it possible that these girls, who identify themselves explicitly as Muslims, 
are searching for a ‘proper’ and ‘beautiful’ Islam rather than the apparently 
outmoded religious practices of their parents?” 
Following Dinç’s typology (see chapter 2), the girls thus seem to prefer the Neo-
Muslim identity position.
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2. How to deal with Catholic RE at De Tijm School?
De Tijm school is an ethnically mixed school with two dominant groups: 
Turkish pupils with an Islamic background and Flemish children with mostly 
a catholic background. As a Catholic school and in line with its school policy, 
De Tijm School insists on Catholic RE. In general, the Muslim children did not 
problematize attending Catholic RE. However, the way in which their teacher 
dealt with this subject was discussed: 
“When we learned in biology that we come fr om monkeys, a classmate asked 
the teacher: ‘But, in religion, you said that we came fr om dust, and now you’re 
telling us that we come fr om monkeys?’ Our teacher answered that what is 
written in the Bible isn’t to be taken literally.”
In this case, the children point to an underlying tension between scientifi c/
secular and religious world views on the creation of the world. Th e teacher, 
who teaches religion as well as biology, resolved this tension by presenting these 
diff erent world views separately. Religious topics or questions were reserved 
for the religion lessons, the scientifi c knowledge on this theme for the biology 
lessons. During the interview, the Muslim children criticized this separation and 
especially the silence about their religious views in the biology lessons. 
In that context, Ipgrave (2010: 18-19) pleads for an epistemology-based 
inclusion of Muslim pupils’ religious capital and theological thinking:
“Religious students should be able to feel confi dent that, for example, their ideas 
about the existence of a guiding transcendent power behind the creation of the 
universe or the movement of human history will be taken seriously and not 
dismissed as relics of a bygone age … A truly inclusive approach requires a degree 
of refl exivity on the part of those (teachers and students) who do not share the 
religious views of some of the class members.”
While the case reveals that the Muslim children interviewed were also in favour 
of such an approach, their position changes when asked if they would like to have 
Islam lessons at school: 
“If I could choose Islam, I wouldn’t say: No, I don’t want it, but if I couldn’t 
choose Islam, I wouldn’t insist on getting it.”
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One possible explanation for this avoidance strategy relates to the educational 
approach of the school that placed emphasis on discipline and good moral 
attitudes, and obedience to the school rules. Given this approach, the Muslim 
children’s reaction may be the result of a (perceived) assimilation pressure. 
Without such pressure, they would perhaps adopt a diff erent position. In short, 
what children do in concrete situations does not always coincide with what 
they think or what they would really like to do. Whether this is the case largely 
depends in practice on the way in which the school handles its position of power 
in its interactions with children. 
Conclusion
In this chapter we investigated the diff erent movements of three groups of 
Muslim children between two signifi cant domains: home and school. In this 
concluding section, we will try to understand the complexity and changeability 
of Muslim children’s movements.
In general, the question ‘how can I become a good Muslim?’ emerges as crucial, 
since the children’s attitudes were mainly based on the way they answered and 
handled this question. Put diff erently, beneath their attitudes a foundational 
intention to become a good Muslim can be distinguished. For children with a 
Muslim education at home who are attending a Flemish school, this question 
needed, however, to be changed into the following, more complex one: ‘how can 
I become a good Muslim in a non-Muslim school context?’, because attending 
Flemish schools will aff ect the way in which children try to become good Muslims. 
Practices from home which are taken for granted and which are guiding them 
to this end are mostly ‘absent’ in Flemish schools. Moreover, Muslim children 
become familiarized with a set of host practices. Th e positive basic attitude 
to these practices indicates that Muslim children believe that it is possible to 
participate in school activities and in some cases even to adopt ritual elements of 
the host culture without becoming ‘bad’ Muslims or without contradicting their 
intention to become good Muslims. Th is is an interesting pattern, which merits 
more attention. As Mahmood (2005) stressed in her analysis of pious women, 
for these women religious practices are not experienced as mechanical acts. 
Religious intentions are important: the rituals are carried out with the intention 
of ‘living modestly’ ( Jansen 2011). Within this intentional framework, refl exivity 
thus becomes possible, albeit within conservative frameworks, because every 
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(new) practice can be valuable as long as it is experienced as an eff ective way of 
‘living modestly’. Th e Muslim children’s attitudes can be interpreted in a similar 
way. Here, the intentional framework is, however, guided by the desire to become 
a good Muslim. Th is intention is therefore at the root of their agency. In the 
previous sections, we off ered examples of Muslim children using this intentional 
framework as a space not only for refl exivity, but also for exploration, fl exibility 
and creativity, and as a means of connecting and moving between home and 
school or of risk management. 
However, on the basis of specifi c interactions with signifi cant others at school 
(the case of the sign of the cross, the case of the moody Islam teacher) or at home 
(the case of the transparent nail polish), the way in which children move between 
diff erent fi elds and manage diff erences becomes problematized, leading to a shift  
from positive basic attitudes to other, more complex ones. We have found that 
this shift  is always preceded by a (perceived or experienced) restriction in agency 
and space to explore for the children, with avoiding or resistance strategies on the 
children’s part as a result. In this process, (stories about) the school or parents’ 
actions played a crucial role; as in most of the cases, the shift s were eff ected by 
school staff  or parents who had pointed to irreconcilable diff erences between 
home and school culture or had devalued or silenced their religious capital. As 
recent childhood studies suggest (Eldén 2013), a lack of power balance between 
children and their parents on the one hand, and between pupils and the school 
on the other, is at the root of this process, as their double non-dominant position 
hampered the children in keeping moving between home and school. 
How can schools help Muslim children in their desire to connect and mediate 
both worlds? We agree with Ipgrave (2010) when she focuses on developing a 
degree of refl exivity on the part of those (teachers and students) who do not share 
religious views, along with an inclusive approach in which children’s religious (or 
secular) heritage is eff ectively valued as religious/secular capital. Th is refl exivity 
and valorization of each other’s richness, however, require not only the act of self-
critical thinking regarding one’s own views and the use of power. Also needed 
is the capability of together – staff , parents and pupils – imagining ways of 
connecting diff erent, sometimes confl icting, fi elds, views and practices without 
avoiding or problematizing the change that this connecting will bring for each 
group.
connecting home and school 71
References
Abbas, T. (2004). Th e Education of British South Asians: Ethnicity, Capital and Class Structure. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Agirdag, O., Hermans, M. and M. Van Houtte (2011). ‘Het Verband tussen Islamitische 
Religie, Religiositeit en Onderwijsprestaties,’ Pedagogische Studiën, 88: 339-353.
Barth, F. (ed.) (1969). Ethnic groups and boundaries: Th e social organization of culture diff erence. 
Boston: Little, Brown.
Bash, L. and E. Zezlina-Philips (2006). ‘Identity, Boundary and Schooling: Perspectives 
on the Experiences and Perceptions of Refugee Children,’ Intercultural Education, 17(1): 
113-128.
Christensen, P. and M.R. Mikkelsen (2011). ‘Th ere is Nothing Here for Us…! How Girls 
Create Meaningful Places of Th eir Own Trough Movement,’ Children and Society, 27(3): 
197-207.
Christensen, P. and M.R. Mikkelsen (2008). ‘Jumping off  and being careful: children’s 
strategies of risk management in everyday life,’ Sociology of Health & Illness, 30(1): 112-130.
Devine, D. (2009). ‘Mobilising Capitals? Migrant Children’s Negotiation of their Everyday 
Lives in School,’ British Journal of Sociology of Education, 30(5): 521-535.
Devine, D. (2012). ‘Practising Leadership in Newly Multi-ethnic Schools: Tension in the 
Field?,’ British Journal of Sociology of Education, 33(1): 1-20.
Eldén, S. (2013). ‘Inviting the messy: Drawing methods and ‘children’s voices’,’ Childhood, 
20(1) 66-81.
Eriksen, T.H. (2003). ‘Creolization and Creativity,’ Global Networks, 3(3) 223-237.
Hemming, P.J and N. Madge (2012) ‘Researching children, youth and religion: Identity, 
complexity and agency,’ Childhood, 19(1): 38-51.
Ipgrave, J. (2010). ‘Including the religious viewpoints and experiences of Muslim students in 
an environment that is both plural and secular,’ Int. Migration & Integration, 11(1): 5-22.
James, A. (2007). ‘Giving Voice to Children’s Voices: Practices and Problems, Pitfalls and 
Potentials,’ American Anthropologist, 109(2): 261-272.
Jansen, Y. (2011). ‘Postsecularism, piety and fanaticism: refl ections on Jürgen Habermas’ and 
Saba Mahmood’s critiques of secularism,’ Philosophy Social Criticism, 37(9): 977-998.
Komulainen, S. (2007). ‘Th e ambiguity of the child’s voice in social research,’ Childhood, 
14(1): 11-28.
Leonard, M., McKnight, M. and S. Spyrou (2011). ‘Growing up in divided societies: 
confronting continuity and change,’ International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 
31 (9/10): 520-530.
Mahmood, S. (2005). Politics of piety: the Islamic revival and the feminist subject. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
goedroen juchtmans72
Mayall, B. (2002). Towards a sociology for Childhood. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
Piontkowski, U., Rohmann, A. and A. Florack (2002). ‘Concordance of Acculturation 
Attitudes and Perceived Th reat,’ Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 5(3): 221-232.
Salvatore, A. (2007). ‘Authority in question: secularity, republicanism and ‘communitarianism 
in the emerging Euro-Islamic public sphere,’ Th eory, Culture and Society, 24(2): 135-160.
Solberg, A. (1997). ‘Negotiating childhood: Changing constructions of age for Norwegian 
children’, in James, A. and A. Prout (eds.) Constructing and reconstructing childhood. 
London: Falmer Press, 126-144. 
Spruyt, B. and M. Elchardus (2012). ‘Are anti-Muslim feelings more widespread than anti-
foreigner feelings? Evidence from two split-sample experiments,’ Ethnicities, 12(6): 
800-820.
Tielemans, J. (2006). Onderwijs in Vlaanderen. Structuur – Organisatie – Wetgeving. 
Antwerp: Garant.
Van Acker, K. and N. Vanbeselaere (2011). ‘Bringing together acculturation theory and 
intergroup contact theory: Predictors of Flemings’ expectations of Turks’ acculturation 
behavior,’ International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 35, 334-345.
Withol de Wenden, C. (1998). ‘Young Muslim Women in France: Cultural and Psychological 
Adjustments,’ Political Psychology, 19, 1, 133-146.
Chapter 4
Immigrant Identity, Social Adaptation 
and Post-Secular Society in Europe
Marcel Mečiar
Th is chapter deals with several interconnected topics – the social identity of 
immigrants, the process of adaptation and changes in identity construction. 
First, the author briefl y introduces some shift s in theorizing identity (with the 
focus on immigrant identity) that were caused by the narrative turn in social 
sciences, and presents a discussion on acculturation and the adaptation process. 
Second, an analysis of adaptation diffi  culties is further introduced via the real-
life stories of immigrants from 8 countries of the European Union. Th e analysis 
follows several frameworks of the adaptation diffi  culties from the immigrant’s 
subjective point of view: legal and social status; the labour market and work 
permits; the recognition of qualifi cations; education and learning a new culture; 
housing; interpersonal confl icts; stereotypes and misunderstandings. Th ird, 
the chapter attempts to outline how adaptation issues (both successes and 
diffi  culties) infl uence the formation of immigrant identity. Th e last section of 
the chapter discusses how the formation of immigrant identities has changed in 
the post-secular condition. Th e concept of post-secular society is not understood 
as some kind of totally ‘new’ reality that is somehow signifi cantly diff erent from 
a previous ‘secular’ reality (Moberg, Granholm and Nynäs 2012: 3), but rather 
as a refl ection of the apparent contemporary resurgence of religion in the public 
sphere. 
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Social identity, adaptation strategies and narratives
In this section, the theoretical background and the interconnections between the 
concepts of social identity formation (in sociology), adaptation strategies and 
narratives as a medium for identity research will be discussed.
Szaló (2003), when introducing his own perspective on social identity 
formation, follows social constructionist principles and post-structuralist 
conceptions about language, knowledge and power. In doing so, he “brings back 
to life” the social identity of an individual when – in agreement with Peter L. 
Berger and Th omas Luckmann (1966) – he places it among the elements that form 
the social reality and not among attributes merely derived from heterogeneous 
social processes. Th e self-identity of human subjects and confi gurations of their 
social identities are therefore “inevitably connected to meanings, practices, 
and experiences that are constituted by particular discourses and institutions” 
(Szaló 2003: 13). He further distinguishes between self-identities which “refer 
to the forms of self-cognition that is formed by refl exive discursive practices”, 
and identity-types which “refer to the forms of knowledge that is constructed by 
discursive practices that constitute typifi cation schemata relating to people in 
general.”
Social identities are then understood as particular identity-types that “typify/
classify individuals by referring them to collectivities” while the typifi cation 
schemata come from a discourse 1.) describing individuals as elements of 
collectivities (larger social groups), and 2.) articulating knowledge about the 
meanings of belonging to a particular collectivity (Szaló 2003: 16-17). Social 
identity can be viewed analytically from the perspective of social categorization 
(i.e. cognition, labelling, and classifi cation of others according to identity-types – 
e.g. a woman, a teacher, French) and group identifi cation (i.e. identifi cation with 
a group, acceptance of a particular identity) ( Jenkins 2000).
Aft er a brief introduction to the concept of socially and discursively constructed 
identity we will focus on the concept of acculturation and adaptation of the 
identity-type (social category) of an immigrant. 
Scholarly literature dealing with acculturation and adaptation shows that two 
dominant aspects of acculturation – a) preservation of one’s heritage culture 
and b) adaptation to the host society – “are conceptually distinct and can vary 
independently” (Liebkind 2001 in Phinney et al. 2001: 495). Emerging from 
these two analytical distinctions that can be turned into the real life question of 
a newcomer (A = “my cultural heritage” and/or B = “integration to society”), 
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the four acculturation strategies have been identifi ed – integration (A+, B+), 
assimilation (A-, B+), separation (A+, B-), and marginalization (A-, B-) 
(Berry 1997: 9-10). Th e concept is based on Berry’s acculturation model, which 
distinguishes between assimilation, integration, rejection and deculturation. 
Phinney’s acculturation strategies follow four slightly diff erent categories: 
1) an individual who retains a strong ethnic identity while also identifying 
with the new society is considered to have an integrated (or bicultural) identity. 
2) An individual with a strong ethnic identity while not identifying with the new 
society constructs a separated identity. 3) Another type, in which an individual 
who gives up an ethnic identity but identifi es with the new society, results in an 
assimilated identity. 4) Th e individual with no identifi cation with either has a 
marginalized identity (Phinney et al. 2001: 495). 
When approaching the relationship between adaptation (as a question of 
belonging) and ethnicity, Floya Anthias (2002) chooses to fi ght the cultural 
essentialist weaknesses in understanding social identities with her own 
conceptual weapons. Methodologically, she uses a narrative (told stories) to 
reach her concept of translocational positionality, which refers to placement 
within a set of relationships and practices that implicate identifi cation and 
‘performativity’ or action. Th ese relations and practices refer to social position 
(as a set of eff ectivities, as outcome) and simultaneously to social positioning (as 
a set of practices, actions, meanings, as a process). Th e concept of translocational 
positionality then leads to the observation that “issues of exclusion, political 
mobilization on the basis of collective identity and narrations of belonging and 
otherness cannot be addressed adequately unless they are located within other 
constructions of diff erence and identity, particularly around gender and class” 
(Anthias 2002: 502).
Similarly, Anna De Fina (2000) focuses on a narrative in her study of immigrant 
identity. She considers language to be the discursive practice that has an infl uence 
on shaping identity. Discursive practices reproduce and constantly form social 
relationships and socio-cultural constructs that people use to give sense to the 
reality around them. De Fina shows how the formation of ethnic identity takes 
place in the narratives (of Mexican immigrants in the U.S.A.) to a large extent built 
on defi ning the boundaries against other ethnicities, or at least on mentioning 
people’s diff erent origins in their stories from a new society. De Fina further states 
that “the ethnic mentions are used in the stories to affi  rm certain characteristics 
of one’s identity and the identity of others via the presentation and evaluation of 
behaviours” (2000: 154). Identity (its ethnic component, or rather constructs and 
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boundaries connected to it) is a major point of orientation in society – especially 
in the multiethnic and multicultural environment. 
Th us, the practical question asking how we can empirically study identity fi nds 
its answer in the concept of narrative. A narrative emerging from telling stories 
is a universal human institution and also a means of ‘carrying’ and manifesting 
discourse. Anna De Fina (2000) regards narrative as a discursive practice that 
creates, reproduces and continuously shapes “the social relationships and 
sociocultural constructs that individuals use to make a sense of their reality” 
(Foucault 1975 in De Fina 2000: 133).
Immigrant adaptation in stories of “a good practice”
Th e study follows, re-evaluates and widens the scope of a practitioner-oriented 
project supported by funds from the EU. Within the project entitled Trainers 
for European Citizens, team members from eight European countries – working 
as pedagogues, trainers and social workers – conducted biographical interviews 
with immigrants who were at the time in the process of adapting to their host 
societies. Th e TEC project team gathered 23 biographical interviews in 2003 
with immigrants from  eight European countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, 
France, Lithuania, Germany, Greece, Spain and Sweden). Th is eff ort brought 
up a set of narratives containing the biographical refl ections of so-called ‘good 
practice’ – i.e. successful adaptation to a host society. 
Th e research resulted in both new teaching tools for trainers and theoretical 
conformation of the complexity of migration, and of hardship (diffi  culties) 
in adaptation. Th e people who shared their stories with the research team 
represented all types of migration as they were classifi ed in migration studies 
(Castles and Miller 1993). Th e narrative methods also helped to display the 
dynamics and changes in the adaptation process.
In this chapter we will not focus on the reasons for migration, but on the 
subjective perspective of an immigrant during the process of adaptation. 
Let us summarize briefl y some aspects of the lives of immigrants in the new 
(European) society. Th e stories of individual actors can be seen in life stories 
that follow the original trajectories, each follows his or her own path, and 
each of them is independent and uniquely individual. However, it may be 
possible to reveal some similar or shared experiences and diffi  culties in their life 
stories. 
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1. Immigration policy and the question of (not just legal) status. Th e crucial issue for 
an immigrant in a receiving country is the legalization of stay (residence permit) 
on which access to the labour market (legal employment) heavily depends and 
which may lead (in diff erent legal systems aft er varying numbers of years) to 
acquiring citizenship. Th e social status of an applicant for a residence permit also 
determines a way of acquiring the residence permit. Th ere is certainly a diff erence 
between the social position of a student, highly qualifi ed specialist, unqualifi ed 
worker or a refugee. In some cases it takes several years to achieve the status based 
on residence permits.
During their long-term process of negotiation with the state bureaucratic 
apparatus, immigrants may experience unpleasant and unsettled feelings about 
the result of their eff orts to obtain legalization.
“Some two years ago we were even threatened with deportation to Sri Lanka 
because our asylum was not recognized, but a supportive circle of our fr iends 
and relatives was formed to stop us fr om being deported and to speak up for us 
in our struggle for permanent residence. A petition was drawn up and given to 
the parliament of the Federal State of ..., pointing out our level of integration 
and the trauma we have suff ered [both were still undergoing therapeutic 
treatment at the time of the research]. Aft er the medical reports had been 
submitted, offi  cials prolonged our stay. At the end of 2003, we have to again 
take our latest health details to the immigration offi  ce to extend our stay again. 
So, even aft er almost 10 years then, we still do not have permanent residence 
status. It is hard to make bigger life plans in this kind of situation. We are well 
integrated, we work and pay taxes, we can speak German, but it seems that it 
isn’t enough.” [Asylum seekers and a married couple Prem and Cynthia, both 
aged 56 years. Country of origin: Sri Lanka, receiving country: Germany. 
Narrative focus (=Nf ): 2001 and mid-2003.]
Th e case of a married couple from Sri Lanka who came to Germany as political 
refugees points to the discrepancy between ‘actual’ adaptation and the decision 
process of granting permanent residence status (i.e. the possibility/impossibility 
of permanent residence). Th e story of Prem and Cynthia is signifi cant in terms of 
adaptation theory. Employment, the ability to communicate in the offi  cial language 
and integration into informal networks (friends, acquaintances willing to help 
with the petition) do not seem to be enough to grant them a permanent residence 
permit. Th e subjective qualities expressed by a sincere eff ort in the development 
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of cultural (German) and social (religious contacts in the organization and 
participation in non-formal education) ties stand in contrast to the solid walls of 
the immigration policy so far of “the most populous country in Europe” (Ringen 
2003: 555). Although countries with high numbers of asylum applications tend 
to have stricter criteria and lower recognition rates for asylum claims (Neumayer 
2005), the situation of well-adapted, integrated immigrants seems to concur 
with the fi ndings of the German refugee interest group Pro-Asyl (Kopp 2000 
in Neumayer 2005: 64), arguing that the chances of becoming recognized as 
a refugee depend on the country in which the claim is processed if signifi cant 
cross-country diff erences in asylum recognition rates are taken into account.
As research has shown (Phinney et al. 2001: 500) social adaptation may 
depend more on local circumstances, personal relationships, and activity settings 
in economic terms. Nonetheless, national policies regarding the state recognition 
of immigrants are equally relevant. In this paradoxical case, the adaptation 
strategy of integration was not accompanied by parallel inclusion expressed by 
relevant legal status. 
2. Employment and the labour market. Finding employment is another important 
aspect of an immigrant’s adaptation process that is usually hard to achieve. In 
cases where a special organization works with qualifi ed professionals who can 
off er assistance, job hunting is more successful. Th e refugee co-ordinator of the 
immigration unit (Ahmad) played an important role in the successful adaptation 
of the newcomer (Hussein) in terms of maintaining his client’s self-esteem, in the 
following example from Sweden.
“I made contact with Hussein. Together we went to the employment agency to 
register Hussein for work. Hussein quickly made new fr iends and was also able 
to visit his cousin who lives in Stockholm. Nevertheless, Hussein felt sad and 
he could not really enjoy his new life. I realised that Hussein had to fi nd a job, 
because his whole identity and motivation depended on his chances of fi nding 
a job and doing his share. It seemed to be more important to him to have a job 
than to be able to speak Swedish.” [Ahmad (about Hussein), Iraq – Sweden. 
Nf: 2003]
Th e specialized counsellor, in addition to the permanently established 
organizations and projects working with immigrant groups, confi rms the 
importance of social support in the search for a job. More importantly, having a 
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job and doing one’s share (for a society) became a necessary motivational factor 
for the formation of a person’s integrated identity and preserving “the sense of 
belonging” (Maydell-Stevens, Masgoret and Ward 2007: 186). 
Unemployment has an infl uence on the psychological condition of an 
individual and the social aspect of his or her existence (deprivation, inferior 
status both as an immigrant and an unemployed person, or a voluntary closure). 
Occupation can even be seen as a personal “salvation” because a newcomer desires 
not only to be economically independent, but also useful.
“I love the job – and for a variety of reasons. I have always believed that helping 
other people is an important task. ... I also need the job to keep body and soul 
together, of course! Aft er fi nishing the two Dutch courses and the course at ..., 
I had no further prospects and ended up sitting at home waiting for a second 
interview with the Belgian Immigration Service to be recognized as a refugee. I 
had no job off ers at all until a consultant at the ... [a social agency] spotted this 
and advised me to apply for a job at ..., which turned out to be my salvation! 
My job is not only useful, necessary and interesting, but it is also my life.” 
[Khaldoun, age 31. Iraq-Belgium. Nf: 2003]
Khaldoun, who studied English language and literature (in his native Iraq, later in 
Yemen, and in the United Kingdom), is an example that defi es the conventional 
notion of immigrants with employment below their qualifi cations. Certain 
numbers of immigrants, however, do not get a job in the same fi eld or at the same 
qualifi cation level (Vinokurov, Birman and Trickett 2000). “Immigrants are 
generally bunched at the two extremities of the skill spectrum – the professional 
and the unskilled (the immigrant workers may have been skilled in his or her 
place of origin but become de-skilled through migration)” (Harris 2000: 95). 
According to Harris, there is competition between native and immigrant in 
professions, whereas unskilled workers do not compete with natives for the same 
jobs. For that reason, unemployment rates tend to be higher for professional than 
for unskilled immigrants (Harris 2000).
Several interviewees talked about a specifi c social practice at employment 
bureaus that had to off er a job fi rst to an applicant with citizenship.
“At this time we also received our work permits, allowing us to fi nd employment. 
In practice, this proved to be more complicated: as soon as we managed to fi nd 
a job, we had to inform the employment offi  ce to receive permission only for 
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that vacant job off er. But, instead of giving us the job, the offi  ce would use this 
information to provide jobs for German applicants.” [Prem and Cynthia, both 
aged 56 years. Country of origin: Sri Lanka – Receiving country: Germany. 
Nf: 1994-1995.]
Another qualifi ed immigrant (a sport manager) had to face a similar problem 
when – aft er a voluntary internship during his studies – his potential employer 
off ered him a full-time contract. Th e struggle for the well-paid job he was very 
well qualifi ed for lasted for over two years. Th e employer was able to wait for all 
this time because Diallo could work part-time on the basis of his student status. 
In France, in order to recruit a foreigner an employer fi rst has to let the National 
Employment Agency (Agence National pour l’Emploi) know about his off er. If 
aft er six weeks no French candidate, or citizen of the European Union, has been 
found who meets the job requirements, then the employer can make a request for 
a work permit for a foreigner. 
“So then, with the support of my employer, we embarked upon “a submission for 
a legal decision.” Th e fi rst request dated fr om 1999. We were then in 2000. Th e 
response came back. Finally, permission to work had been given! But we were 
nearly into 2002!” [Diallo, age 32, Senegal – France. Nf: 1999-2003]
Th e question of fi nding and obtaining suitable employment is closely linked 
with the following problem of the recognition of qualifi cations acquired in other 
countries.
3. Recognition of diplomas and documents for qualifi cation. Many European 
countries have a problem with the recognition of foreign diplomas and other 
certifi cates of qualifi cation. A qualifi ed person whose diploma is not validated in 
the receiving country is oft en forced to take a job requiring lower qualifi cations 
(Harris 2000). Some newcomers may have diffi  culty in obtaining proof of 
qualifi cations if they were forced to fl ee their countries of origin – that is, asylum 
seekers or persons with refugee status. Yet, the help of kinship networks in the 
country of origin or of either non-governmental or governmental organizations 
can be accepted in this case, as the will for foreign credential recognition exists. 
One interviewee even encountered a problem with the recognition of his diploma 
obtained in another country of the European Union, which he perceived as a 
discriminatory practice based on his national origin. 
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“Th ings were very diff erent in the Netherlands. My educational qualifi cations 
were regarded as not being at the appropriate level simply because I was 
Moroccan… and I was told that I would have to start again fr om the beginning 
because my academic certifi cates were not recognized as valid. It was assumed 
that the academic qualifi cations of immigrants could not have the validity of the 
equivalent Dutch qualifi cations. Even my French diploma was not recognized! 
Th is was a great disappointment. I was later able to get a partial accreditation 
of my qualifi cations at the University of..., where I was allowed to participate 
in an academic research project, but was only used for fi eld work. I feel that I 
am now too old to have much chance of being able to continue my studies. In 
the Netherlands I worked initially in a leather factory as a manual worker, 
and then later found work teaching French and Arabic in a private school.” 
[Lahcen, age 41, Morocco – the Netherlands, then Belgium. Nf: late 1990s]
Besides the negative impact on motivation that may aff ect the formation of 
marginalized identity, and diffi  culties with obtaining work that would be 
adequate to one’s qualifi cations, the topic of ‘brain drain’ was brought up by 
another conversational partner.
“Even my wife, who was a pharmacist in Iraq, has so far only been off ered work 
as a cleaning lady. Lecturing to newcomers or working for a social agency is oft en 
the best that we can get. Little wonder then that hardly any of the university 
educated refugees want to stay in Belgium and that there is a full scale brain-
drain fr om Belgium in progress. Only the poorly educated stay as they have no 
other option open to them.” [Khaldoun, age 31, Iraq - Belgium. Nf: 2003]
In the case where ‘highly skilled’ professionals (particularly researchers) emigrate 
from the country where they were educated and trained, the destination country 
receives the human capital as a gift . According to neoclassical economic theory it 
has made a ‘brain gain’, whereas the country of origin has suff ered a ‘brain drain’ 
(Wächter 2006: 53). Th e approach towards educated immigrants in Europe can 
in terms of the previous metaphor be described as a lack of interest in a brain 
gain. Recent research focused on a brain drain from Europe to the U.S.A. does 
not fully answer the question of how many emigrating professionals come via 
Europe from Non-EU countries. 
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4. Education and learning new cultures. Education does not only fulfi l the role 
of teaching immigrants the language of a host country. Stories and experiences 
of immigrants indicate the practical importance of courses dealing with the 
development of social and intercultural communication skills. Learning may 
become a mutual process, both from the perspective of the ‘new’ and ‘old’ 
Europeans, as well as from that of formal and informal learning. Formal education 
takes place in a classroom when a teacher provides the necessary knowledge to 
students a) for the successful completion of the course, and b) for further use in 
life. And the usability of knowledge and acquired skills is the most important 
factor for incoming foreigners. Th e informal side of learning is expressed in 
communicating with students outside the classroom or lecture hall and is very 
necessary both in terms of building confi dence and also for the process of 
adaptation and learning a new culture. In some European countries with a rich 
history of immigration, there are already courses that teach and transfer socio-
cultural competencies.
Human identity is formed through the reaction and perception of the physical 
world and through relationships with others, which are mediated by language – the 
use of language (in terms of discursive practices). “And while the tools with which 
people produce are the medium through which they gain mastery over nature, so 
language is the tool and the medium through which people gain infl uence over 
the behaviour of others and over their own actions” (Burkitt 1991: 139).
“It is important that newcomers learn the language as soon as possible so that 
they can get started on something and not just sit around at home all day. It is 
only since I have been able to follow everything which is said on TV and can 
talk to people that I have come to understand Belgium.” [Khaldoun, age 31, 
Iraq - Belgium. Nf: 2003]
Nevertheless, the language is not the only thing an immigrant needs in order to 
adapt to a new culture. If we understand language as a gateway to culture (in the 
sense of understanding values, norms, symbols and institutions), in particular it 
functions as the means for the transmission of culture. Usually, the newcomer 
acquires the rudiments of  the new culture informally, which is sometimes 
insuffi  cient, especially when members of the immigrant community as individuals 
are socially and spatially separated from the culture of the host country (in 
refugee centres, ethnic districts). Whoever feels that he/she needs to know more 
attends courses providing skills and competences for social integration.
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“Th at was cool! Th e course was about intercultural competence. Th ere were 
about 15 people on the course, some Germans, and people fr om Turkey, Russia, 
Senegal, and so on. Everybody talked about his or her experience with other 
cultures, about confr ontation, problems and ways to deal with them. Th ey also 
put on culturally diverse theatre shows. I liked this course a lot and I had lots of 
interesting experiences.” [Meïssa: age 35?, Senegal - Germany. Nf: 2001]
Th e actual preparation and teaching of such courses must necessarily be based on 
“sensitivity” in intercultural communication, since stereotypical ideas are lurking 
at every step and in the structures of language as well.
“I take a very critical view of the Social Orientation course which I have to 
teach: even the course itself contains prejudices! I try to put this into perspective 
for my students. For me the most important element is communication. I fi nd 
it striking that there is so little contact between newcomers and Belgians: it 
is exactly the contact that I want to promote, and in so doing to remove the 
obstacles. Here too I again emphasize the importance of the necessary acceptance 
on both sides.” [Lahcen, age 41, Morocco - Belgium. Nf: 2003]
Courses alone cannot replace communication between members of diff erent 
cultures. As the basic defi ciency and therefore imperative, a need for informal 
contacts and for a tendency to value tolerance and solidarity remains.
5. Housing. Private housing is very important because staying in special 
accommodation facilities (camps, centres) may be stressful. Privacy is highly 
important in terms of psychological well-being and social signifi cance in many 
cultures, although ideas about it may vary. Diff erences in the notion of private 
space may sometimes lead to misunderstandings. For instance, paying a visit is in 
some cultures a very common and frequent social practice.
“You may only know the person you are going to visit a little, but there is no 
need to call in advance, to arrange it. You just come. You cannot say anything to 
contradict an older person. You have to stand up and remain standing till the 
guest is seated.” [Tumisa, age 43, Chechnya - Lithuania. Nf: 2003]
Noise, crowding and partying during the night probably do not meet with 
understanding from tenants and apartment owners. But it can oft en be an 
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unwritten (but still signifi cant) social norm tied to hospitality to visitors. Th e 
housing sector is also a social fi eld of discrimination in which prejudices against 
particular groups of immigrants seem to play an important role.
“I’ve not had any diffi  culties fi nding accommodation, for example. But other 
Afr icans have had problems. Owners who don’t want them, or who impose 
additional barriers.” [Diallo, age 32, Senegal - France. Nf: 1999-2003]
As pointed out by social geographer Ash Amin (2004), some patterns of 
discrimination from previous migration waves persist and spread to countries 
with newer migration (housing, labour market, social rights).
6. Interpersonal confl ict and the problem of misunderstanding or prejudice. Some 
people respond negatively to cultural diversity or with a certain degree of distrust, 
or fear, and these diverse patterns are collectively referred to as xenophobia. 
Th e immigrant experience shows that misunderstandings or stereotypes can be 
overcome through communication, assertiveness and patience, which, however, 
will not succeed without goodwill on both sides.
Th e issue of prejudices is more complex than just being reducible to ethnicity – 
it also unfolds along the axes of gender, class and age diff erences. Besides the 
phenotypic human characteristics, the recognition process is strongly infl uenced 
by the language or its method of use-speech. 
“And then there are also some amusing situations. I’ve an accent, aft er all. So, at 
work, when I answer the phone I sometimes get someone saying ‘No, I want to 
speak to the person in charge.’ So I have to explain that, in fact, I am the person 
in charge…” [Diallo, age 32, Senegal - France. Nf: 1999-2003]
Th e quotation is a good example of the validity of Foucault’s concept about 
the relationship of power and language as discursive practices (Szaló 2003) and 
Goff man’s (2003) concept of stigma. Th e caller heard Diallo’s foreign accent and 
he took from the stock of his knowledge the stereotypical idea that a foreigner 
would not be a manager but rather an assistant. Diallo is stigmatized for his French 
accent. But he is not discouraged by the fact and maintains a positive attitude.
A newcomer is usually expected, given his status as a foreigner, to take a fi rst 
step. Charity’s story shows that the strategy may be successful on the whole. Initial 
distrust can be broken right at the beginning, but this depends on a particular 
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situation, people and conditions in given society. In reacting to various forms 
of ‘othering’, an immigrant or an immigrant group “may develop arrangements 
of voluntary separation and strive for full-fl edged recognition by emphasising 
their social ... inclusion on multicultural grounds” (Szalai 2010: 5), or may be 
singled out as the consequence of refusal on the part of a major society (e.g. large 
segments of the Roma community in Central Europe).
“When I moved into the neighbourhood, I visited all the neighbours 
and introduced myself. I get on well with my neighbours and I have 
a wide circle of fr iends, both old and new Swedes. It was not diffi  cult 
to become integrated into society. Sometimes I may hear someone 
saying stupid things, but I don’t take them seriously, I just consider it 
narrow-mindedness.” [Charity, age 62, Ghana - Sweden. Nf: 1993-2003]
“Th e management also oft en pointed me out as a good example for the local 
factory workers. Th is, however, caused some of my colleagues to sneer at me. 
I still remember comments I had to listen to, such as “Let Slanty-eyes do it, he’s 
the best”, and the like. On the other hand I remember the positive behaviour 
of other Czech colleagues, who fr equently off ered snacks for me to taste, like 
traditional Czech stuff ed cake.” Vervang door: [Nguyen, age 40, Vietnam - 
Czech Republic. Nf: late 1980s]
Charity and Nguyen construct in their narratives the positive pole of an 
immigrant’s identity. Charity is not taking everything anyone says very seriously 
and retains a positive attitude even in the event of some negative reactions from 
patients or derogatory comments of people in her environment. Nguyen in the 
same manner managed to integrate himself in spite of the xenophobic and even 
racist behaviour of some of his co-workers – which was caused by social strains 
during the economic transformation in the fi rst half of the 1990s - and diminished 
the cultural diff erences and peoples’ crassness by learning Czech on a professional 
level (as a translator) via contacts with open-minded locals who became his friends.
Although narratives in the study consisted of stories of good practice as 
interpreted by successfully integrated immigrants, these people encountered 
many diffi  culties and faced many troubles during this long-term process. Th e 
interviewees presented several situations in which it had to be very hard not 
to change course into the direction of a marginalized or a separated identity, 
and which showed that the disadvantages resulted from “their social position” 
in the labour market and legal system of host countries rather “than from their 
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ethnicity” (Burnett 1998: 14). In this context the term ethnicity implicitly 
means not only belonging to an ethnic group but also cultural values and norms. 
While in this part we have approached the immigrant identity in the period before 
the open formulation of the post-secular thesis (Habermas 2007 in particular), 
the last part of this chapter deals with changes in the (perception of ) immigrant 
identity that appeared aft er the realization of the post-secular situation.
Immigrant identities in the post-secular society
Th e kind reader who has followed the text to this point may be thinking 
about why religion was not mentioned in the narratives analysed. Th e original 
research design contained the question about religious identity and about the 
adaptation of religious practices in a host country, but team members from the 
West European countries considered these questions to be inappropriate, because 
religion was deemed to be a matter of the private sphere. Th is brief account from 
2003 fi gures as evidence of the situation before several signifi cant changes during 
the 2000s took place.
Th ese changes have roots in the post-1945 development of Europe which 
needed to be reconstructed aft er WWII. Th e states in Western Europe found 
a solution to the labour force problem that became obvious in later years in 
the immigration of foreign workers for temporary employment. “By the 1960s, 
migrant labour had become a structural feature of Western European labour 
markets” (Castles 2000: 7). When it became evident that the temporary workers 
would stay for good, the question of their integration emerged. Among the three 
main approaches to the incorporation of immigrants, besides assimilation and 
diff erential exclusion, multiculturalism (Castles 2002: 1154) was introduced 
as part of offi  cial policy, initially in classical immigrant countries such as 
Canada (1971) and Australia (1973). West European countries (especially Great 
Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden), too, began to apply, to varying degrees, 
multicultural policies in an attempt to integrate immigrants, in particular 
those of non-European descent (Modood 2007: 4). Multicultural policy has 
been criticized since the 1970s (Vertovec 2001: 2), with a growing intensity 
(but also refl exivity) during the 1990s, and was marked as dysfunctional at the 
beginning of the 2000s (Alibhai-Brown 2001). Multiculturalism was accused 
of developing ‘a parallel society’, i.e. causing the fragmentation of society into 
a mosaic of mutually (socially) segregated groups/communities. In less than a 
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decade multiculturalism was proclaimed dead (by the Bavarian state minister 
Horst Seehoff er) and the model of the multicultural society branded as a failure 
(by the German chancellor Angela Merkel and the British prime minister David 
Cameron) by some high-level European politicians. 
Hence, the fi rst change that has a potential infl uence on the formation of 
immigrant identity is the shift  in de-emphasizing multiculturalism and openly 
focusing on so-called civic integration. Th e policy of civic integration imposes 
the obligation on newcomers to enrol in civic and language courses and to pass 
the civic integration exam if they want to obtain permanent residence permits or 
be accepted into the naturalization process. Although multicultural policies were 
fully abandoned only in the Netherlands, at the same time the civic integration 
approach (as a political doctrine and social policy) has developed rapidly since 
the late 1990s (Banting and Kymlicka 2012) and has been “adopted by, among 
other European states, Finland, Denmark, Austria, Germany and France” 
( Joppke 2007: 8). 
Th e second process is associated with the changing perception of various 
religious communities among which co-existence with Muslim communities 
spurred the most frequent debates. Frédérique Harry (in chapter 8 of this 
collected volume) shows how the Norwegian far-right movements started to 
employ religion in their political narratives aft er Muslims in Europe became 
the centre of the public debate on integration. Th ese nationalistic movements 
have in recent decades shift ed the emphasis from a secular discourse that had left  
religion unnoticed, or was opposed to it, to a non-traditional1 religious discourse 
by using the image of Christianity as a symbol for strengthening national 
identity. Post-secular society witnesses the utilization of the religious facade for 
the interests of secular movements and institutions. Harry’s study contributes 
to our understanding of the self-perception of Europeans (Norwegians) and 
empirically confi rms that religion has since the late 2000s become a public and 
heavily publicized topic.
Riem Spielhaus (2006) presents a similar shift , in the example of Germany, 
in the perception of immigrants from Muslim countries who have come from 
diff erent cultures of vast geographical areas. She claims that aft er decades in which 
immigrants’ religion was rather overlooked, “discussions on Muslims in Germany 
are now focusing on religious identity” (Spielhaus 2006: 17). In the debates before 
2000, the immigrant issues were discussed in ethnic terms (‘the Turks’) or within 
the ‘natives vs foreigners’ dichotomy, whereas the more contemporary discourse 
emphasizes their religious affi  liation. Allievi (2005) also points out that “the 
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immigrant has become the Muslim” and explains that some reasons for this shift  
are related to recent phenomena such as the increasing number of immigrants of 
Muslim origin and the emerging role of Islam as a public actor on the global scene. 
Th is change in perception brings the problem of homogenizing diverse groups of 
people with diff erent cultural background and sets of identities that can easily 
be ostracized and become a political scapegoat. Moreover, the ongoing situation 
causes a change in the self-perception of settled immigrants, aft er which the 
importance of religious identifi cation is steadily growing at the expense of other 
sources of identity. Roger Brubaker (2013) demonstrates how the relationships 
between language and religion have changed over the last 20 years. Although 
language has been both a subject and means of political contestation in the 
public sphere (and linked to issues of ethnicity and nationalism) and religion has 
been depoliticized into the realm of private worship, the counter-trend of recent 
years has led to the deprivatization of religion. Public religion diff ers from the 
domain of language in attempting intensively to “authoritatively regulate public 
and private life” (Brubaker 2013: 16). Th e study by Cüneyd Dinç (in chapter 2 
of this volume), by explaining the importance of the role of religion in the lives 
of (Muslim) young post-migrants (generations born in immigrant families) in 
Germany, supports the thesis about gradual deprivatization of religion. All the 
types of post-migrant devout Muslims bring the question of religious traditions 
into the public domain with diff ering intensity as they lead the debate on whether 
to accept or reject life in German society.
Th e growth of religious diversity in the Western world can be linked to another 
signifi cant change that puts into question the thesis about the secularization of 
modern society ( Juergensmeyer 2011). Th e discourse is personifi ed by one of the 
leading contemporary thinkers – Jürgen Habermas, who renewed the debate on 
the post-secular turn. Habermas (2008) assumes that a group of Western affl  uent 
societies (besides some European countries, also Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand), where people’s religiosity has decreased in the post-1945 period, are 
entering a new post-secular age. 
According to Habermas, this spatially and temporally limited defi nition of 
modern societies as ‘post-secular’ does not invalidate the secularization theory as 
it refers to a change in consciousness (Habermas 2008: 20, italics in orig.) and further 
can be linked to the three following phenomena. Th e fi rst phenomenon is based 
on an observation that the secularistic belief in the foreseeable disappearance of 
religion is weakened by global confl icts, while the second process refers to the 
growing importance of religion within national public spheres. 
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Th e third issue is directly linked to the object of this study because it considers 
the question of social integration and identities. Habermas (2008: 21) maintains 
that ‘the issue of tolerant coexistence between diff erent religious communities’ is 
complicated by diffi  culties in the social integration of immigrants, and concludes 
that growing social inequality should not be allowed to block the process of 
integration. Furthermore, he argues that the democratic state should not limit 
the sources for the shaping of identities by reducing the diversity of voices and 
opinions within the public discourse.
Conclusion
Th e outcomes of Habermas’ concept of the post-secular society and the message 
contained in it confi rm the signifi cance of the existing discourse about religious 
identities and link it directly to the situation in post-immigrant Western countries. 
Th e articulation of the post-secular discourse itself has a refl exive eff ect on society 
as well as on the scientifi c community (e.g. how social scientists approach identity 
at the present time). Th e consequences of the previously discussed changes – 
i.e. the emphasis on religious identifi cations – can obscure the understanding 
of immigrant identity, because widely used sociological categories (in other 
words, etic terms or a priori frameworks such as ethnicity and religiosity) may 
lack the explanatory depth and complexity necessary for the understanding or 
interpretation of what is specifi c for narratives about immigrants’ experiences. 
Unsuitable frameworks that are also changed from time to time – as we can 
observe in the case of the post-secular turn – can be counterproductive for 
understanding the common features of social adaptation and building more 
symbolic boundaries in the social reality can discourage social integration. 
Overemphasizing and (over)politicizing one of the sources of identity may cause 
a bias – as Spielhaus concisely argued in the case of ‘non-Christian’ immigrants 
in Germany – that religion is not the only source of Muslim identity and “it 
is certainly not the only reason for their actions” (Spielhaus 2005: 18). Stefano 
Allievi (2005) considers this the paradoxical situation in which the integration 
of Muslims and immigrants in general2 gradually continues, while they are still 
perceived as one of the groups endangering European society. Th e social identity 
that is labelled ‘immigrant’ is constructed by the media and radicalized segments 
of society as a threat (the Other).3 At the same time, autochthonous populations 
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strengthen their own reactive identities opposed to the Other within the borders 
of Europe. 
Th is immigrant social identity does not overlap with the second analytical 
perspective, i.e. self-identity, which was presented in the middle section of 
the text, focusing on the narratives of the generally successful (but not non-
problematic) social adaptation4 of mostly non-European immigrants. Th e 
narrative texts expressed the commonness in the immigrant experience of 
striving to ‘fi t in’ (to which a negative reaction aft er a failure to adapt can 
be a separated identity), the struggle to make a living and uprootedness 
(marginalized identity) from which identity issues and new identifi cations 
seem to stream and which are re/constructed in everyday life via language 
(Sabatos 2013), thoughts and social practices.5 
In spite of all the changes, the question of relevant immigration policies, of 
balanced conditions in ‘the system’ and rights for immigrants still remains at 
the centre of the solution on how to stop the separation and marginalization 
of immigrant groups – that is, not to let them become minorities but ethnic 
communities (Castles & Miller 1993) and individuals with an integrated identity, 
i.e. people who did not forget their origin and who at the same time feel at home 
in the new society (Anthias 2002). 
Notes
1 Th e religious discourse may be termed non-traditional, because rather than reviving 
Christian values, it helps to form a sense of obligation to a national community. Traditional 
religion (Christianity) is put to the service of civic religion (nationalism).
2 Similarly in the U.S.A., according to Waters and Jiménez (2005), immigrants are being 
successfully incorporated into American society. (see Waters, M.C. & Jiménez, T.R. 
(2005) ‘Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Th eoretical Challenges’. 
Annual Review of Sociology. 31: 105-25.)
3 Th is defi nition of social identity follows Szalo’s concept (2003), not Erickson’s theory 
of identity construction (Schwartz, Montgomery & Briones 2006). (see Schwartz, S.J.; 
Montgomery, M.J. and E. Briones (2006). ‘Th e Role of Identity in Acculturation among 
Immigrant People: Th eoretical Propositions, Empirical Questions, and Applied 
Recommendations’. Human Development, 49: 1-30.)
4 For a similar approach to immigrant identity that is oriented to narratives about experience 
and in which emic categories are interpreted and translated into etic ones during the 
analysis see (Maydell-Stevens, Masgoret and Ward 2007). About the analysis of immigrant 
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identity focused on a story structure see Benish-Weisman, M. (2009). ‘Between Trauma 
and Redemption: Story Form Diff erences in Immigrant Narratives of Successful and Non 
successful Immigration’. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40(6): 953-968.
5 Besides anthropology, psychology and sociology, comparative literature appears to be a 
prolifi c discipline in publications dealing with identity issues.
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Chapter 5
Manufacturing Self-Respect: Stigma, Pride and 
Cultural Juggling among Dalit Youth in Spain
Kathryn Lum
Th is chapter, which at fi rst view may be seen as an outlier in this volume, has as 
its function to broaden our focus on the study of ethnic minority diaspora youth 
by considering the identity management strategies of a non-Muslim community, 
the Dalit Indian youth living in Spain. Dalit youth face a dual challenge: how 
to combat caste stigma and how to negotiate being a racialized ethnic minority 
in Spain. For former untouchables, intra-ethnic prejudice is just as important 
as external discrimination. Th is chapter discusses the importance of music and 
micro acts of social normalization in defying caste stigma. It then explores 
the various strategies for integrating a bicultural identity that Dalit Indian 
youth adopt, focusing on the concept of situational ethnicity. It concludes by 
considering what this case study of a Dalit Indian community in the diaspora can 
teach us about segmented integration and bicultural and multicultural identities. 
Introduction
Much of the literature as well as popular discussion on the integration of ethnic 
minority second generation youth focuses exclusively on the axis of ethnicity 
or religion. Th is oft en ignores cleavages within ethnic groups and gives an 
impression of ethnic unity and homogeneity that does not exist in practice. In 
the case of the Indian subcontinent, caste is a signifi cant driver of identity that 
competes with ethnic/religious identity both in India and the Indian diaspora. 
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Th is is particularly so for Dalit (lower caste) Indians who suff er from intra-
ethnic discrimination from upper-caste groups. In fact, while it is frequently 
assumed that ethnicity will be the most important axis of identity for Indian 
ethnic minority youth, the caste stigma that Dalit youth must confront means 
that caste is at least as important as, if not more so than, their ethnic identities. 
While all Indian youth in the Spanish diaspora are racialized, this racialization 
is partially off set by a societal push to recognize and value all cultures equally. In 
contrast, the issue of caste remains taboo within the Punjabi community in Spain, 
making caste discrimination a more emotive issue for Dalit youth. Th is chapter 
will explore how youth from a ‘minority within a minority’, belonging to the 
Punjabi Dalit caste known as the Ravidassia, negotiate caste stigma and ethnic 
minority status in Barcelona. Grounded in an anthropological methodology, the 
aim of this research is to ascertain how youth subject to more than one form of 
discrimination overcome internalized stigma, while at the same time managing 
dual cultural infl uences. 
Th e Ravidassia are a group of former untouchables in the regional caste 
hierarchy of the Punjab, located in Northwestern India, stigmatized by both 
Hindus and Sikhs1 (although ritual impurity is not important theologically to 
the latter). Th e majority of the Ravidassia in the Punjab have adopted a heterodox 
version of Sikhism that incorporates the worship of their patron saint Ravidass 
who, despite being untouchable, achieved spiritual renown. Increased education, 
along with migration overseas, has enabled the Ravidassia community to achieve 
upward economic mobility in the Punjab, a process which has encountered 
strong resistance from traditionally dominant caste groups. In Spain, casteism 
has implanted and reproduced itself, forcing all Ravidassia youth to come to 
terms with the ‘casted mind’, despite living miles away from India, where caste 
politics is a daily reality. Most Ravidassia youth, defi ned as unmarried individuals 
under the age of thirty, are of an ‘in-between’ (Dronkers and van’t Hof 1994: 9) 
or ‘1.5’ generation, due to their status of being Indian born, yet partially raised 
in Spain: many came to Catalonia at a young age, generally before the age of 
sixteen. Th ese youth are bilingual and increasingly trilingual: fl uent in Punjabi, 
Spanish and Catalan and familiar with the Catalan school system. Like many 
other ethnic minority youth, they straddle two worlds – the Punjabi cultural 
universe of their family and the dominant culture of Catalan and Spanish society. 
However, as part of a stigmatized caste minority, they must also come to terms 
with their caste identity in a way that is not required of their upper caste peers. 
Using the examples of my interviewees, I discuss how Ravidassia youth view the 
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caste system and the impact of the new ‘Ravidassia pride’ movement that has 
emerged in the wake of the Ravidassia schism with Sikhism in 2009. I will then 
address how Ravidassia youth negotiate being an ethnic minority in Spain with 
multiple and oft en confl icting cultural expectations. I will conclude by analyzing 
the varied responses of Ravidassia youth to the challenges of biculturalism. 
Methodology
Th e fi eldwork for this chapter was carried out over a period of two years 
(2009-2011) in the greater Barcelona area and employed an anthropological 
methodology of ongoing participation observation in the Ravidassia temple 
and in family homes, as well as repeat, in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
young men and women in the 18-30 age group from the Ravidassia community. 
Interviews were conducted in Spanish and involved the “1.5” generation of young 
men and women who had migrated with their families to Spain as schoolchildren 
or early adolescents. Interviews were held either at the university or in a public 
space such as a quiet café or a park, chosen by the interviewee. Th e decision to 
avoid interviews at the temple or in family homes was motivated by a desire for 
greater privacy and confi dentiality. Initial contact with interviewees was made 
through the temple, as well as via the snowball method, resulting in a core sample 
of fi ft een youth, with a preponderance of young men (11 men and four women). 
Th is gender imbalance is a result of both the masculine majority of the community 
and the greater willingness of young men to be interviewed for the study. 
Attitudes towards the caste system
My interviews with upper-caste youth in India revealed that caste was oft en not 
particularly relevant for them until they reached university, where the issue of 
quotas for the lower castes has created a great deal of resentment on the part 
of upper-caste students. Many affi  rmed that they normally ‘did not think about 
caste’, a privilege that is not shared by the lower castes, many of whom grow up 
painfully aware that they are marked out as diff erent and choose to pass when 
they reach university in order to avoid stigma. In the diaspora, although the 
vexed issue of educational quotas does not colour caste relations, the caste system 
is still very much socially present. Eleanor Nesbitt, in her study of perceptions of 
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caste among young British Indian youth of Gujarati and Punjabi origin, shows 
that both Hindu and Sikh youth are well aware of caste. By the ages of eight 
to thirteen, Sikhs and Hindus are able to identify other children by their caste 
(Nesbitt 1997: 212). Hindu children understand caste as a hereditary institution 
and vertically graded hierarchy that implies marriage endogamy. Attitudes to 
the caste system among non-Dalit Hindus range from their being openly critical 
to an idealized acceptance (Nesbitt 1997: 207). While the majority accepted 
intercaste marriage, if somewhat grudgingly, they repeatedly declared that caste 
was irrelevant when it came to friendship (Nesbitt 1997: 208). Among young 
Sikhs, both Dalit and non-Dalit, repeated reference was made to ‘proper’ Sikhs, 
a concept which was oft en linked to caste, with Jat Sikhs perceiving themselves 
as well as being perceived by Ravidassia youth as ‘true’ Sikhs (Nesbitt 1997 
211-212). Among Ravidassia and Valmiki youth (Valmikis are another Dalit 
group), some youths spoke of their fear of being discriminated against should 
their untouchable origins be discovered, and of having learned various passing 
strategies from their parents for dealing with the caste question (Nesbitt 1997: 
212). Nesbitt concludes that caste and casteism is just as strong among young 
Punjabi Sikhs as it is among Gujarati Hindus. No longer considered relevant to 
friendship, it is still seen as central to marriage, although British Indian youth 
underline the fact that intercaste marriages are increasing (Nesbitt 1997: 213). 
Another study, carried out in 2001 among predominantly Gujarati Hindu 
British youth by the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies (the caste makeup of their 
sample was unfortunately not indicated), found that 35% of the respondents 
affi  rmed that the caste system infl uences some of the decisions in their lives, and 
43% agreed with the statement that “the caste system is important to my family” 
(Santosh & Vij 2003: 27). In this survey, while caste prejudice was condemned, 
the positive aspects of caste were also highlighted, such as caste-specifi c social/
religious events, and the security and identity that caste bestows (Santosh & Vij 
2001: 27). Brahmin youths rejected an ideology of Brahmin supremacy, but some 
did feel that being part of the Brahmin community made them diff erent and 
special. Th eir sample was equally divided on the issue of cross-cultural friendship: 
41% preferred to have friends from a similar religious/cultural background, while 
41% stated that this was not important. However, with regard to marriage, 67% 
declared that it was important for them to have a “Hindu life partner” (Santosh 
& Vij 2003: 22-23). 
How do Spanish Ravidassia youth2 perceive and make sense of the caste system? 
And how do these perceptions compare with those of other Indian youth in 
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Europe? In Spain, I interviewed exclusively Dalit youth regarding their perceptions 
of the caste system and intercaste mixing. Th e caste system was universally 
condemned and frequently compared to racism. Indeed racism as a metaphor 
was used more oft en than casteism when describing upper caste discrimination. 
Ravidassia youth emphasized that upper caste racism was a bigger problem than 
racism originating from Spanish society. When asked about experiences of racism, 
very few off ered any examples from Spaniards, whether at work or at school. Th is 
contrasts with the fi ndings from an Italian case study of second-generation youth 
from the Maghreb and the Philippines, which revealed local racism, especially 
in the job market, rather than internal instances of bigotry (Ricucci 2010: 422). 
Th e results from my Spanish interviewees have broadly echoed research 
already carried out in the UK on youth attitudes towards the caste system. All 
of my interviewees were in favour of inter-caste friendship, and considered 
caste to be immaterial in forming friendships. However, their fl exible attitude 
towards friendship contrasted sharply with their views on marriage, where all but 
one interviewee favoured marrying within one’s caste. As in the UK, caste was 
understood as a hierarchical and hereditary institution, but the legitimacy of this 
vertical hierarchy, in which Chamars are placed at the bottom, was continually 
contested. One articulate young man referred to caste as a ‘trap’, in which all 
castes, including Chamars, were ensnared: “[e]veryone believes that he is superior 
to someone else”. Th us caste is also understood as a deeply rooted mentality that 
automatically categorizes and ranks the worth of others – even when the system 
itself is condemned and despised. Th e relevance of caste to humanity or to the 
human personality was consistently challenged. ‘We all have the same blood’ 
and ‘I am fi rst and foremost a human being’ were common refrains. At the same 
time, Ravidassia youth fi nd themselves operating within a social system in which 
caste is omnipresent and assumed fundamentally to determine an individual’s 
personality traits. A system which automatically devalues the Chamar/Ravidassia 
identity and associates it with a number of negative characteristics such as being 
poor, illiterate, dirty and lazy/unreliable. Th e dominant caste in Punjabi society, 
the Jats3, were repeatedly criticized for their arrogance and superiority complex. 
Given that the Jats have traditionally dominated the Ravidassia both economically 
and culturally, there is a history of confl ict between the two communities that 
has recently been accentuated with the rise of Ravidassia assertion in the Punjab. 
Many Ravidassia identify the Jats with collective and individual feelings of 
humiliation and lack of respect. It therefore comes as no surprise that negative 
stereotypes were voiced about Jats as a group, such as their propensity for drink, 
kathryn lum100
their lack of education, and their lack of respect for women. Apart from the Jats, 
only the Lubanas (a generally prosperous intermediary caste) were singled out 
by the Ravidassia for being particularly casteist. In fact, some of my interviewees 
pointed out that the Lubanas were sometimes worse than the Jats, but the 
demographic dominance of the Jats both in the Punjab and the diaspora, means 
that casteism is most oft en associated with them. Ravidassia youth therefore fi nd 
themselves simultaneously dreaming of a world in which caste does not exist and 
also dealing with the daily reality of caste stigma and the consequences of their 
low position in the caste hierarchy, which leads them to strike back with negative 
caste stereotyping of their own. 
Th e supremely important institution of marriage in Indian culture can be 
regarded as a litmus test of evolving caste attitudes. Th e strong preference for 
marrying within one’s caste, at all points along the caste continuum, has made 
marriage the preeminent institution for maintaining caste boundaries. Th e 
modern leader of India’s Dalit movement, B. R. Ambedkar, recognized this and 
preached that ultimately only intercaste marriage could undo the caste system. 
Surveys of Indian youth show, despite expectations to the contrary, that they 
are surprisingly conservative with regard to the issue of marriage. A survey 
conducted by the national magazine India Today, for example, found that 73% 
of youth believe in arranged marriage (Bobb: 2006). Th is trend is echoed in 
the Spanish diaspora. Th e majority of Ravidassia youth accept the institution 
of arranged marriage (or at least the utility and ease of an arranged marriage), 
and prefer to marry a girl or boy of their own caste. As in India, the main reasons 
off ered are the ‘better understanding’ within the same caste or jat, and the greater 
parental and community support that intracaste marriages enjoy. No one wished 
to marry a Spaniard; the strong preference was that their marriage partner should 
be Indian, preferably an Indian settled in Spain. In preferring to marry a fellow 
Chamar, youths frequently pointed out that mixed marriage (both out of caste 
and with Spaniards) was disapproved of by the community – particularly so 
on the part of girls. Indeed, one girl pointed out the dramatic gendered double 
standard regarding marrying out: ‘[i]f I marry a Spanish boy, it is horrible; it 
will be very badly seen. If a boy does it, it is normal, people will feel proud, that 
he has married a gori (a white girl)’. Intercaste marriages were primarily viewed 
as undesirable due to cultural diff erences – a theme also echoed repeatedly in 
India. 21-year-old Balminder spoke for many when he highlighted the cultural 
diff erences between Chamars and other jats and emphasized the problematic 
nature of marrying out of caste: 
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“Normally Chamars don’t marry with people from other castes. Th e Jats are 
not raised well. Th ey drink a lot of alcohol, they do drugs, they have a lot 
of vices…people with problems. Not all are like that, but the majority yes. 
We prefer with another Chamar. Th ey will be of the same culture, they will 
think in the same way, they will understand each other better… it will avoid 
problems.” (Balminder, male, 21 years, Barcelona)
Th e key diff erence in the relationship to the caste system experienced by the 
upper castes and Dalits is that while caste is particularly salient when it comes to 
marriage and community events for all caste groups, it does not pose the problem 
of stigma management that the lower castes face. Upper caste youth do not have 
to think about how a new acquaintance will react to their caste identity, whereas 
the lower castes are aware that they are potentially ‘discreditable’ at any time. In 
addition, while marrying within one’s caste is accepted across a wide spectrum 
of youth, the motives for doing so can be quite diff erent for Dalits, who oft en 
fear that they will never be truly accepted by their in-laws if they marry out of caste. 
“Putt Chamara De”- Th e Emergence of a Chamar Pride 
Movement
Th e term ‘Chamar’ in India is a highly stigmatized one, equivalent to the highly 
derogatory term used to humiliate African Americans. Under the SC/ST 
(Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe)4 Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989, it is 
a legal off ence to call someone a Chamar. However, in the wake of the attacks 
on the spiritual leaders of Dera SachKhand Balland (the leading religious centre 
of the global Ravidassia community), which resulted in serious injury to their 
most senior leader and the death of his much respected second-in-command, 
the term Chamar has since been reclaimed by the community. Th e attacks on 
their beloved leaders (the personal gurus for a number of Ravidassia both in 
India and the diaspora) led to immediate riots in the Punjab. However, more 
than three years aft er this tragic incident, which took place in Vienna in 2009 
during a European tour by the gurus, the most visible change has been cultural. 
Starting in 2009, there was an explosion in songs that, imitating the pre-existing 
trend to exalt ‘Jatness’ in Punjabi folk music, sing the praises of the Chamar 
caste. Diaspora Ravidassia have played a key role in funding and promoting this 
musical renaissance (Dogra: 2011). Although the fi rst such song “Putt Chamara 
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De” (Sons of Chamars) appeared in 1998, in the aft ermath of the Vienna attacks, 
a veritable tide of songs has fl ooded the market, all with themes that speak of 
pride in being Chamar. Examples of songs include titles such as ‘Th e Fighter 
Chamar’, ‘Hummer Chamar’, ‘Th ese self-respecting Sons of Chamars’, ‘Th ink 
before Messing with a Chamar’ and ‘Young Lions of Chamars’. Th ese songs have 
all been accompanied by videos that have been hugely successful among the 
Ravidassia community. 
For the fi rst time, Ravidassia youth are able to listen to songs that speak to 
their need to assert themselves culturally and claim collective self-respect, in 
a broader context in which they feel their identity is under attack. Th ey are 
reclaiming bhangra, as Punjabi folk music is known, as a musical genre for their 
community aft er a long history of its being intimately associated with the Jat 
caste. Ethnographic studies of the Jat community show that bhangra is identifi ed 
and claimed by Jats as being ‘their music’ (Mooney 2008: 113). Ravidassia youth 
use social media such as YouTube to listen to and share videos of their favourite 
songs. In the gurudwara, ‘have you heard the latest song?’ has become a common 
theme of conversation, and youths proudly discuss the number of songs now 
available. During the 2010 birthday celebration for Guru Ravidass in Barcelona, 
one of the most popular “Putt Chamara De” songs was sung during the religious 
ceremony, indicating how symbolically important such songs have become. It is 
important to point out however that it is predominantly male youth who are 
the most enthusiastic fans of these songs. Th e videos that accompany them show 
young, well-built, menacing Ravidassia men who oft en brandish swords or guns, 
in a clear message that Ravidassia men will no longer be bullied or made to feel 
inferior by upper caste men. Th eir common theme is ‘we are just as manly as 
you’. Most of the titles make reference to Ravidassia boys and men only, such as 
the song ‘I’ve heard that there is talk of Chamar boys everywhere’. As with ‘Jat 
pride’ songs, ‘Chamar pride’ songs are aimed at promoting a specifi cally male 
Chamar pride and bolstering Chamar masculinity. Th us far, no song addressing 
Chamaris (female Chamars) has been released. However, one of the most popular 
singers in the Chamar pride movement is a young Punjabi woman known as 
Miss Pooja, who has galvanized the collective consciousness of the Ravidassia 
Chamar community with her inspiring song “Begumpura Vasauna” (‘Establish 
Begumpura’, the paradise of social equality envisaged by Ravidass). 
For youth raised on a constant diet of ‘Jat pride’ bhangra music, a cultural 
phenomenon which many previously took for granted, the new songs that speak 
positively of Chamars have greatly stimulated pride in their caste. Prior to the 
manufacturing self-respect 103
Vienna attacks, some Ravidassia youth rued the fact that many famous singers 
were Chamars, but due to caste stigma were not open about their caste identity 
or, even worse, sang ‘Jat pride’ lyrics. Now Ravidassia youth were eager to list 
all the singers who were Chamar, and more importantly, singing Chamar lyrics. 
Th e psychological impact of these songs on the self-esteem of a group that has 
historically been both underrepresented and negatively portrayed in popular 
culture should not be underestimated. In the words of a seventeen-year-old 
computer science student enrolled in a professional training college, these songs 
represent a collective ‘awakening’ of the Ravidassia:
“I feel good when I listen to these songs. I feel a lot of pride – before also, but 
now more. Now we are more awakened. I listen to loads of songs every day; 
this music is ours, it makes me feel strong. I no longer listen to the songs of 
Jats…they speak about Punjabi culture like it was theirs, as if all important 
persons were Jat. Th ese songs for the low castes are good to wake up our 
people. Now, there is more pride, I say, ‘what’s up Chamar’ jokingly to my 
brother.” (Nandeep, male, 17, Barcelona)
Although songs form the backbone of the emerging Chamar Pride movement, at 
the individual level important transformations are also taking place that have the 
potential to completely revolutionize the unequal power dynamics that structure 
social interactions between former untouchables and the upper castes. A growing 
number of Ravidassia youth, both male and female, are becoming micro 
ambassadors for Chamar pride in their daily lives through attempts to normalize 
their caste identity – that is, by declaring their caste identity as nonchalantly as 
their upper caste counterparts do. Just as Chamar Pride songs seek to make the 
Chamar caste like any other, declaring their caste identity with inner pride and 
confi dence seeks the same in daily social life. For such normalization to take 
place, Ravidassia youth must fi rst begin the process of ‘de-Othering’ themselves 
in their own minds, which enables them to embrace their stigmatized identity 
and feel comfortable with it despite its social devaluation. It is a process of 
defying stigma from within and coming to terms with stigma in such a way 
that it no longer provokes anxiety or feelings of inferiority. Goff man speaks 
of the ‘moral careers’ of stigmatized individuals, to describe the learning and 
socialization experiences of those who share a particular stigma. As in his 
defi nitions of discredited (visible) stigma versus discreditable (invisible) stigma, 
he is careful to distinguish between diff erent types of ‘moral careers’, depending 
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upon the stigma in question. He also identifi es two phases of socialization: 
that in which the individual acquires and internalizes the standards/norms of 
dominant society, and that in which he or she learns that he has a stigma, and the 
consequences of possessing it. Goff man calls the moment of stigma realization 
a ‘moral experience’ (Goff man 1963: 33). Most Ravidassia youth confessed that 
their strongest moment of stigma realization came when they moved to Spain 
and faced both subtle and open prejudice in Barcelona’s guruduwaras. What 
Ravidassia youth are currently attempting is a brave new moment in their ‘moral 
careers’: that of stigma unlearning. 
An example is off ered by 24-year-old Surinder, a pharmacy student who also 
works part-time in a local health centre. Gone is the discomfort and unease that 
she used to feel when faced with the ubiquitous caste question. Refl ecting on 
how she now feels internally when someone asks her about her caste, pharmacy 
student Surinder off ered the following observations:
“I don’t like to say that I am from a low caste, but rather that I have this caste, 
and that’s it. If I ask someone from an upper caste about their caste, they feel 
proud, they feel good that you have asked them that question, so why should 
I feel bothered or angry because I am asked?...For a Chamar or a Chuhra on 
the other hand, they always reduce themselves and this should not happen. 
I think that in a situation in which the person before you thinks he is strong 
because of his caste, I think a low caste person has to be his equal…Now 
if someone asks for my caste it’s as if they are asking me for my name and 
that’s how I respond, I am proud to be Chamar.” (Surinder, female, 24 years, 
Barcelona)
Aft er several years of internal struggle, Surinder reached the conclusion that the 
only feasible alternative was to accept and value oneself fully:
“If I don’t accept myself, what other options do I have?....None, and they 
are all negative. And they will aff ect you more. And what’s more, you will 
suff er…you have to come to the realisation that you must accept yourself in 
your entirety. Otherwise you will always be on the defensive.” (Surinder)
Surinder’s path to self-acceptance came through the realization that she could 
claim a piece of upper caste privilege and enjoy the same social ease that they do 
by fully accepting her diff erence and considering herself entitled to the normality 
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that is usually the prerogative of the upper castes in social life. For Ravidassia 
youth in the Spanish diaspora, then, Chamar pride, both in songs, and internally, 
is transforming their self-image and giving birth to a new self-confi dence and 
nascent assertiveness. In eff ect, Ravidassia youth, through music and in everyday 
social interaction, are creating a new language for thinking and feeling about 
their caste that is reclaiming the traditionally demeaning term of ‘Chamar’ and 
turning it into a term of self-respect, akin to ‘Jat’ or ‘Brahmin’. Th e Chamar pride 
movement shows that stigma, no matter how deeply rooted, can be overcome, 
at least from below, from those who suff er from its psychological weight. It also 
reveals that popular culture, in this case music, can be a very eff ective tool for 
‘speaking back’ to dominant groups and creating a self-affi  rming alternative 
narrative to that off ered by mainstream Punjabi culture. 
Situational biculturalism
In addition to overcoming caste stigma, Ravidassia youth living in Spain face a 
number of challenges related to their cultural identity. Whilst Spanish youth also 
deal with identity issues and must work out ‘who they are’, they do so supported 
by the majority culture. Native youth in Catalonia are more likely to report a 
Catalan/Spanish dualism, a cultural frame that is largely absent for Ravidassia 
youth, for whom the Spanish/Catalan binary is less emotionally salient than 
the India/Spain binary. Similarly, Ravidassia parents have the anchor of Punjabi 
culture to help them weather the stormy seas of adapting to a new culture, 
language and way of life. Ravidassia youth, on the other hand, must negotiate 
two diff erent, and oft en diametrically opposed, sets of cultural values. Th ey 
fi nd themselves inhabiting a psychological ‘borderland’, much like the Mestizo 
community in the United States described by Anzaldúa (Anzaldúa: 1987). Th ey 
receive contradictory messages regarding how to behave and identify – one at 
home and within the community, and the other, at school and in broader society. 
How do they resolve the psychological confl icts resulting from having dual 
cultural infl uences? Some theorists, such as Phinney (1999), posit a developmental 
model of ethnic minority identity that sees ethnic minorities proceeding neatly 
from one stage to another. He identifi ed fi ve stages: 1) conformity, characterized 
by a preference for the dominant culture; 2) dissonance, characterized by confl ict 
between the dominant culture and the culture of origin; 3) resistance and 
immersion, characterized by rejection of the dominant culture and acceptance 
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of the culture of origin; 4) introspection, during which the previous trend is 
intensifi ed; and fi nally 5) integration, characterized by a synergy between the two 
cultures. I believe that this developmental model is of limited use in helping us to 
understand the complex process of identity development among ethnic minority 
youth. In practice, individuals do not proceed in a linear fashion from one stage 
to another, but rather may be juggling several stages at the same time, depending 
upon the issue in question. My research reveals that ethnic identity for Ravidassia 
youth is very much situational in nature and is much more fl uid than Phinney’s 
model allows for. 
Marcia (1980), who identifi ed four statuses of ethnic minority identity, off ers 
a more fl exible, non-developmental model: 1) identity achievement, in which 
an identity is committed to aft er a period of exploration; 2) foreclosure, in 
which an identity is chosen without personal exploration, following family and 
community prescriptions; 3) moratorium, during which one is in the process of 
exploration; and 4) diff usion, in which no eff ort is made to explore or make an 
identity commitment. While Marcia’s model is an improvement on Phinney’s, 
it speaks of identity commitment in monocultural, as opposed to bicultural 
terms – it does not appear to allow for a dual identity commitment. It shares the 
limitation of Phinney’s model in that it does not contemplate the possibility that 
all four stages may be present simultaneously depending upon the identity issue 
that a particular youth may be facing. Like the previous model, Marcia’s model 
is too static and fails to capture the complexity and constantly changing nature 
of ethnic minority identity dilemmas. I argue that the fourth stage of diff usion is 
more likely to apply to majority than to ethnic minority youth, since most ethnic 
minority youths are forced to refl ect upon the nature of their ethnic identity and 
to make certain choices in order to be accepted both within their community 
and within the majority culture. Usually, it is only dominant culture youth who 
have the luxury of being non-refl exive and non-explorative, since they take their 
cultural references and values for granted and do not feel the need to interrogate 
them. 
I fi nd the model proposed by Berger, who studied the coping strategies of 
Jewish adolescent immigrants from the former Soviet Union in New York, to 
be more useful in helping us to understand how adolescent immigrants make 
sense of their dual identities. Berger (1997) identifi ed four patterns for dealing 
with what she calls adolescent immigrants’ ‘double identity crisis’: 1) clingers: 
those who hold on to their native culture and either passively or actively refuse 
to adopt the host culture; 2) eradicators: those who erase their culture of origin 
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and wholeheartedly embrace the norms of the new culture; 3) vacillators: those 
who oscillate between both cultures, fi nding it diffi  cult to choose either one; and 
4) integrators: those who concurrently balance aspects of both cultures, defi ned 
by Berger as truly bicultural (Berger 1997: 268.268). Berger points out that both 
individual factors, such as the perception of the place of their culture within 
the majority culture, and social factors, such as family dynamics, impact upon 
the coping patterns of ethnic minority youth (Berger 1997: 266). I would also 
add the critical factor of gender, since female Ravidassia youth have less scope 
for identity exploration than their male counterparts due to the patriarchal 
gender norms that govern Punjabi culture, leading to greater restrictions on 
their mobility and free time (most girls are expected to come home directly aft er 
school or work). Th e reputation of girls is much more fragile and Ravidassia girls 
are thus less able to take risks when managing their dual identities. 
My research among Ravidassia youth living in Spain reveals that Ravidassia 
adolescents exhibit aspects of all four patterns outlined by Berger, although with 
very few eradicators, since the vast majority of Ravidassia youth are proud of 
their Punjabi/Indian heritage and value their culture. Ricucci, in her case study 
of North African and Filipino adolescents in Italy, also found that it was ‘very 
important’ for them to maintain their culture and language (Ricucci 2010: 422). 
Strong social and family control also means that most Ravidassia youth are not 
free to eradicate, even if they wished to do so. Th us, rather than represent only 
one of the patterns defi ned by Berger across the board, Ravidassia youth tend 
to adopt diff erent identity strategies and levels of Spanish/Indian identifi cation 
depending upon their physical environment and the situation in which they fi nd 
themselves – performing a situational ethnicity. In the gurudwara, at home and 
in the street (particularly in areas with a large Indian/Pakistani population), they 
will enact a Punjabi ethnic identity (for example, through dress in the gurudwara 
and by taking care not to be seen speaking with someone of the opposite sex 
in public). At school, work or with non-Punjabi friends they will enact more 
syncretic ethnic identities. Th ey live in two diff erent cultural worlds, which 
they are adept at managing and keeping separate when necessary, performing a 
variety of ethnic identities simultaneously. Okamura, in his study of situational 
ethnicity, defi nes it as the ability of ‘actors’ either to affi  rm or obscure their 
ethnic identities in specifi c situations, ideally to their advantage, but with the 
caveat that such choices are always circumscribed by the overall structure of 
ethnic relations (Okamura 1981: 454-455). In recognizing the fl uid and at times 
strategic nature of ethnic identity, we avoid the reifi cation trap, and also capture 
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the fundamental contradictions inherent in all identities: just as women may 
strategically emphasize or downplay their ‘femininity’ in the workplace, ethnic 
minorities also adopt social situation-specifi c strategies for managing ethnicity.
Cultural jugglers
21-year-old Balminder, a mechanical engineering trainee, is a good example of 
this cultural juggling and individual mixing of the four patterns described by 
Berger. Balminder is a leading member of the community due to his language 
skills and is very active in the gurudwara. He is a confi dent integrator, who at 
times also demonstrates aspects of clinging and eradication, depending upon 
the cultural confl ict with which he is faced. He describes Ravidassia youth as 
“iguanas”, skilled at changing their self-presentation depending upon whether 
they are at home, at school, in the street or in the gurudwara. He himself affi  rms 
that he feels completely bicultural, adopting ‘half of Indian culture and half of 
Spanish culture’. However, there are times when the collision between the two 
is so great that he feels ‘radical, extremist’ and chooses either Indian culture or 
Spanish culture in order to resolve the confl ict. A dramatic example of eradication 
is when he and his younger brother took the momentous decision to move out of 
the family home despite being quite young and unmarried, a taboo even for boys 
in Punjabi culture (and completely unthinkable for girls). In taking this decision, 
he challenged not only the sacrosanct authority of his aunt and uncle, but also 
the injunction of his culture against youth independence prior to marriage. In 
putting his individual wishes ahead of those of his family, he was able to draw 
upon Spanish culture in order to support his case and validate his decision, 
although he confessed that he continued to feel guilty for several months aft er 
the move. 
In contrast, in an example of “clinging”, Balminder refers to his personal 
discomfort about showing physical aff ection in public. Whilst asserting that 
seeing other Indian or Pakistani boys kissing their girlfriends in public did not 
bother him, he declared that he personally would never dare to do so. Some 
things, he said, ‘just don’t change, no matter how long one has lived in Spain’. 
Interestingly, for both Balminder and other Ravidassia boys it is oft en round 
issues of gender values and behaviour that culture confl ict arises. A number of 
boys mentioned the dress of Spanish women or customs such as kissing in public 
as examples of cultural clashes that provoke unease – clashes that are usually 
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resolved in favour of Punjabi gender norms in one’s personal life. Balminder 
off ered an example of when his two cultural worlds collided simultaneously, 
and he was confronted with the diffi  cult situation of having to balance both at 
the same time. He related how once when he was walking with his aunt in the 
street, he met a former Latin American classmate who gave him an enthusiastic 
traditional kiss, as they had not seen each other for some time. He went bright 
red, and felt deeply embarrassed at his (shocked) aunt having witnessed such an 
intimate display with a classmate of the opposite sex. At the time he felt acutely 
uncomfortable, since he could not enact his usual environment-specifi c identity 
strategies. Later, however, he questioned why he should have felt so embarrassed, 
showing that the question of ethnic identity for Ravidassia youth is continually 
in fl ux.
Ravidassia girls face the same identity dilemmas as their male peers, but have 
less freedom when it comes to cultural juggling and balancing. Girls, as the 
repositories of both community and family izzat or honour, must jealously guard 
their reputations. Th is means that they are more limited in the extent to which 
they can be culturally syncretic. Th e fi ndings of Remennick, however, show that 
without such restrictions, it might well be young Indian women who sought to 
balance the two cultures more. Remenick studied the integration processes of 
the 1.5 generation of Russian immigrants in Israel, and discovered that young 
women were more open to social adaptation, learning Hebrew and forming 
friendships with other Israelis, than their male peers, who showed greater cultural 
conservatism (Remennick 2003: 59).
24-year-old Surinder is an excellent example of an integrator. She is fl uent in 
both Punjabi and Spanish/Catalan, has a number of Spanish acquaintances and 
incorporates aspects of both Indian and Spanish culture in her daily life. She both 
works and studies pharmacy, and is determined to be fi nancially independent. 
Yet, as a girl, she has faced additional hurdles in carving out her dual identity. 
In secondary school, she fought a major battle with her parents, particularly 
her father, for the right to wear jeans. Her parents had initially forced her to 
wear traditional Punjabi dress at all times, and it was only with much debate and 
discussion that she managed to secure the right to wear jeans. She is currently 
resisting their persistent attempts to marry her off , for she is nearing the age at 
which Punjabi girls’ value on the marriage market begins to ‘expire’. Th us far, 
she has managed to delay marriage with her studies and her insistence on fi rst 
establishing herself professionally. Many of the freedoms that Spanish girls take 
for granted, such as the right to go the beach, go out at night or have male friends, 
kathryn lum110
are denied to Surinder and other Ravidassia girls. Her desire to balance Spanish 
and Indian culture in her life is oft en frustrated by unspoken gender norms that 
proscribe certain activities for girls. For example, although Surinder would like 
to distribute langar (vegetarian food served at the end of religious services) in the 
gurudwara, she does not dare attempt to, fearing the reactions of her community. In 
the Ravidassia gurudwara, langar distribution is a task that has been monopolized 
by boys and men, based on the assumption that it would not be appropriate for 
girls to come into ‘close’ contact with males via serving food. 
Th erefore, Ravidassia girls, in addition to juggling the norms and expectations 
of two very diff erent cultures, must also operate within a restrictive gender 
ideology which, while also aff ecting boys, is far more punishing for and 
eff ective at policing girls. Surinder feels bicultural, but affi  rms that it ‘depends 
on the situation’, once again revealing the importance of situational ethnicity. 
Surinder also experiences signifi cant vacillation as she struggles to integrate 
the two cultures. She declares that she feels as if there were ‘two Surinders’, and 
confesses that committing to one is diffi  cult. She describes how the opinions of 
each culture are so diff erent that she does not see how she can reconcile them at 
times. For Ravidassia girls, the challenge of cultural reconciliation can be greater 
due to the expectation that they will remain faithful to Indian gender norms. 
Since the Punjabi community in the Spanish diaspora has eff ectively used gender 
norms as a cultural boundary marker, cultural and gender boundaries are oft en 
coterminous. Th us the way ‘their’ women and ‘our’ women dress and behave is 
used to distinguish the culture of origin from the majority culture, and also to 
value the culture of origin positively as morally superior. Th is makes girls’ juggling 
acts all the more diffi  cult, since transgressing a cultural boundary automatically 
implies transgressing a gender boundary as well, all too easily bringing with it the 
accusation of being ‘bad girls’. 
Biculturalism strategies
Ravidassia youth tend to respond in one of three ways to the challenges of 
biculturalism: they become positive jugglers, anxious jugglers or comfort zone 
jugglers. Regardless of the shift ing intensity of their ethnic identifi cation(s), 
or whether they have achieved the position of integrator defi ned by Berger, all 
must to some extent balance the demands of living in two diff erent cultures. 
Positive jugglers are those who see the benefi ts of biculturalism in their 
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lives, despite its stresses and diffi  culties. An example of a positive juggler is 
Balminder. He consistently highlights the positive aspects of biculturalism, 
despite acknowledging its inherent diffi  culties, as well as the problems that 
come from having to deal with families that are not ‘modern’ and gossipy 
members of the community that make it their business to keep an eye on the 
youth. Balminder defi nes having two cultures as ‘fun’, pointing out that he has 
twice the options when it comes to entertaining himself: he can choose both 
Spanish and Bollywood fi lms. He emphasizes the advantages of being able to 
choose the best of both cultures, the superior linguistic capital that having two 
cultures provides, a wider friendship network and the ability to connect with a 
wider range of people due to greater cultural knowledge. In other words, he feels 
that being bicultural has signifi cantly enhanced his cultural, social and linguistic 
capital. Indeed, he believes that his biculturalism will also bring him practical 
benefi ts in the job market. 22-year-old Akalpreet, who has completed her 
studies and now works in a fast food restaurant, echoes Balminder’s sentiments 
when she underlines that she has been able to learn many things thanks to her 
biculturalism, and above all, enjoy greater liberty as a girl than would have been 
possible in the Punjab. 
However, there are those for whom the stress of constantly having two cultural 
options and messages becomes overwhelming, resulting in biculturalism being 
viewed through a negative as opposed to a positive prism. Th ese youths fi nd that 
the inner turmoil of cultural juggling outweighs its possible benefi ts. Th ey are 
self-refl exive, and hence are aware of the psychological eff ects of biculturalism 
in their lives. Th is is particularly the case for female youth, who are subject to a 
multiplicity of gender pressures.
Surinder is a good example of how double standards for sons and daughters in 
the diaspora create additional anxiety for young women. Surinder states that, until 
now, having to juggle two cultures has made her depressed, and refers to the juggling 
as a constant struggle that causes stress and anxiety. While she hopes that in the 
long term at the age of forty or fi ft y she can say that being bicultural has benefi ted 
her, she currently feels overwhelmed by having to deal with diametrically opposed 
values on a daily basis, particularly in the fi eld of gender. She gives the example of 
make-up to illustrate her case. In the Punjab, unmarried girls generally do not wear 
make-up, but aft er marriage they are socially expected to apply make-up in order 
to advertize their married status publicly. In Spain, by contrast, girls generally 
start wearing make-up at an early age, but are not expected to follow a particular 
make-up protocol aft er marriage. Surinder cited this example as just one of many 
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with which she is faced (should she wear make-up to the gurudwara?) and fi nds 
diffi  cult to resolve satisfactorily, leading to chronic anxiety. Another thorny area 
was marriage:
“My parents want to marry me with someone with a high level of studies 
– he should be from my caste. I don’t care about his level of studies or his 
colour (skin tone). My goal is not to marry someone from my caste – it 
is my struggle. Every time we go to India they want to marry me. All my 
female cousins were married at the age of eighteen – for them I am old! 
My argument is this: I want to be independent and provide for myself... It 
is already diffi  cult to decide with whom you want to marry. Imagine with a 
person from another caste. It is diffi  cult, but not impossible. It is the young 
generation that has to change. I think that if we young people give a good 
example to children, those children will have an easier time when they 
become youth.” (Surinder, female, 24 years, Barcelona)
Surinder was one of the few youths who spoke candidly of the confl ict between 
following one’s heart and obeying one’s parents and conforming to broader 
community pressure:
“[t]he izzat, the dignity of my parents, their image in the community is 
important. Th e decision depends upon them. What do I want? Th at they 
decide for me? I could not be happy if I obey my parents, I would be killing 
all my dreams, what I want…what is more important: happiness or dignity?” 
(Surinder, female, 24 years, Barcelona)
Surinder is not alone in experiencing an intense internal struggle to reconcile 
confl icting desires – following her own heart and pleasing her parents. Her 
dilemma has been studied in the psychological literature on second generation 
diaspora youth. Srinivasan, in her comparative study of Indian origin female 
university students in the US and India, found that psychological stress was 
highest among Indian females and Americans of Indian origin who most 
identifi ed with Indian culture. Indian American and Indian females reported 
high stress levels (much higher than their European American counterparts), 
due to marriage/career pressure and a psychological discrepancy between their 
publicly stated values and their ‘inner’ attitudes (Srinivasan 2000: 148-49). 
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Th e strong pressure to be ‘good Indian girls’ to which they are subject gives them 
a much heavier psychological burden.
A third trend is represented by comfort zone jugglers, who are less self-refl exive 
than the previous two groups. Th eir response to the stress inherent in combining 
the two cultures and defi ning their ethnic identity is to remain within a Punjabi 
cultural ‘comfort zone’, eff ectively avoiding the oft en intense inner confl ict 
experienced by anxious jugglers. Such youths frequently deny the presence 
of cultural stress in their lives and maintain that they have no problems with 
Spanish culture. 17-year-old Nandeep is an example of a comfort zone juggler. 
Apart from one Pakistani classmate who is an acquaintance, all his friends are 
Ravidassia. He goes to the gurudwara every Sunday, and his cultural references 
are predominantly Punjabi. He watches Indian fi lms, listens to Punjabi music and 
eats exclusively Indian food. While comfort zone jugglers do not actively reject 
Spanish culture, psychologically they distance themselves from it and are oft en 
critical, especially of its gender norms. Nandeep, for example, while claiming that 
everyone is free to do as he or she pleases, speaks critically of Spanish woman 
bathing ‘naked’ at the beach or being scantily dressed. Th ey exhibit more neutral 
attitudes towards biculturalism, precisely because they seek to avoid the sort of 
questioning – and the inner doubt/uncertainty – characteristic of Ravidassia 
youth who confront the challenges of biculturalism head-on. Th us while almost 
all Ravidassia youth affi  rm that they incorporate aspects of both Indian and 
Spanish culture into their lives and feel ‘both from here and from India’, their 
responses to the diffi  culties involved in cultural juggling vary. 
Conclusion 
For Indian diaspora youth from Dalit castes, striving to achieve self-acceptance 
and overcome caste stigma goes hand-in-hand with cultural juggling. Th ey 
face not only the social and psychological challenges of biculturalism, but 
also, unbeknown to the host society, internal prejudice and discrimination. 
Th eir experiences show that an exclusive focus on ethnicity alone as an axis of 
integration is mistaken: the internal cleavages of immigrant communities must 
always be taken into account, particularly in policy-making. Th e situational 
ethnicity approach of Ravidassia youth reveals that although Indians are always 
racialized in the diaspora, they can affi  rm their ethnic identities in ethnic-
majority spaces, and enact a variety of social performances in majority spaces, 
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which can vary from emphasizing a Spanish identity to combining both Indian 
and Spanish identifi cations depending upon the situation. Th is gives fl exibility 
but also gives rise to identity management strategies. Broadly, whether positive, 
anxious or comfort-zone jugglers, the integration process of the 1.5 generation 
of Ravidassia youth in the Spanish diaspora can be described as segmented, in 
which most youth are ‘Punjabi’ at home but ‘Spanish’ to varying degrees in public 
life. Srinivasan describes the fi rst generation of Indian immigrants to the US as 
‘dichotomizing’ their lives between the family and the outside world, while the 1.5 
second generation and second generations consider the US their home (Srinivasan 
2000: 138). However, this case study has shown that segmented integration and 
compartamentalization also occurs in the 1.5 and subsequent generations, which 
can in part be attributed to the diff erent sociocultural contexts of Spain and the 
US: the former is a relatively new immigrant country and continues to maintain 
a citizenship policy based on ius sanguinis. My fi ndings coincide with those of 
Remennick, who also found that the 1.5 generation of Russian immigrants in 
Israel remained fi rmly connected to their co-ethnic circle in the private realm, 
for friendships, a social safety net and intimate relationships (Remennick 2003: 
60). Rather than interpret these fi ndings as an indication that the Ravidassia 
community is not integrating as desired into Spanish society, I would argue 
that segmented integration need not be viewed as ‘holding immigrants back’. 
Success in education and employment can co-exist with social networks that 
are principally co-ethnic. Indeed, despite not being established for very long in 
Spain, some members of the 1.5 generation have started to enter university, while 
others are setting up their own businesses. 
Paul Scheff er, in his book “Th e Open Society and Its Immigrants”, argues 
that migration entails a shared experience of loss and alienation on the part of 
migrants and of natives, since both lose familiar worlds and must come to terms 
with a new reality. According to Scheff er, this mutual loss is akin to the process 
of grieving, in which there is initially resistance to and denial of loss, followed 
by anger and fi nally acceptance (Scheff er 2010: 17). He also stresses the diffi  culty 
that particularly the in-between generation faces in fi nding a sense of belonging, 
rootedness and ‘home’. However, in emphasizing a discourse of loss, Scheff er 
ignores both the tangible and intangible gains that the in-between generation 
reaps, despite the stress of cultural juggling. While it is true that, as Scheff er 
puts it, ‘it takes a great deal of eff ort to balance on a slack rope slung between 
the country of origin and the country of arrival’, cultural juggling also produces 
cultural richness and resilience (Scheff er 2010: 31). I argue that we need to adopt 
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a new paradigm for viewing integration and migration, one in which having 
multiple identities is increasingly normalized for all citizens, both native and 
migrant, rather than viewed as problematic or as an obstacle to integration. Th e 
‘imagined community’ of all citizens needs to be expanded in order to make room 
for multiple identifi cations and affi  liations. While we speak about a ‘globalized 
world’, the reality is that nations, like religions, are keen to stake out exclusive 
psychological territory, as witnessed by many nations’ unwillingness to recognize 
dual nationality. Similarly, at the social level, the ubiquitous question of ‘where 
are you from?’ that the in-between generation faces reveals that at the micro 
level we continue mentally to perceive and classify individuals according to their 
ethnicity, implicitly making those of the in-between and subsequent generations 
feel out of place in their own country. While the results of my research show 
that cultural juggling can be unsettling and anxiety-provoking, it ultimately 
serves as a creative source of social and emotional capital that will hopefully 
lead to more open, tolerant and creative citizens in the long term. Whether 
positive, anxious or comfort zone jugglers, all Ravidassia youth are active in 
carving out a cultural path for themselves in which they can claim pride in their 
various identities. Th ey are true ‘cultural workers’ in a world that still privileges 
monoculturalism. Th is case study of Ravidassia youth living in Spain shows that 
the future of a strong Europe will be one in which all citizens move away from 
monoculturalism, which can be viewed as a form of cultural defi cit, and adopt 
what one international movement of highly mobile individuals calls the ‘third 
culture’, to characterize their plural cultural and psychological identifi cations. 
Bi- and multiculturalism at the individual level should no longer be exclusively 
identifi ed with migrants and their off spring, but rather as a resource for all 
citizens. 
Notes
1 Sikhism is a religion that was born in 1469, founded by Guru Nanak in the Punjab. 
Although infl uenced by certain aspects of Hindu culture, its ten Gurus condemned the 
caste system, purdah (the segregation of women) and ritualism, all common features of 
Hindu society at the time.
2 Th roughout this article I employ Indian English usage when referring to unmarried youth: 
boy for unmarried young man and girl for unmarried young woman.
kathryn lum116
3 Th e Indian caste system is extraordinarily complex, with diff erent regional manifestations 
of caste that do not always place the Brahmins at the pinnacle of the local hierarchy, but 
rather regional castes whose power oft en derives from their ownership of land.
4 Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe are offi  cial Indian government terms used to 
refer to the former untouchables in the case of the scheduled castes and to various tribal 
communities in the case of scheduled tribes.
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Chapter 6
A Case of Euro-Muslimness 
in Poland? Th e Polish Tartars case
 
Katarzyna Warmińska
Th e chapter focuses on Polish Tartars, the progeny of the Golden Horde – a small 
ethno-religious community which has thoroughly written itself into the Polish 
ethno-cultural landscape. Th e example of their history and contemporary life 
shows both the identity strategies undertaken by the groups which have a post-
migration origin and which for centuries have lived in a social environment that 
is diff erent from their own culture and religion, as well as – which is signifi cant in 
the context of the debate in recent years concerning the possibility of a dialogue 
between the Islamic and Western worlds – the ways of building relations which, 
metaphorically speaking, can be described as good-neighbourly. I will illustrate 
the principles and the logic of building intercultural relations which, above all, 
are geared towards cooperation. 
  
Between ‘post-migrant’ and indigenous status
 
Co-existence or the neighbourhood of cultures can take on diff erent forms, 
starting with co-operation or neutral distance, and ending with confl ict 
relationships. Th e logic and dynamics of these relations are derivatives of many 
factors: the character and a range of cultural diversity in a society on the macro-, 
mezzo- and micro-social scales; the dominating political discourse (offi  cial 
and existing in the public domain) dealing with the desired state of aff airs in 
intercultural relations; the type of nationalism which determines the attitude 
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towards ethno-cultural otherness; and fi nally factors of a historical or geopolitical 
nature.
One of the more important aspects of intercultural relations is those in which 
the host and the newcomers, or members of the receiving society and migrants, 
are entangled. Th eir presence in a given society can be relatively short-term or 
can last for many centuries, just as the reasons for their arrival can be diff erent 
from the conditions on which their stay in their place of settlement is possible. 
In time, they can become ‘one of us’ (from the perspective of a receiving society) 
and assimilate; they can also, metaphorically speaking, become a personifi cation 
of strangeness/a symbol of otherness; but they can also be regarded as the 
familiarized other.
Th e issue of migration and its consequences for the entirety of cultural relations 
within contemporary societies has found its place in the centre of attention 
of numerous social researchers. My goal is not to review the literature on the 
subject, as the main theoretical considerations were made in the Introduction 
(Leman, Toğuşlu and Sezgin), but to draw the reader’s attention to one of the 
most interesting dimensions of intercultural relations between newcomers and 
their hosts, i.e. long-term relations. 
In this part of Europe, Tartars – Sunni Muslims – invite curiosity because their 
location seems untypical, even exotic. Intriguing as it may seem, their exoticism 
is not the only reason for which they have been taken as an example. From the 
standpoint of migration issues, the community does not belong to those who, 
according to objective criteria, can be described as suffi  ciently settled in a given 
social place that their post-migrant status loses its signifi cance. Members of this 
community have a sense of their separateness which partly results from their 
uncommon history. Also, their social environment communicates this very 
context of their being unique. Furthermore, the long time which has passed 
since the time of the Tartars’ settlement in this part of Europe has resulted in 
their conviction about their right to be ‘here’, about being ‘at home’ in territorial, 
symbolic and identity dimensions. 
Th erefore, one can say that the group is positioned “in-between” as they are 
not really post-migrant and not really seen as indigenous. Th is ambivalent status 
makes it the starting point for my consideration of the issue in the title: Being a 
Muslim in Poland. 
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Polish Tartars: an introduction
According to historical sources, contemporary Polish, Lithuanian and Belorussian 
Tartars are, fi rst of all, the descendants of newcomers from the Golden Horde, 
who settled in the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the fi rst half 
of the fourteenth century. In those days, the population was not dense, as it is 
estimated to have been 12,000 or so in total. Th e main concentration of the Tatar 
population was in Vilnius and its surrounding areas – Troki, Minsk, Słonim 
and in the Podlasie area. Th e Tartar settlement in contemporary Poland – in 
Podlasie, where the biggest Tartar group (approximately 3000 strong) currently 
resides – began in the second half of the seventeenth century (Borawski; 
Dubiński 1986).
In the context of the issue being discussed, it is important to stress that arriving 
in the territories of Lithuania and later the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
meant, in the majority of cases, the specifi c location of the Tartars within the 
spaces of these political entities, both in reference to the location of the settlement 
(geographically) and in reference to their legal status based on the right to land and 
nobility and related privileges and obligations (which does not pertain to those 
who were not free or the descendants of Tartar prisoners). Generally speaking, 
they were allowed to settle down in return for military service. Although limited 
due to their religious otherness, they were granted some citizenship rights. Islam, 
the practice of which was not in any way restricted (except during the period of 
persecutions in the 17th century), constituted a barrier, making it impossible to 
be fully included in the privileged group of citizens of the old Republic. As a 
result of marriages with Catholic and Orthodox partners, some of them became 
Christians and assimilated.
One can say metaphorically that, in a period of a few hundred years, a Tartar 
ethnic world was born and developed: not a temporary world but a well-
established one. It had a specifi c character, in which such elements as religion 
(Islam), the nobility ethos as well as traditions and social and cultural values of 
the surrounding environment permeated each other, especially since their own 
ethnic language ceased to be the centre of communication as early as the sixteenth 
century. Within this world, community life went on, new mosques were built 
and cemeteries and places of remembrance established.
Th e situation changed only in 1918 when national borders divided the Tartar 
community for the fi rst time. Statistics from 1930 show that there were about 
6,000 Tartars in Poland, mainly concentrated in the Vilnius, Nowogródek, 
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Grodno and Białystok regions. About 2,500 Tartars lived in Soviet Belorussia, 
and a little over 1,000 in Lithuania. (Miśkiewicz 1990).
Th e consequences of World War II were also crucial for the Tartars’ situation 
because at that time another breakup of the group took place. Aft er the change 
of national borders, some Tartars took the decision to leave their local mother 
country in 1945 and, together with other Poles, left  the territories then annexed 
to the Soviet Union and moved, fi rst of all, to the Western Territories, and then 
to the Podlasie region. Th e immigration movement included one third of the 
population which had lived in Poland before the War. Th e borders, which divided 
the Tartar community for many years to come, not only brought about physical 
alienation of the members of the group but also, in consequence, contributed to 
the creation of diff erent Tartar ethnoses. 
Even in the interwar period the community functioned under the common 
name of the Polish-Lithuanian Tartars, which had historical connotations. Today, 
however, we speak of Polish Tartars, Lithuanian Tartars and Belorussian Tartars. 
Th e ethonym (composed of two elements) can serve as an interesting indicator of 
an identity situation among contemporary Tatars. Firstly, it informs one about 
the Polish-Lithuanian Tartars’ common origin, their ethnic history, culture or 
specifi c Muslim religiousness, which – when considered together – decide the 
separate, unique character of this historical community.
Secondly, the adjectives “Polish”,  “Lithuanian”  or “Belorussian” are not 
just territorial indicators of a group’s roots in the meaning of contemporary 
state locations but also – as the case of the Polish Tartars shows – a national 
identifi cation or – in the case of the Lithuanian or Belorussian Tartars – a 
potential piece of information about community ties or citizen loyalty. 
Currently, the Tartar population in Poland numbers roughly 5,000 according 
to estimates by the Muslim Religious Association.1
Th e national census of 2011 showed that, in Poland, it had almost 2,000 
members. Th e legal status of Polish Tartars was regulated by the Act of 2005 on 
national and ethnic minorities and on regional languages, according to which 
they are a recognized ethnic minority in Poland. It gives them some rights and 
fi nancial support from the state and its institutions.
Today’s Polish Tartars do not constitute a socially compact community, as 
they are dispersed all over Poland, living mostly in smaller or bigger towns. Th e 
reconstruction of a community life of the past has been only partially successful. 
At present, Białystok, the capital of the region, and the neighbouring towns are 
the area where over half of the members of the Tartar community live, although 
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before WWII only some 10% of them lived here. We can say that contemporary 
Tartars do not cultivate their traditional community life around the place 
of their residence, but rather around moments of being together on religious, 
ethnic or family occasions, although their kinsmen in Lithuania still live in 
conglomerations, like the one in the village of Sorok Tatary, where a community 
of several tens of Tartars have lived for over 450 years.
Th ey gather in two associations – religious and ethnic. Th e Muslim Religious 
Association keeps eight religious communes, linking for the most part Muslims 
of Tartar origin. Today, the Muslim Religious Association and its ethnic 
organization –  the Polish Tartars’ Association – have their seats in Białystok. 
And so, near Białystok, in the villages of Kruszyniany and Bohoniki, there are two 
old mosques and cemeteries which date back to the 18th and 19th centuries (from 
among 17 temples and 39 cemeteries they had during the interwar period). Th ese 
places have, as my interlocutors declare, the most symbolic meaning to them. Once 
typically Tartar, at present these villages are inhabited by a few families, and they 
constitute places where during their major religious holidays Tartars from all over 
Poland arrive to pray together in the mosques and to visit their ancestors’ graves. 
Another relatively socially compact group of about 200 Tartars lives in Gdańsk. 
Th ey have, besides the aforementioned old mosques, a temple in Gdańsk, three 
cemeteries and a few houses of prayer. In 2004 the post of Muft i was established. 
Being a representative of the group, he leads the religious life of the Muslim 
community.
For many years, the Muslim Religious Association was the only religious 
association connecting Muslims in Poland, and, for the most part, the Tartars 
functioned as imams. Under the organization’s statutes, everyone who came from 
a Muslim family automatically became a member of the Association. In practice, 
this meant that he/she also had Tartar origin. It was so because for many years 
the Polish Tartars shared a conviction that they were the only group of Muslims 
in Poland that could be distinctly separated. Th e stereotype that every Tartar 
in Poland is a Muslim and every Muslim in Poland is a Tartar confi rmed this. 
Th e awareness had both historical roots, as the Polish Tartars had always lived 
in relative isolation from the Islamic world, and political roots because the 
contact of members of this community with other Muslim believers, especially in 
communist Poland, boiled down to more or less sporadic and intensive meetings 
with students from Muslim countries. Th e latter, among others, served as teachers 
of religion in the absence of those members of the group who were able to run 
such educational courses.
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Th e situation started to change in the 1990s when Muslims from other 
countries started to settle in Poland temporarily or permanently, and when 
conversions to Islam began to occur. What is more, in 2004 another religious 
association was legalized – the Muslim League of Poland. Th ose factors have 
brought about a change in the formula of membership of the Muslim Religious 
Association, which for the past few years has been admitting Muslim believers 
who have Polish citizenship or a permanent residence card. Consequently, the 
ethnic make-up of the Muslim Religious Association has changed; at present 1/3 
are non-Tartars, and the communes are led by people from outside their ethnic 
community. 
A complex confi guration of identifi cations
My research on Tartar identity has shown that members of this group are carriers 
of a multiple identity in the ethno-cultural sense.2 For members of the community, 
combining and integrating three aspects in one identity project, i.e. the religious, 
ethnic and national-citizen aspects, is a legacy and obvious reality. Th e image of 
the world based on which one can be a Muslim, a Tartar and a Pole at the same 
time has been permanently domesticated by group tradition and ideological 
visions as well as by the experiences of individuals. Th e existing identifying status 
quo is a result of both identity choices and also a certain historical logic.
Th eir being Polish comes from the fact of their acquisitive prescription (of over 
600 years), cultural community (the language), historic traditions (especially 
military ones), historical memory and citizenship. Th eir being Tartars, however, 
is determined by their origins, historical memory, traditions, but most of all by 
their religion, Islam, which delineates the ethnicity of the group very strongly. 
I wish to stress, in general terms, that in the case of this group, on the identity 
level, we are dealing with a strong mutual permeation of ethnic and religious 
elements, like the abovementioned stereotype. Th erefore, we can talk about a 
far-reaching ethnicization of religion. Moreover, another strong component of 
a collective identity in its ethno-cultural aspect is Polishness, understood as a 
national or state identifi cation. 
Polishness locates itself, metaphorically speaking, between an obligation 
and a fate. Th e fact of having (participated) lived in Polish society for many 
decades brought about a far-reaching enculturation into Polishness within the 
aspect of popular culture and also within the values of the national canon of 
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values, attitudes, visions of the history, everyday and festive codes. Th is fi nds its 
expression in the manner of argument for being Polish, which is deeply rooted 
in the traditional/dominating discourse, although the civic element has become 
stronger in recent years, and it is stressed in many declarations that citizenship 
and nationality are two separate issues. It is interesting that the scholarly discourse 
which postulates the existence of multiple identities goes hand in hand with the 
declarations of the members of the community and, to a certain degree, is used 
reversibly for self-description. So one can say that it has become an element of a 
reference knowledge.
At this point I would like to mention yet another issue. Th e Tartar community 
is distinct in respect of religion as its members practise Islam. Th eir religion is 
tightly bound up with the ethnic dimension of identity, although for some of 
the group’s members it is a dimension that functions independently of the ethnic 
one, which is expressed in the name used to mark the group: Polish Muslims. Th is 
is not the place to explain the role of religion in marking the ethnic boundaries 
of a group but, in the context of a collective memory of the type I am speaking 
about, the fact of preserving Islam is equivalent to preserving the separateness of 
the ethnic group and, like Tartarness, an argument of a dual character. Perhaps I 
should just mention that the religious past constitutes a crucial key to deviations 
from Islamic principles, especially in relations with Muslims from outside Poland. 
An ultimate argument is those 600 years of being here, in the sea of Christianity, 
as one of my interlocutors said, and preserving the religion of the ancestors. 
Th is complex identity confi guration, resulting from the mutual permeation 
of cultural areas as a system of reference for building self-defi nition, i.e. those 
connected with the Tartar origin, religion and Polishness, causes the processes of 
building symbolic borders of the community to be dynamic and multifaceted. As 
my interlocutors declare, each of the mentioned elements is important to them 
and, in a sense, inalienable, despite the fact that their importance diff ers depending 
on how a given subject constructs his/her vision of self and the community. 
To illustrate this issue briefl y, let us refer to the name as an important emblem 
of the group. Some of its members name “him/herself ” as “Polish Tartars – 
Muslims”, others as “Polish Muslims”, “Poles of Tartar origin”. If each of these terms 
were to be treated as a declaration of identity, not just as a customarily used name, 
then one would be able to note the complexity of this system of identifi cation. 
Stressing or omitting one of the three key elements in one’s declaration does not 
exclude the others. It does show, however, his/her identifi cation preferences in a 
given time and place or a moment in that person’s life. One should also remember 
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that that social identity is always constructed vis a vis others, be it members of 
one’s own group or a social environment in a broad sense, and this fact defi ne a 
possible area for the negotiation of social recognition.
For instance, if for some of the members of the group it is being a Muslim 
(let us add a Polish Muslim) that is most important, and if they emphasize 
this community identifi cation in relations with others, then perhaps they will 
encounter a barrier caused by the situation where in popular discourse they 
function, fi rst of all, under the name of Polish Tartars – Polish Muslims. Such a 
situation took place when the Muslim Religious Association celebrated its 80th 
anniversary, when during the festivities the Muft i used in his speech the term 
“we Polish Muslims”, while the representatives of local authorities addressed their 
words to the Polish Tartars saying “our Tartars”. It has to be stressed that this 
did not stir up any objections on the part of the representatives of the group. 
Nevertheless, it was an interesting example of the interplay between internal and 
external aspects of social identity. 
 
Co-operative neighbourhood relations 
 
In the case of Polish Muslims, being a Tartar in Poland translates into a variety of 
institutional, ideological and less formal daily activities which are based on such 
an interplay of similarities and diff erences when delineating symbolic borders 
of the community, so that on the one hand its religious and ethnic separateness 
could be preserved, and so that it was possible to delineate a possibly wide fi eld 
of complementarity with the dominating group on the other. Hence, the identity 
aspect and social practices are equally important.
In order to describe strategies which members of this community adopt in 
multicultural relations with representatives of other ethnic and religious groups 
which are situated on similar or dominating social positions, one has to take note 
of a few variables. 
Firstly, nowadays Poland is a country of a relatively low degree of saturation 
with multiculturalism in its ethnic and religious aspects. Th e Białystok region, 
however, where the largest population of Tartars is located, is not only a region of 
borderline character but also an area where the proportion of ethnic and religious 
minorities in the general population is higher than in other regions (Belarussians, 
Orthodox, Roma). Th is makes us take into consideration the specifi city of Tartar 
actions on a local level.
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Secondly, in public discourse at the national level, Tartars seldom appear 
as social partners/subjects, and in the recent years they were talked about (as 
Muslims in Poland, our Muslims, Tartars, Euro-Muslims) in the context of the 
2001 events, publications in the press printing cartoons depicting Mohammed, 
and the problem of headscarves in France.
Th ese circumstances became a pretext for Tartars to communicate a vision of 
mutual relations. Also, the Polish press reports on the fact that Polish Tartars, 
who are Muslims who have been living in Poland for centuries, celebrate Kurban 
Bajram and Ramadam Bajram. 
Th irdly, one cannot but agree that, in the group leaders’ opinion, the Tartars 
as a numerically small group have a marginal position among other ethnic and 
religious minorities in Poland and cannot expect (in fact, they do not expect) 
to become important partners in relations with at least the authorities. As they 
say, they are local exotica. It should be stressed that they do not present to the 
dominant group any demands addressing discrimination. To cite A.P. Cohen’s 
(1975) typology, one can speak of a strategy of “assertive marginality”, i.e. a way 
of constructing their identity so that the marginality stigma is minimized by 
turning it into a positive value.
Going back to the analysis of the rules or logic behind building neighbourly 
relations between diff erent religious and ethnic communities, the example of 
Polish Tartars is a good illustration of a strategy focused on cooperation. Th e 
mechanisms of such actions are based on a game of similarities and diff erences 
while delineating the symbolic borders of a community in such a way as, 
while preserving their own cultural resources, to mark a possibly large fi eld of 
complementarity with the dominating group and to build an image of a “tamed 
other” within Polish (Christian) society.
If we understand neighbourhood on the level of coexistence within a larger 
community of groups that are diff erent in respect of culture, then these rhetorical 
strategies gain special importance when used by members of a discussed group, 
especially its leaders, who speak about their Polishness as a way of stressing 
cultural, historical closeness. And so, such values and attitudes are manifested 
as Tartar patriotism, their involvement in the defence of the country, loyalty, 
from time almost immemorial being part of Polish culture and tradition. At the 
same time, the Tartars declare that Poland is their mother country and that they 
feel themselves and are considered by others to be Poland’s “loyal sons”, to use the 
Tartar leaders’ rhetoric.
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In this case, the religion of Islam is undercommunicated, as a crucial element 
of Polishness is Catholicism, and this specifi c criterion potentially excludes 
the Tartars from the community of nationals. Polishness, on the other hand, is 
positively associated with Islam as building the image of the Tartars as Polish 
Muslims, i.e. “ones of their own”, “proven”, ones that can be relied on. Such 
rhetoric appeared in Tartars’ statements especially when issues relating to 
Muslim extremism, terrorism and the threat of the “war between civilizations” 
were tackled in the public discourse. 
In such circumstances they usually overcommunicated their cultural and 
historical ties with Poland as a representative of Western civilization. Th ey 
condemned aggressive actions on the part of some Islamic groups; they educated 
“others”, showing the peaceful “face” of their religion, by using their own example. 
Another important issue was their indicating cultural community with Europe 
rather than with that which is Arabic. In this way, they clearly showed their 
hierarchy of values.
It is also interesting that, when the other Muslim association (besides the 
Muslim Religious Association) was legalized by the authorities in 2004 some 
Tartar leaders expressed their disappointment with such a move, and said that in 
such a situation they would not be able to take care of the Polish interests in the 
broadly understood world of Islam because those interests had been passed to 
other than Tartar hands. In the case of the discussion on the “scarves”, they also 
clearly stressed their Polish/European roots, indicating cultural distance from 
“the brothers in Islam”, which did not result in the depreciation of their own 
religion, but showed its positive character, i.e. – Polish Tartars –Muslims.
Another aspect of neighbourhood in its “global” dimension is their involvement 
in joint ventures which have the character of organized cooperation. In this 
case, since 1997 the Tartar Muslims have participated in the Joint Council of 
Catholics and Muslims, which constitutes a forum for religious dialogue. Th e 
Council works to strengthen peace, desisting from aggression in mutual contacts, 
wants to prevent confl ict and stereotypes by getting people to know each other 
and by mutual understanding.
For several years now, educational initiatives for a religious dialogue have been 
underway in cooperation with diff erent institutions. For instance, in June 2008, 
the Centre of Culture of the Polish Tartars in Gdańsk organized a conference 
entitled “Islam in Europe”. Alongside academics, among the invited guests were 
leaders and representatives of the Jewish and Catholic communities. And in 
Sokółka, a local annual event called “Sokólski Orient” is organized, during which 
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Byelorussian, Roma and Tartar folk groups from Vilnius perform. Th e theme of 
the event is “Culture unites nations”.
Moreover, the organizers of important religious or ethnic celebrations invite 
representatives of the Catholic church (bishops and local priests) and sometimes 
representatives of the Orthodox church to be present as guests of honour during 
the festivities.
Th erefore, one can say that there are many diff erent institutionalized levels or 
platforms on which the “neighbourhood” of cultures, nations and religions is 
implemented, where the platforms are created and initialized by representatives 
of the community or in which they participate. 
Community coexistence has yet another dimension: that of everyday relations 
where the logic and character of mutual relations come to the surface, where there 
are fewer declarations and manifestations of attitudes and more practical social 
life. In this case too one can talk about a cultural strategy of neighbourhood on 
the part of representatives of the discussed group that is expressed through such a 
construction of symbolic boundaries so that it is possible to delineate the widest 
possible fi eld of complementarity with “others”. Such an approach assumes 
striving to accept the existing diff erences, not only as a fact but as an asset. In any 
case, this is a typical strategy for minority groups oriented towards cooperation 
rather than competition or confl ict. 
Conversations with members of the group paint the following picture of 
neighbourly relations. Usually, the fact that they are Tartars and Muslims is well 
known. As they declare, among the people from their close social environment, 
the fact stirs friendly interest, rather than dislike or distance. Th ey have friends 
both among “their own kind” and among many Catholics and Orthodox, and that 
makes no diff erence to them. Th ey stress that in their relations it is the character 
of a person or mutual attitude that matters, not the person’s ethnic origin or 
religion. Care for good neighbourly relations is expressed through respecting 
holidays, whether Catholic or Orthodox. Th erefore, they abstain from activities 
which, according to the traditions of other religions, should not be performed. 
For instance avoiding making a noise or engaging in deep and thorough pre-
holiday tidying. Friends from outside the group are guests at such celebrations as 
weddings or birthday parties, while they are invited to and participate in similar 
social occasions.
Th is picture of good neighbourly relations can be overshadowed by a fact which 
was present in many statements: in their childhood, at school or in the playground, 
situations frequently took place in which my interlocutors were ridiculed or 
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called names because of their diff erent religious or ethnic origin. Sometimes 
they were called “you Tartar gob”, nowadays more oft en “binladens”. When asked 
about their views on those experiences, they would blame such behaviour on 
“children’s silliness” and lack of understanding rather than verbal aggression, in 




In the context of discussing multicultural relations, it is also important to note that 
the Tartars’ religious distinction is not visible in a social sense in many everyday 
situations. Th is is so partly because of the essence of the Tartar Muslim practice, 
and partly because of the nature of the functioning of this religious community 
which gathers not so much around places as around common moments of being 
together.
Th e Tartar religiousness fi rst of all has a private character as it concentrates 
within a family. When asked about their religious practice (which diff ers from 
the “orthodoxy” as they are well aware), my interlocutors stressed many times 
that they had to “adapt” to their surroundings, giving up some of the requirements 
of their religion at the same time. In their opinion, however, this does not change 
the fact that they are Muslims in their hearts and actions, only their Islam is 
“local” and Tartar. Th e few situations in a year when Polish Muslims celebrate 
their holidays together, for example Kurban Bajram, during which they publicly 
sacrifi ce animals, take place in relatively distant places away from their homes. 
I give this example as this custom clearly communicates a religious distinctiveness 
and can shock because of its bloody character. Th e two mosques to which Tartars 
from all over Poland arrive to pray together are located in small villages and 
their Christian (Catholic or Orthodox) inhabitants are well accustomed to this 
Muslim custom. Th ey are observers of the ceremonies who keep their distance 
and do not enter the mosque.
Th e everyday life of the group is also not deeply marked by what could make 
their religious practice clearly visible. For instance, the majority do not say their 
prayers fi ve times a day and religious services take place on Sundays when their 
neighbours attend services too. Besides, their lifestyle lacks those elements which 
can be associated with Arabic Islam, such as headscarves. 
Th is issue is connected with another interesting topic, namely a wider cultural 
location of Polish Tartars-Muslims. I mean their Europeanness as a key to their 
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geopolitical location, hence an argument in debates on their familiarity or 




Since 1994, the Tartar ethnic union has been a corresponding member of the 
Federation of European Union Ethnic Groups at the EU Council, but the Muslim 
Religious Association, which links Polish Tartars and represents the religious 
interests of that community, is associated with world Muslim organizations. Th is 
fact clearly shows the dual or (in a cultural sense) borderland character of the 
group location, which in a symbolic sense locates itself between the Western and 
Islamic civilizations, to use Samuel Huntington’s terminology. On the one hand, 
for hundreds of years this group has been connected with Europe geographically 
and culturally (through its ties with Poland), and on the other hand, through 
Islam, with the world community connoted through values other than the ones 
typical for the place of settling. Th e cultural thread of Europeanness was already 
shown in my research on the identity of Polish Tartars in the 1990s. Even then, 
my Tartar interlocutors were mentioning their Europeanness when the issue of 
their religiousness was touched upon, which, in the eyes of Muslims from other 
countries, was not considered as being completely in line with Islamic orthodoxy. 
Th e Tartars would claim, however, that they were completely loyal/orthodox 
Muslims and the Islam they were cultivating had a specifi c Tartar character that 
was as valid as its Arabic version. Th ey would stress diff erences in morals and 
civilization relative to other Muslims, their religious and everyday culture by 
valuing it as being more European or civilized (Warmińska 1999). It is worth 
adding that not all members were of the same opinion and some would negatively 
perceive the deviations from orthodoxy and would strive for cleansing Islam of 
what was new – Tartar. 
Th is thread returned at the beginning of the 2000s, especially aft er September 
11, 2001, and took on a new meaning in the context of the international discourse 
which placed Islam in a new political and cultural light, e.g. presenting a confl ict 
between the Western and Muslim civilizations. It was then that the group’s 
leaders, when required to take a position on their relationship with the Arab 
states or toward Islamic terrorism, clearly distanced themselves from this type 
of action or ideology. One of the weighty arguments was the Europeanness of 
the group, professing other values. As one of the activists said, “We have chosen 
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our own path of development as Polish or European Muslims… We think that 
acculturation with the Polish or European environment is not wrong; on the 
contrary, we believe that the Muslim world should Europeanize itself, similar to 
Japan, which could contribute to its peaceful growth”(Chazbijewicz 2001). In 
one of the interviews, the above-quoted Tartar leader referred to himself as a 
‘Euro-Muslim,’ thus signaling that religion – Islam – and nation or culture are 
two separate issues and that he feels that he belongs more to the European culture 
than, for instance, to the Arab culture, with which Islam is oft en associated 
(Euroislam 2004). In the context of Polish Tartars, the concept of ‘Euro-Islam’ 
has divided the group. Part of the group, following the line of the current MRU’s 
policy programme and their Muft i, claims that Islam is one and the term ‘Euro-
Islam’ distorts the essence of the religion and is one that should not be promoted. 
Th e Europeanness of Polish Tartars – Muslims is at times mentioned in 
statements of the group’s representatives when asked especially by journalists 
about Muslim customs which they profess. When talking about the group’s 
customs, they stressed their European character, rather than the Arab one which 
is foreign to them from the culture and civilization standpoint. As one of the 
Tartar women stated in an interview in the daily Rzeczpospolita, ‘Imams try to 
introduce customs which are foreign to the Tartar culture. Our mothers and 
grandmothers did not wear scarves. We are Europeans. Our girls would rebel 
against it.’ (Południk 2004).
When considering the issue of symbolic boundaries and when describing their 
functioning in intergroup relations, one must see in what contexts they take on 
the form of a barrier or a wall. Metaphorically speaking, they are clearly visible 
“inside the mosque” and they pertain to the relations between the Muslims of the 
group in question and the non-Tartar Muslims.
In the declarative sphere and partly in social practice, both communities 
maintain some relations. Th e Tartars refer to non-Tartar Muslims as “brothers in 
Islam”, stressing a certain fundamental bond among believers regardless of their 
ethnic provenance. Similarly, like the majority of the representatives of the Islamic 
world, they were indignant at the publication of the Mohammed caricatures, and 
in this context they communicated their community with the world of Islam. 
In any case, the Muft i, a person who for many years lived and received education 
in Saudi Arabia, has been acting for the integration of the two Muslim groups. 
Suspected of pro-Arabic sympathies, during his initial work he was treated 
by Tartars with a certain distance, and only aft er a few years did he win their 
respect. Th is, however, still does not change the fact that the two sides separate 
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themselves from each other. Th e separation is visible in the fact that they pray 
separately, and Muslims from outside the group do not participate in religious 
holidays which are celebrated in the “Tartar style”. Hardly ever do they establish 
or keep close relations except for religious occasions even if there is no language 
barrier. 
As I mentioned earlier, students from the Arab countries were religion teachers 
and this fact, except in a very few cases, did not establish non-formal relations. 
It is symptomatic that, if we look at the “makeup” of the groups praying in the 
Gdańsk mosque during Friday prayers, the majority come from outside the 
Tartar group, while those praying in the old mosques are Tartars. Th e reasons 
for this situation are complex. When listening to the members of the group in 
question one can hear arguments which point to the cultural strangeness of 
other Muslims, to a diff erent lifestyle, customs and lack of willingness to make 
contact, or their isolating themselves. Th e diff erences are also seen in the sphere 
of religion: according to the Tartars, the “Arabs” (as they oft en call the Muslims 
who do not belong to their group) pray diff erently, faster, in a less celebratory 
manner than the Tartars, and the melody of the prayer is diff erent too. Moreover, 
in the Tartars’ opinion, the “Arabs” criticized their Muslim practice, reproaching 
them with numerous mistakes and departures from the norm. To a certain 
extent, the Tartars share a dislike of the “Arabs” with the Poles. Th e scope of the 
solidarity with the Islamic world depends on the social context, sometimes the 
feeling of unity appears, but more oft en there is a distance. 
 
Conclusion: an in-between consciousness
 
To sum up, the above mentioned unique in-between status of the group results, 
fi rst of all, from the context – the migrant genesis of this community in Poland. 
What is important, using the words of members of this group, is that in their 
own eyes they are both newcomers and indigenous – Tartars, Tartars-Muslims, 
just Polish ones. Th at is how they are perceived by the broadly understood social 
environment. A signifi cant role is played by the Tartars’ long settlement which, 
on the level of everyday and ideological experiences, has allowed others to get 
accustomed to their otherness or to write themselves permanently into the Polish 
landscape and as a familiarized other. However, on the level of identifi cation 
processes, not only has it released strong ties with Polishness but also deep roots 
in their own, local, Polish-Tartar-Muslim social world.
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Secondly, this ambivalent status comes from the location of this community 
in a specifi c cultural borderland in a symbolic dimension – between Polishness 
and Tartarness/Muslimness; Muslimness and Polishness; and fi nally between 
Polishness/European Muslimness and Arab/orthodox Muslimness. Being 
‘between’ these dimensions can release both certain dilemmas or identity 
tensions but also, as I wanted to show, it creates an identity status quo based on 
which individual members of the community can give sense to their lives. 
Th e above considerations pertain, fi rst of all, to the Tartar vision of relations 
with their neighbours. Th erefore, we can see a group which strives to impose on the 
social environment, both near and far, such an image of themselves which would 
allow them to be seen as good, trustworthy neighbours that have been present in 
the Polish cultural space, who area familiar ‘other’ rather than strangers. Polish 
Tartars appear as a community which, by striving to be considered separate, is 
building its relations with the ‘neighbours’, one that is focused on cooperation 
rather than on dichotomization. I wish to stress that, in the case of Polish Tartars, 
to be a Muslim in Poland translates into a variety of identity strategies, from the 
point of view of both the institutional and less formal, everyday aspects.
 
Notes
1 Th e main religious organization of Polish Tartars, the Muslim Religious Association, was 
founded in 1925 and reactivated as early as 1947.
2 Th e analyses presented in this part of the chapter were prepared on the basis of the 
anthropological research I have been conducting among Polish Tartars since the beginning 
of the 1990s. I collected the research material over many years during my in-depth 
interviews with members and the leaders of the group. I have also analysed the printed 
materials published in the Tartar press and on the Internet. Furthermore, I participated in 
group events during which I conducted participant observation.
References
Borawski, P., Dubiński, A. (1986). Tatarzy polscy. Dzieje, obrzędy, legendy, tradycje. Warszawa: 
Iskry.
Cohen, A.P. (1975). ‘Social Identity and the Management of Marginality,’ Sociological Review, 
February.
Chazbijewicz, S. (2001). ‘Rozmowy partnerów Onetu. Selim Chazbijewicz –  rozmowa,’ 
28.11.2001, www.onet.pl 
euro-muslimness in poland 135
Euroislam (2004). Gazeta Wyborcza, 17-18.07. 2004.
Miśkiewicz A. (1990). Tatarzy polscy 1919-1939. Warszawa: PWN.
Południk E. (2004). ‘Szczeropolscy Tatarzy i partia Boga,’ Rzeczpospolita, 04.11.







‘Anti-Islamization of Europe’ Activism 
or the Phenomenon of an Allegedly 
 ‘Non-racist’ Islamophobia: A Case Study 
of a Problematic Advocacy Coalition
Vincent Legrand
In the fi rst chapter in this second Part, this time dedicated to the non-migrant 
and anti-Islam interactions/identifi cations, we present research that is based on 
the observation of a series of actors in Western Europe grappling – directly or 
indirectly – with a growing cultural and religious diversity, with Islam as a new 
religion asserting itself at the forefront, in an area which is traditionally mainly 
Christian and secular. More specifi cally the fi rst section presents a synthesis of 
‘anti-islamization of Europe’ activism, setting out the context, the actors and main 
features of the phenomenon. Th e second section is an original case-study based 
on participative observation, informal exchanges of views and data collected 
at meetings1 of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE)2 organized by its Offi  ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODHIR) in Vienna and Warsaw in 2009. In this setting I observe two types of 
organizations in a tentative form of what Paul A. Sabatier has conceptualized 
as an ‘advocacy coalition’ in the dialogue process around the issues of Western 
civilization, Islam and Christianity in Europe: on the one hand Christian or 
Christian-inspired (Roman-Catholic and Protestant) organizations; on the 
other hand what I call ‘Defence of Western civilization’ organizations.
As we will see, this process related to intertwined issues pertaining to current 
dynamics of identity change in Habermassian post-secular Western Europe (as 
defi ned in the General Introduction to the present book and implicitly referred 
to in the introduction to this chapter) is not without tensions expressed by clashes 
between several clusters of values, rights and reference points, such as freedom 
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of religion, freedom of expression and hate speech legislation. Christian actors 
are caught up in a paradox of asking for a Christian-faith margin for manoeuvre 
in the prevailing secular order while at the same time being uncomfortable 
about sharing this principle with believers of another faith, Muslims. On their 
part, ‘Defence of Western civilization’ actors claim that they ‘put the facts on 
the table’ and deliver information about the ‘real Islam’, which would threaten 
both Europe’s secular liberal democratic order and Christianity, which would 
be challenged – in their view – not so much as Faith but as culture and identity, 
echoing the renewed role played by religion in Western societies as identifi ed by 
Casanova and Göle (cf. General Introduction to the book).
‘Anti-islamization of Europe’ activism
‘Racism is the lowest form of human stupidity, but Islamophobia is the height of 
common sense’, so asserts the slogan of the Stop Islamization of Europe (SIOE) 
movement. SIOE is a transnational network of 18 national associations, based 
mainly in Europe. It started with a meeting between the Danish political party 
Stop Islamifi cering Af Danmark (SIAD – Stop the Islamization of Denmark), 
founded by Anders Gravers following the Mohammad Cartoons Controversy 
in 2005, and the English association No Sharia Here, which became the English 
branch of the SIOE headed by Stephen Gash. Th ey were then joined by the 
German Pax Europa organization. In 2010 SIOE joined the European Freedom 
Initiative, which is composed of a series of national Defence Leagues (18 at the 
moment, also mainly based in European countries and following the model of 
the initial English Defence League, created in 2009).
Th e focus here is on civil society organizations – national and transnational 
associations and networks – thus not including political parties sharing the same 
agenda such as Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands – even 
if there are some links between some of these organizations and political parties, 
whether recognized or denied, or if some of them may form embryos of new 
political parties (Weis, 2011: 51-64) or themselves emanate from former political 
groups, as in the case of SIAD.
From SIOE’s slogan we can see that it endorses Islamophobia, proclaiming 
itself to be non-racist. Th e SIOE clearly distances itself from extreme right-wing 
and xenophobic movements and parties and claims that it defends the values of 
the European liberal democracy: it equates Islam with a form of totalitarianism 
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exactly like Nazism and Communism, one that would, by its very nature, be 
incompatible with democracy (‘Islamofascism’).
So, is this indeed a non-racist phenomenon? Or is it a new form of racism: 
xenophobia in ‘new clothes’? If it is not racist, extreme right-wing, neither Nazi 
nor fascist, has it some connections with such currents? And whatever the case, 
does it nevertheless contribute to a xenophobia which targets Muslims?
In order to answer these questions, I will fi rst address the context in which 
this phenomenon emerged as well as its main features. I rely here on (too) few 
major secondary sources (Fekete 2011; Carr 2006) as well as on complementary 
materials collected by me (Legrand 2007).
In the short term we can see the emergence of such a phenomenon in the 
context of diff erent events in the course of which Western audiences have felt 
themselves under attack from ‘Islam’: the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 in the United States, those of Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the 
assassination of the fi lm-maker Th eo Van Gogh in the Netherlands (2004) and 
the Danish Cartoon Controversy (2005). In the long term let us just mention 
here the crucial evolution that in recent decades in Western Europe transformed 
the issue of migrants, Gastarbeiter, into an issue of North-Africans and Turks 
before being transformed into one of Muslims and Islam (for more details about 
the long term see Fekete 2011).
For anti-islamization activists the immigration of Muslims to Europe is 
perceived as massive and depicted in terms of a demographic conquest. As the 
German president of Die Freiheit party René Stadtkewitz (2011: 165) says, ‘what 
we see today is not Muslim fi ghters at the gates of Vienna. Th e fi ghters are now in 
the very midst of our countries. Today they use our schools, banks, social system 
and most of all our tolerance and our weakness to fi ght against us’. It is assumed 
that Muslims will become the majority in Europe, and when they are, they will 
impose their religion and introduce sharia (Islamic law). In this perspective 
Muslim minorities will be about to or will already have set up ‘Islamic enclaves’ 
through sharia courts (Doc. 6). In their eyes Islam is in essence a warlike and 
criminal religion, which is “unable and unwilling to adapt to diff erent historical 
and cultural settings” (Fekete 2011: 36). In their view, Islam is also in essence 
political, and as such is equated with a totalitarian violent political ideology 
termed ‘Islamofascism’. Not only is Islam essentialized, Muslims are too: they 
are assumed to be violent people unwilling to live at peace with non-Muslims 
and fundamentalist in their literalist interpretation of the Koran. A ‘nuanced’ 
synthesis has been formulated by René Marchand (2011: 149), an orientalist 
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journalist active in the French organization Riposte laïque: “Th ere are Muslims 
who are moderate by their nature or by reason; there is no moderate Islam.” Th is 
last point is linked to the general suspicion that is directed at all Muslims, who 
are assumed to be masters of ‘double speak’ and ‘taqiyya’ (dissimulation) (Fekete 
2011: 35). In the fi nal analysis, the ‘non-racist’ perspective puts it in the following 
way: Muslims are the fi rst victims of their own religion and they should leave 
Islam because, formulated in a radical way, the only good Muslim is an ex-Muslim.
Now comes the second part of the picture. Th e main threat is not from Muslims 
themselves, who have migrated and settled in Europe; rather the responsibility 
lies with those who made this migration possible, and are still doing so: the 
‘indigenous’ people of Europe, in particular, the ‘political establishment’, who 
permissively and naïvely supports pro-migrant and multicultural policies, 
either by omission, guilty surrendering or by multiculturalist sensitivity. Most 
politicians have become “apathetic. (…) Th ey have become blind, they have 
become accommodating and are not aware of the extent to which our Liberty is 
threatened” (Stadtkewitz 2011: 164); also, politicians are accused of ‘collaborating’ 
with Muslims “in order to avoid any problems or tension” (Gravers 2011: 108).
We can easily see here Anders Breivik’s worldview that motivated his attacks 
in Oslo and on the island of Utoya in July 2011. He did not attack migrants, but 
rather his country’s government (targeting offi  cial buildings) and fellow citizens 
of the Workers’ Youth League, a political youth organization affi  liated to the 
Norwegian Labour Party, which commits the ‘crime’ of multiculturalism and – 
in so doing – allegedly contributes to the decline of civilization in Europe (for a 
broader view of the political context in which these attacks took place see Harry’s 
essay in the present book on the issues of nationalism, religion, secularism and 
multicultural politics in present-day Norway).
Concerning actors sharing this worldview – or part if it – Liz Fekete (2011: 
30, 31 & 38) makes the correct distinction between those who support the 
notion of a deliberate conspiracy to Islamicize Europe (in extreme right, neo-
Nazi and counter-jihadist circles) and those who claim to observe and deplore 
the Islamization of Europe, but without attributing it to a deliberate conspiracy 
(in neo-conservative and cultural conservative intellectual and political circles). 
In this regard the best-known benchmark conspiracy theory is called ‘Eurabia’ 
aft er counter-jihadist Bat Ye’or’s title for a book in which the author defends the 
thesis of a secret project between European politicians and the Arab world for 
the ‘Islamization of Europe’, the purpose of which is “to destroy America and 
Israel, with Europe a doomed continent on the brink of cultural extinction in 
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the face of a relentless and co-ordinated campaign of domination of Muslims 
to transform it into an Islamic colony called Eurabia”, where Europeans would 
become dhimmi people (Fekete 2011: 43; Carr 2006).
Conspiracy or not, what is at stake for anti-islamization activists is nothing less 
than the decline of civilization in Europe – a strong existential threat at the core 
of identity and in the transmission of identity. Th is strong existential threat is so 
acute that it is an alarmist, catastrophist, kind of apocalyptic vision and framed in 
terms of a ‘demographic time bomb’ (an element to which I will critically come 
back later) (Carr 2006).
Case-study: a problematic advocacy coalition between 
Christian faith-based and ‘Defence of Western civilization’ 
actors at OSCE, Vienna, July 2009
As stated above, the present case-study is based on participative observation, 
informal exchanges of views and data collected at meetings of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) organized by its Offi  ce for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) in Vienna and Warsaw in 
2009, in particular the ‘Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief’ held in Vienna on 9-10 July. 
Th is meeting tackled issues related to the status of religious communities and 
places of worship, concerning, among others, religious minorities, in terms of the 
problematic formulated as “from commitments to implementation” (Legrand 
2009a). It was attended by most of the Organization’s 56 Member States (covering 
countries outside Europe, stretching across the Northern Hemisphere from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok) together with about a hundred people representing 
‘civil society’, NGOs, churches, religious organizations, philosophical non-
confessional bodies and academic institutions.
In terms of minority rights the OSCE, among others, used to work in the fi ght 
against anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. But a few months before the meeting 
being studied the OSCE had also started – with a Round Table organized on 4 
March in Vienna – to work on ‘Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians’, 
also in Christian majority contexts and areas, on the basis of a newly constructed 
agenda: not only minority but also majority religions may be the object of 
violations of religious freedom, and this happens as much ‘west of Vienna’ (the 
former Cold War’s ‘Free World’) as ‘east of Vienna’ (Legrand 2009a).
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With this as a background and in this context I was able to observe at the 
Vienna meeting of July 2009 two types of organizations in a tentative form of 
‘advocacy coalition’ (Paul A. Sabatier’s concept) in the dialogue process around 
the issues of Western civilization, Islam and Christianity in Europe. Th is 
was not however without tensions, as we will see: on the one hand, Christian 
organizations –Observatorio para la libertad religiosa y de consciencia (Madrid), 
Alliance Defence Fund (USA), Paneuropa Union (Paneuropabewegung), the 
Vienna-based Platform Christianophobia in Europe (also called Observatory on 
Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians) and Evangelischer Aufb ruch 
in Deutschland (EAD); on the other hand, what I call ‘Defence of Western 
civilization’ organizations (liberal/secular-oriented and referring to the Judeo-
Christian heritage in cultural terms): Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa (BPE), 
International Civil Liberties Alliance (ICLA, USA), Mission Europa – Netzwerk 
Karl Martell and the Wiener Akademikerbund.
I will elaborate later on on the profi le of this second type of organization, but 
it is worth mentioning here straightaway another type of actor present at the 
meeting under study and sharing a secular-oriented profi le but who should not 
be confused with them. Th is other type of actor is classically defi ned and defi nes 
itself as ‘secular humanist’, like the European Humanist Federation (EHF) and the 
Belgian Centre d’Action laïque (CAL) and shares some features: secularism (State-
Church separation, rule of (secular) law), emphasis on religion and belief seen as 
a private matter, freedom of religion and freedom fr om religion (rights of non-
believers). Even if it is concerned about some tendencies in Muslim communities 
(such as the refusal to countenance mixed-gender swimming pools), the focus 
remains – at least in this setting – on the traditional religion present in Europe: 
Christianity, in particular the Roman Catholic Church, with its clerical structure 
and source of political infl uence in public aff airs. As such it is not ‘obsessional’ 
about Islam in particular. All religions that would be uncomfortable with the 
emancipatory humanist achievements of the Enlightenment are a matter of 
concern. I did not observe in this setting any connections with ‘Defence of 
Western civilization’ organizations.
In order to investigate this, I take as a basis the Joint Statement of NGOs to 
OSCE and to participating States at the Vienna ODHIR meeting of July 2009, 
which was signed by the above-mentioned Christian organizations (Doc. 1). On 
their part the ‘Defence of Western civilization’ organizations were approached to 
sign up, but did not rally to the cause.
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Before going through their recommendations, let us fi rst mention a general 
remark made in the Statement concerning the context as described above: 
“[i]t should … be noted that the infringement of religious freedom aff ects both, 
minority as well as majority religions”. In this regard, we read elsewhere that 
‘prejudice against Christians seems to be the last socially acceptable prejudice 
in Europe’ (Doc. 3). Of nine recommendations (Rs), four concern religion in 
general, three concern religion in general and (implicitly) the Christian faith 
in particular, and two concern Christian relations with minority religions and 
(among others or implicitly) Islam in a Christian majority context.
Religion in general. To act against harm, disrespect or contempt toward religion 
(R1). In the Statement we read in this regard:
the State might infl uence negatively and indirectly on individuals and 
communities, through a public and offi  cial message, or subtle actions, 
according to which religion appears a “remnant of ancient times”, an “old-
fashioned behaviour”, something “inconsistent with progress and freedom” 
or the equivalent of “intolerance and violence”.
R2: To recognise freedom of religion as an essential dimension of humankind. 
Th e Statement reads in this regard: ‘[f ]reedom of religion deals with the utmost 
profound and meaningful dimension of the human being. It presupposes 
transcendence. Th erefore freedom of religion should occupy a preferred 
position among human rights and freedoms and not be considered as inferior.’ 
R3: To recognize the specifi c aspects of freedom of religion in comparison to 
related but diff erent freedoms, like freedom of thought, speech, association or 
assembly. 
Religion in general, (implicitly) based on specifi c consequences for the Christian 
faith in particular. Some light can be shed on the three recommendations 
concerned by the following passage in the Statement:
[Freedom of religion] deals with duties and relationships in human 
interrelations. Th at is why religious freedom involves an immunity sphere in 
which the State is not competent at all in order to dictate or govern citizens’ 
options and decisions, as long as the religion respects the public order and 
the principles of the constitutional framework.
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In this regard, “States must recognise religious conscientious objection in delicate 
fi elds, like bioethics (abortion, euthanasia, stem cell research, etc.), education, 
military service, etc.” Following this, R6 reads: “to pay specifi c attention to the 
right of religious conscientious objection in all social and public spheres” and 
also advocates “the right of parents or tutors to the moral education of children 
in public education”. 
Expressed in the same ‘package’ R8 reads: “[t]o recognise and protect the use and 
display in private and public of religious symbols”. More precisely, in this regard 
we read in Doc. 2 (Platform Christianophobia in Europe): “we urge for a wide 
protection of religious symbols and traditions including Christmas trees and the 
wearing of religious symbols, such as crosses on necklaces (…)”. Finally R9 reads: 
“To recognise and protect freedom of speech on moral issues aff ecting public life”.
As we will see later, this is related to the issue of hate speech legislation 
concerning homophobia, as was illustrated by the cases reported by the Alliance 
Defence Fund during the debates (pastors prosecuted in Sweden for homophobic 
hate speech following sermons during Mass addressing the issue of homosexual 
orientation as a sin).
Relation to minority religions and (among others or implicitly) Islam in a 
Christian majority context.R4 reads:
to guarantee the availability of places of worship taking into account urban 
planning considerations, and the artistic, cultural, religious, architectural 
and environmental characteristics of the territory. A dialogue should be 
established with the local community and religions traditionally present in 
the area. Legislative regulations should distinguish between places used for 
worship only and places of worship used for activities beyond purpose of 
worship (R4).
We can fi nd complementary elements to this recommendation in the Statement, 
although not specifi cally about places of worship, but concerning growing 
religious diversity:
many (…) countries face a new challenge in which the complexities of 
religious pluralism have increased enormously. For these countries OSCE 
Commitments always off er a plain and general source for dealing with 
new problems and issues. It is important in this vein to be open-minded 
to peoples and cultures coming from other geographical areas, to grant 
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full enjoyment of freedom of religion to those citizens who belong to new 
religious minorities and to trust in the centrality of the human person 
without surrendering their legal systems and politics to possible tension 
between cultures and civilisations.
Th is is an implicit – but clear – reference to Islam and Sharia law. Another issue 
is: ‘to respect, with regard to anti-discrimination laws, the right to autonomy of 
religious communities and religiously inspired institutions’ (R7). In this regard we 
read in the Statement: “States cannot apply anti-discrimination law to religious 
communities and religiously-inspired institutions as if they were secular entities 
or part of State agencies.” In the debates the case of Catholic adoption agencies 
which had to close because of their refusal to entrust children to homosexual 
couples was raised, as well as the case of a Christian organization legally obliged 
not to refuse to recruit non-Christian (in this case Muslim) personnel. 
As stated above, the above-mentioned ‘Defence of Western civilization’ 
organizations were invited to sign up to the Statement, but abstained from doing 
so, for the reasons that we will review below. How do these organizations present 
themselves?
Th e Citizens’ Movement Pax Europa (Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa – hereaft er 
BPE) is based in Austria and has local chapters in several German Länder such 
as Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, NorthRhine-Westphalia and Rhineland 
Palatinate. It defi nes itself in its leafl et (Doc. 8) as a ‘Human Rights Organization 
for Freedom and Democracy Against Islamisation’ – an ‘independent, non-
partisan movement’, whose objectives “are to protect not only the democratic, 
free and secular rule of law in our country but also to struggle for European 
culture based on the Judeo-Christian traditions and – especially – on the values 
of the Enlightenment”. Like the SIOE movement, this organization emphasizes 
that it “clearly distances itself from all right-wing or left -wing extremists and all 
xenophobic movements”.
Th e organization puts forward some contextual elements regarding the ‘host 
society’ part of the issue (Doc. 8): “[d]ue to the rising threats being imposed by 
the Islamisation of Europe, we clearly explain and express these threats which are 
a given. We keep people informed about how Islamisation challenges, threatens 
and undermines our free and democratic order.” In particular, “politicians, 
lawyers, clerics and journalists have to acquire authentic knowledge about Islam, 
about the Koran and the Sunna. Th ey should be ready for free and politically 
incorrect public discussions about Islam – and about what Islam really means: 
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SUBMISSION – rather than fi nding excuses or glossing over. Appeasement has 
never been a good idea.”
Th e sense of SIOE-like duty with regard to future generations is refl ected in 
BPE’s recommendations which are addressed to the OSCE “in order to leave 
behind to our children and grandchildren a world in peace” (Doc. 4) In the 
report written by BPE’s representative (Doc. 5), we also read this line: “[o]ne day 
in a distant future we might perhaps say: Th e OSCE brought Communism to an 
end; the OSCE also brought to an end the Islamic claim to domination.”
Th e organization also supplies some contextual elements regarding the 
‘migrant’ part of the issue: ‘[a]pproximately ten percent of Muslims in Germany 
are members of one of the four largest organizations (DITIB, ZMD, Islamrat, 
VIKZ)’, whose objectives are said to be the implementation of ‘a theocratic 
Islamic state in Germany’. 
BPE’s leafl et (Doc. 8) also says some words about Mission Europa – Netzwerk 
Karl Martell (a clear reference to the battle of Poitiers, 732), which was founded 
in 2007 “in order to coordinate organizations working against Islamisation”. It is 
a Vienna-based organization whose objective is to make public – at international 
level – “what Austrians experience with the extensive Muslim presence”. On the 
one hand, its populist-sounding slogan is ‘Giving the silent majority a loud voice’. 
On the other hand, once again, here the public still would not know ‘about the 
real Islam’ and the organization’s aim is “to put the facts on the table”. It warns 
against Muslim groups’ propaganda about Austria’s law on Islam as “the ideal 
way to integrate Islam into a country” (this law was the fi rst in Western Europe 
to recognize Islam as a religion with an offi  cial status alongside the traditional 
Christian denominations; it was adopted on the heels of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina). It opposes Turkey’s accession to 
the EU on the grounds of the “incompatibility of Turkey with western standards 
and life style”. Also the two Ottoman sieges of 1529 and 1683 against Vienna are 
depicted as proof of Turkey’s aggressive intention. Mission Europa is affi  liated 
with the Wiener Akademikerbund (Vienna Association of Academics).
Th e Wiener Akademikerbund shares sensitivities close to those of the Christian 
organizations (e.g. the fi ght against attempts to abolish the technical terms of 
the Gregorian Calendar BC and AD, which would be “a severe and totally 
unacceptable form of persecution of Christians and Christian belief ”; see Doc. 2). 
Th is organization also seems to share a common element with the ‘Defence of 
Western civilization’ organizations concerning the general suspicion aff ecting 
Muslims as mentioned before, as it recommends “to the OSCE member states 
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and OSCE institutions to protect the freedom of belief of only those religious 
groups that have made public all elements of their creed” (Doc. 2).
Th e International Civil Liberties Alliance (ICLA) presents itself as “an 
international alliance defending democracy and freedom”. During the meeting 
the ICLA’s representative circulated a document entitled ‘A Proposed Charter 
of Muslim Understanding’, written by ex-Muslim Islamic scientist Sam Solomon 
(Doc. 7). Th is document which ICLA recommends the OSCE to adopt ‘in 
[its] entirety’ (Doc. 6), invites Muslims, in particular Muslim leaders and 
representatives of organizations representing the Islamic faith, to adhere to a 
series of principles and attitudes: the rejection of violence in the name of religion; 
the recognition of equality between all human beings, including between 
man and woman; the right to religious freedom including the right to change 
religion; the precedence of national law over Sharia; full co-operation with the 
police and intelligence services in the fi ght against terrorism; the revision or 
reinterpretation of Koranic verses calling for violence against enemies of Islam, 
unbelievers or non-Muslim believers (17 specifi c Koranic verses are referred 
to as examples); adhesion to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) – ten articles followed by a form that can be signed on a named individual 
basis or in the name of an organization representing the Islamic faith and sent 
to a postal address in London. “Th is Charter, signed and adhered to, would 
guarantee the compatibility of Islamic organisations with secular democracy”, 
says the ICLA (Doc. 6), mirroring the general suspicion aff ecting Muslims as 
mentioned before.
Let us now expound on why these organizations did not rally behind the Joint 
Statement. “Th ere are in it some acceptable points; but also some passages that 
fully contradict our point of view, are therefore highly problematic, even if well 
intended”, reports BPE’s delegate Elisabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff . She mentions the 
following passage of the Statement, which “is totally unacceptable”:
Governments must admit religious attire even in public places, except when 
paramount interests such as safety, public order or health compel to rule 
otherwise. Governments must recognise the wide extent and implications 
of the right of parents to the moral and religious upbringing of children, 
without any interference from political power and from offi  cial ideology 
leading to indoctrination. In sum, States must recognise religion as a vital 
source of moral behaviour which is beyond and superior to secular legal 
systems.
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Concerning fi rst what BPE’s representative sees as the ‘unlimited right of parents 
to the moral and religious upbringing of their children’, this would:
open the door to Islamic Madrassas, that are generally well known to prepare 
the ground for brainwashing and religious indoctrination. Th e intention 
that only parents should determine their children’s moral education may 
be honourable in itself, but Muslim parents should fi rst of all take some 
distance from the problematic verses and suras present in the Koran. [and a 
reference is made to the ‘Charter for Muslim Understanding’ (Doc. 5)]
A second objection concerns national (also meaning secular) law (cf. Doc. 4) 
and is in line with BPE’s recommendations addressed to the OSCE meeting: 
“no religious laws of any sort be implemented into any national legislation” 
(Doc. 2), which is more specifi cally oriented towards Islam in its leafl et (Doc. 8): 
“No introduction of any parts of Sharia law into German (European) law which 
explicitly refer to Allah, Mohammed, and Islamic traditions”. 
We have here a rejoinder by the ICLA, that, referring to 85 operational Sharia 
courts in Great Britain, indicates “the possible misuse of religious autonomy 
to establish parallel societies where national law does not apply” – a misuse of 
religious autonomy which would threaten fundamental rights, in particular 
women’s rights (cf. Doc. 6, entitled ‘Th e problem of granting autonomy to Islamic 
enclaves in the West’).
Conversely, BPE’s representative mentions that the passage of the Joint 
Statement of (Christian) NGOs concerning places of worship for minority 
religions might have been supported (Doc. 5). Th is is in line with BPE’s own 
recommendations addressed to the OSCE meeting (presumably linking with the 
suggestion referred to in the NGOs’ Statement of a dialogue between “the local 
community and religions traditionally present in the area”): “We recommend 
that religious building projects not be enforced against the residents’ appeals.” 
Also probably in line with this, see the following position of the BPE (Doc. 8): 
‘abandonment of Islamic symbols of power or Islamic predominance’ – a probable 
reference to minarets.
Before elaborating on some perspectives of understanding of the dynamics 
of the case under study, a complementary issue which is not addressed in the 
Joint Statement of NGOs but which is present in other documents related to the 
Vienna meeting and in the debates held on that occasion is worth mentioning: 
hate speech legislation and freedom of expression. In BPE’s recommendations 
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addressed to the OSCE meeting (Doc. 4) we read: “since criticism of religion is 
part of free speech, any eff ort to ban free speech, in name of religious interests 
on the pretext of ‘Islamophobia’ or racism must be prevented”. In this line its 
delegate also said during the meeting: “hate speech is punishable, but criticism 
of religion is not hate speech and should be legal; there is a misuse of hate speech 
law to forbid criticism of religion”. An element of observation worth noting in 
this regard is the clashes that occurred during the Vienna meeting between these 
organizations (ICLA in particular) and the anti-racist organization Conseil de 
la Jeunesse pluriculturelle (COJEP) International (originally founded by French 
youngsters of Turkish origin), which considered that the ‘Charter of Muslim 
Understanding’ that was circulated was an unacceptable manifestation of 
Islamophobia.
How is it from the perspective of Christian organizations? In Platform 
Christianophobia in Europe’s recommendations (Doc. 2) we read:
Radical political correctness and hate speech legislation may lead to a 
restriction of the freedom of religion as well as the freedom of expression. 
We urge not to promote a claimed right not to feel off ended which ends up 
in restricting the freedom of expression of individuals and groups, including 
religious individuals and groups.
One cannot but read the second part of the position expressed here as obviously 
referring to Islamophobia; if this were not the case, how could we understand 
this organization’s adoption of recommendation No 1 (Doc. 1) calling for action 
against harm, disrespect or contempt to religion?
Some perspectives of understanding
Th e phenomenon under scrutiny proceeds from a deep identity crisis for the 
actors concerned and can be understood – from their points of view – as a 
cultural and/or religious defence mechanism. While it claims to be non-racist, 
one cannot but question its perhaps unintentional xenophobic dimension. Th is 
issue is related to that of misinformation vs. manipulation, among others, in 
terms of demographic ‘threat’. Let us go through these points before concluding 
our case-study as an example of a problematic advocacy coalition and saying 
some words about the extent of the phenomenon.
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Identity crisis
Th e two types of actors observed experience identity crises. Th e Christian 
organizations face a strongly secularized Europe, a decline in Christianity 
(at least in its traditional patterns – practice, relation to clerical authorities …) 
and, at the same time, stronger religious and cultural diversity – with Islam at the 
forefront. Th ey see themselves as an oppressed majority and have at the same time 
the feeling of becoming a minority, not only by comparison with communities 
of foreign origin, but also within the ‘host part’ of society. Th ese Christians, as 
practising believers of conservative orientation, see new legislation (such as on 
abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage …) harming their religious convictions 
in a mainstream secularized society that is at ease with – or even in favour of – 
these changes. Th e call for the fi ght against attacks on majority religion in fact 
concerns majority religion as the religion traditionally present on the territory, 
not necessarily the eff ective majority religion as it has evolved.
Th ey face the following paradox: a more secularized context tends to sideline 
the Christian religion (symbols, names of religious feasts …) in the public space, 
while, at the same time, anti-discrimination laws made for minorities may 
provide for a certain protection and allow for more expression in this regard. 
So, for instance, the case of a Christian employee of British Airways asked to 
hide her crucifi x necklace, while Muslim colleagues may wear a veil and Sikh 
colleagues may wear a Kara bangle (Th e Christian Institute 2009: 49). So while 
minorities may in some instances enjoy some protection (in other instances they 
of course also suff er from discrimination), the ‘majority’ lacks safeguards because 
of its status as the traditional majority religion. In this context Christian actors 
have succeeded in putting Christianophobia on the political agenda next to 
anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Furthermore, in a situation where one cannot 
oppose the prevailing democratically adopted legislation, the only way is to live 
with ‘conscientious objection’ on an individual basis or try to obtain exemptions 
at a community level.
Th e ‘Defence of Western civilization’ actors are mostly motivated to protect 
the secular liberal democratic order, which would be threatened by Islamization. 
Th ey also share the concern of Christian organizations for Christianity mainly 
as culture at the collective level, and not so much as faith at the individual and 
community level; religion as faith is in their view mostly a private issue (see 
Harry’s essay in this book on the case of the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP)’s 
process of ideological repositioning in terms of both secular and Christian 
values). Both types of actors face a ‘cultural relativism’ that has its origins in the 
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challenges resulting from the growing diversity of ‘outsiders’ or ‘newcomers’ in 
today’s plural and pluralist societies. Some Christian actors face a secondary 
‘cultural relativism’ that comes from ‘within’ – a phenomenon of unprecedented 
changes in values and moral standards within the inner culture itself, which are 
diffi  cult for conservative people to accept.
Girardet (1986) puts forward the proposition that times of crises – I would 
add: in particular identity crises – are conducive to conspiracy theories. Matt Carr 
(2006: 11) states that ‘the fear of cultural and racial extinction has a long pedigree 
in European history’, and evokes a parallel between between the ‘Eurabia’ 
conspiracy and the alleged Jewish conspiracy at the end of the 19th century in 
Victorian Britain. Schiff er and Wagner (2011) also compare Anti-Semitism and 
Islamophobia in terms of ‘new enemies, old patterns’. Looking for a scapegoat is 
a classical social phenomenon aimed at identifying the ‘guilty one’ who is at the 
root of the crisis and thus allows us to recover our sense of control in the world. At 
the same time, as we have seen, for some actors there is no deliberate conspiracy; 
they nevertheless share the same uncomfortable feeling of change in societies 
marked by growing diversity, relativism and the lack of points of reference.
Racist or non-racist? Misinformed or manipulative?
As we have seen, our actors claim to be non-racist. I see two possibilities here. 
Some actors may be sincere in this, but my considered view is nevertheless that 
both their monolithic and essentialized representation of Islam and Muslims 
and their alarmist, catastrophist, apocalyptic representation of European Muslim 
demography are not scientifi cally grounded (cf. infra). Th e same applies to issues 
like sharia courts (see Legrand 2008) in a Western context – an issue that Nimni 
tackles in this book from a contrasting, stimulating and sophisticated academic 
perspective. Other actors are more manipulative and their mobilization is 
nothing more than a more sophisticated form of xenophobia: a re-defi nition of 
an anti-migrant position in non-racist terms (Roy 2005). So, there is the example 
of a member of the French Bloc identitaire, who explains that campaigns targeting 
Islam are mainly for ‘publicity purposes’ for the movement:
Th ere is no islamization of Europe, there are not millions of white people 
converting to islam either; it is still very much an immigrant phenomenon. 
(…) Th ere is no phenomenon of islamization, but, on the contrary, there is a 
phenomenon of population replacement (Fourest 2012).
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I relate the two possibilities (racist vs. ‘non-racist’) to the distinction I 
make between fi rst-level ‘primary’ Islamophobia and second-level political 
Islamophobia (Legrand 2010). Th e ‘primary’ psycho(-socio)logical meaning of 
Islamophobia is fear of ‘Islam’, nurtured by a series of empirical facts at both local 
and international levels; the media presentation of which is open to criticism. 
While the facts presented are indeed true (for example, reprehensible intolerant 
or hate speech – or speech advocating conquest – as made by some imams), their 
selectiveness leads to a confusing mixture and misleading generalizations about 
Muslims and ‘Islam’ ‘as a whole’. Islamophobia – political Islamophobia this 
time – then steps in and exploits this fear around the presence and affi  rmation 
of ‘Islam’ in formulating an ideological agenda for the defence of Christian or 
Western civilization, which is supposedly under threat (Christianity in the strict 
sense, or secularized Christendom in more overtly political and cultural terms). 
Th e step from phobia as fear to phobia as hatred is not far.
Here now comes the delicate issue of criticism of Islam, freedom of expression 
and hate speech. Can religion be criticized whilst respecting religious beliefs? 
Where do you draw the line between legitimate criticism of a religion and hate 
speech directed at a community of faith or a group of individuals that belong to 
it? While the Danish cartoons targeted Islam, many Muslims on their part felt 
that they were stigmatized, and that they were all lumped together with terrorists 
in the aft ermath of 11 September. Th ere are no easy answers to this question. As 
Prof. Ombretta Fumagalli Carulli (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, 
Milan) said as a keynote speaker at the opening session of the OSCE meeting in 
Vienna of July 2009, if ‘a supposed right “not to feel off ended”’ ought not to be 
promoted, ‘conversely – the freedom of expression’ ought not to be ‘abused to 
off end and vilify the religions, their representatives, symbols and teachings’.
Th e demographic ‘threat’
In some localities in Europe (some towns or parts of towns), the concentration 
of the Muslim population nourishes fears of Muslims becoming a majority. Th e 
problem is that some local situations, which are real, are then – without any 
grounds – pointed to as a prefi guration of future situations at the national or 
European level, some activists putting forward the view that Europe will have a 
Muslim majority in a few decades. If we take the capital of Belgium as an example, 
Muslims are estimated to be 17% (Torrekens 2007: 2) or around 25% (Dassetto, 
2011: 21-25) of the total population, but they are only 4% at the national level. If 
we go into even more detail, 75% of Brussels’ Muslim population is concentrated 
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in only 5 of the 19 municipalities composing the capital (Torrekens 2007: 3). In 
Schaerbeek, the Muslim population (people originating from Muslim majority 
countries as well as their descendants having obtained Belgian nationality) 
comprise 29% of the total population (Torrekens 2009: 17). Scientifi c studies 
like the one published by the Pew Research Centre’s Forum on Religion & Public 
Life (2011) show that at national level in 2030 only two countries in Western 
Europe (Belgium and France) will have Muslims as little more than 10% of their 
population (all the other countries remaining below 10%, most between 5 and 
10% at national level).
Th e case of a problematic advocacy coalition
Th e situation that I have observed can be described by the following tri-
angle. We could add other actors such as, for instance, feminist or Zionist/ 
Jewish/Israeli actors. As Liz Fekete (2011: 30 & 42) rightly puts it, some 
(not all) Islamophobic actors who are, ironically, ‘linked to anti-Semitic 
traditions have now, because of their fear of Islam and Arab countries, 
become staunch defenders of Israel and Zionism’.
Let us observe dyadic relations within this triangle. Interaction between Muslim 
actors and secularist/‘Western defence civilization’ actors against Christians is 
improbable and was not observed. A Christian-Muslim dyadic alliance against 
‘Defence of Western civilization’ actors was not observed (from observation in 
other settings I can state that this kind of confi guration can take place to a certain 
degree, vis-à-vis secularist actors of the other type mentioned above – secular 
humanists). Th e observed dyadic alliance in our Vienna OSCE setting is that 
between Christian actors and ‘Defence of Western civilization’ actors around the 
issue of Islam and Muslims. Th is (tentative) advocacy coalition is, as we have seen, 
not without its tensions. Th e ‘anti-islamization’ activists who declare themselves 
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to be non-racist then claim the right to criticize Islam without being accused of 
Islamophobia (conceived as racism directed against Muslims). For them it is not 
hatred, and there cannot be such a ‘right not to be off ended’ which would open 
the door to muzzling free speech, which is part of secular liberal values. Here 
‘anti-islamization’ Christian actors may not feel comfortable, because of their 
sensitivity to blasphemy or to the critique of religion in general: if doors are more 
open to a critique of religion, this could be of concern not only to Islam, but also 
to Christianity. Now one last word on the extent of the phenomenon.
Conclusion: some insights on the extent of the phenomenon
Is ‘anti-islamization’ activism a social movement? It has the ambition to be one. 
What we have is activists and groups of activists in national and transnational 
networks that are suffi  ciently structured, widespread and with a critical mass to 
qualify – at the very least – as an emerging social movement. Some are linked to 
parties, emanate from a party or are embryos of future parties. Th eir worldviews 
may spread, in particular through right-wing populist and ‘nativist’ parties 
(Weis 2011: 52-58), which are potentially more popular than extreme right-wing 
parties, and become more and more mainstream. All this in a general context 
marked by a less overtly Islamophobic secular liberalist public discourse that is 
far more likely to go unnoticed or unrecognized in comparison to its far-right 
‘version’, as Allen argues in his essay on Islamophobia and the crises of Europe’s 
multiculturalism in this book – as well, I would add, as to its right-wing populist 
and ‘nativist’ ‘versions’. On the Christian side the Roman Catholic Church is 
herself well aware of the dangers present in her own ranks (Legrand and Vella 
Gauci 2011). Contrary to ‘Defence of Western civilization’ organizations, the 
actions of Christian organizations observed in this study cannot be qualifi ed as a 
social movement; they remain at the stage of advocacy groups.
In the fi nal analysis I would say that it is the ‘anti-islamization of Europe’ 
phenomenon being studied – and more generally the prevailing Islamophobic 
climate prevailing in today’s Western Europe – which may well be the real danger, 
and not the alleged and so-called ‘islamization of Europe’.
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Notes
1 I attended these meetings in my former capacity as adviser on interreligious aff airs at the 
Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community (COMECE), which 
is the liaising body of the Roman Catholic Church at EU level. Th e meetings concerned are 
the ‘Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting – Freedom of religion or belief ’ (Vienna, 
09-10 July 2009) (cf. Legrand 2009a) and the ‘Human Dimension  Implementation 
Meeting’ (Warsaw, 28 Sep.-09 Oct. 2009) (cf. Legrand 2009b).
2 Th e OSCE was created on 1 January 1995 to replace the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which resulted from the signing of the Helsinki Final 
Act (1975), which, during the Cold War, defi ned security not only in politico-military 
and economic-environmental terms, but also in terms relating to the human dimension – 
especially in terms of democracy, human rights and minority rights.
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Chapter 8
Discourses on Religion and Identity in Norway:
Right-Wing Radicalism and 
Anti-Immigration Parties 
Frédérique Harry
For the last twenty years, Europe has witnessed the birth of new extreme 
right-wing movements fi ghting for a stronger national identity, supporting 
islamophobic theses and sharing a strong dislike of immigration fi gures and 
policies. Little by little, anti-immigration parties have become leading forces 
in many countries and are now duly represented in numerous Parliaments (in 
Sweden, Denmark, Norway Finland, as well as in France, Greece, the Netherlands 
and so on). Vincent Legrand’s work (see also in this book) depicts some of these 
new movements, including such organizations as ‘Stop Islamization Of Europe’ 
in Denmark, which share transnational networks and a common ideological 
foundation: they oft en quote Samuel P. Huntington, the creator of the clash of 
civilizations postulate; they frown upon cultural Marxism and fear the end of 
Europe as we know it – as a vigorous Muslim demography may threaten it as 
such, for instance (the latter being called the Eurabian thesis). Vincent Legrand’s 
analysis highlights the way they give a wide berth to more ‘typical’ and/or older 
racist ideologies, all the while trying to redefi ne xenophobia in terms of confl icts 
utterly deprived of racial issues. With them, xenophobia and racism are actually 
evolving diff erently and refl ect the broader mutations that are taking place in our 
societies. Th is evolution teaches us something crucial about the way European 
citizens understand and build their identities, as a novel social and political order 
gradually replaces nation states – the model formerly known to us as a means 
of European democratic governance – in what could be called a ‘postnational 
constellation’ (Habermas 2000). Th erefore, in analysing Vincent Legrand’s essay 
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further, I shall focus on how the Norwegian right-wing radicalism and anti-
immigration parties use religion (somewhat paradoxically) as a means to redefi ne 
collective identities in our more global, multicutural and interdependent societies. 
Whilst Europe is becoming highly secular – we will even use ‘post-secular’ to 
designate Northern Europe countries –, these movements have actually brought 
religion back into politics, a fact quite likely to betray its dichotomy with the 
most common theories about secularization. 
Fully to understand how religion is used by far right parties to depict new 
patterns of ‘imagined communities’ (if one may use Benedict Anderson’s 
expression), this study shall be based on the analysis of Fremskrittspartiet’s 
party platforms, interviews, Anders Behring Breivik’s famed manifesto 2083, 
and electoral studies performed in 2001, 2005 and 2009 (courtesy of Statistics 
Norway). My personal hypothesis is that multiculturalism and the feeling of 
‘globality’ (Giddens 1990) reactivate religion’s collective function (Durkheim 
may have been close to this defi nition), as our societies tend to become more 
globalized and their identities more refl exive. 
Religion and nationalism in northern Europe societies
Northern European countries are interesting, if not unique, case studies. Th ey 
are constantly rated as the best places to live in the world, political and social 
unrest is rare, and theirs are among the healthiest economic systems in the world. 
Still, anti-immigration parties have become major political forces there, and they 
are now well represented in all northern Parliaments: the Norwegian Progress 
Party (Fremskrittspartiet – FrP) in the Storting, the Danish People Party (Dansk 
Folkeparti) in the Folketing, the True Finns (Perussuomalaiset) in the Eduskunta, or 
even the smaller Sweden (or Swedish) Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, admitted 
in the Riksdag in 2010). All are sceptical about the multiculturalism which, in 
their opinion, undermines or even destroys European culture and national unity. 
Th ere are also much more radical organizations and people, such as the one 
responsible for the grim Oslo attacks of 07/22/2011: Anders Behring Breivik 
killed 77 people, mostly young members of the Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet), 
and planted a bomb in a car which detonated in Regjeringskvartalet, the 
executive government quarter of Oslo. Th is self-proclaimed lone wolf claimed 
that he wanted to take revenge on the Norwegian multicultural policies that he 
held the Labour Party responsible for. In his manifesto, 2083, Breivik made it 
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clear that he fully despised such an intermingling of communities, Islam and its 
social-democratic ‘cultural Marxism’, relying on the ‘Eurabian’ thesis to support 
his vision of a Christian-European cohesive group at war against Islam and the 
Arabic world. Despite the information provided at fi rst by the police, this man is 
far from being a fundamentalist Christian or ‘an excessively religious man’: rather 
– as he puts it – a ‘supporter of a monocultural Christian Europe’ (2083) who 
radically isolates political and cultural functions from ethical and metaphysical 
issues.
We may call northern European countries ‘post-secular societies’; theirs are 
among the lowest rates of traditional religious observance in the world. Since 
World War II, religious ties and habits have declined. Religion has gradually been 
sidelined, as the separation between State and Church has asserted itself, and 
public institutions became more and more independent of the Church. Following 
high immigration waves and the development of mass pluralism, religion had to 
redefi ne its prerogatives. In Norway, the separation between State and Church 
(May 2012 – 2000 in Sweden) gave way to a later stage of secularization progress: 
multiculturalism and religious diversity are now the social norm. Th e institutions 
have expanded policies freed from denominational and/or spiritual justifi cations. 
Religion and the National Churches have lost their ‘from above’ prerogatives but 
still have a legitimate role to play as ethical and moral actors in public matters. In 
such a highly secular culture, religions are quite distinct from politics, since they 
no longer have any structural political function. Yet, paradoxically enough, the 
northern European peoples are still intimately linked to the cultural and ‘tribal’ 
function of their National Churches (Harry 2013; Petterson and Riis 1994; 
Riis 2013). 
Interactions between nationalism and religion raise a lot of theoretical 
discussions (Brubaker 2012; Santiago 2012). Th e return of religious issues in 
politics, and especially among nationalist leaders and followers, questions 
the ‘linear and compensatory’ model, where nationalism is oft en viewed as a 
replacement for historical religions. However, even if this model may still seem 
relevant, the importance religion gains today in highly secular countries requires 
a deeper analysis of the function of religion in the political fi eld: As elements 
of national collective representations, do religions assert the compensatory 
evolution? How do religions help to elaborate collective and fi ctitious 
identities in the midst of societies becoming more and more globalized and 
interconnected? 
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Th e memorialization of religion
Th e 16th century Lutheran Reformation in Scandinavia (and even more so 
throughout the 17th century), based on the principle of cujus regio ejus religio 
(‘Whose realm, his religion’), led to confessionalization (or ‘confession-building’) 
through the erection of religious states and involved the “fusion of politics and 
religion through the emergence of territorial churches subordinated to secular 
political control” (Brubaker 2012). Churches had a territorial and identitarian 
function and constructed their legitimacy in terms of collective identities acting 
as symbols of national unity. In this context, being a member of these Churches 
meant belonging to the national community they partly organized and ritualized 
(Aagedal 2000). Still, the de-territorialization which occurred during the 19th and 
20th centuries gradually sapped the historical links between religion, citizenship 
and ethnicity.
More recently, throughout the second part of the 20th century, Norway 
obviously turned into an attractive place to live: the number of immigrants grew 
steadily during the late nineties and aft er 2004, reaching 13.1% of the Norwegian 
population in 2012 (Statistics Norway). Th is led to a more extensive religious 
plurality and the development of faiths that were quite unknown before. 
Consequently, this situation radically changed the notions of multiculturalism, 
religious diversity and, last but not least, the conception of citizenship and 
identity. Today’s angles may seem paradoxical, though: despite very high rates 
of secularization and quite affi  rmative multicultural policies, most Norwegians 
still belong to the Lutheran Church of Norway (77% of the population in 2012, 
Statistics Norway). Religion still has a national and collective symbolic function, 
as the high rates of baptisms, religious wedding ceremonies, etc. attest to. Th e 
Church of Norway still owns cultural preemption over life and death rituals and 
assumes “cognitive, ideological, normative, commemorative and dramaturgical 
functions” (Riis 2010). Th us, Norway is a good example of a “belonging 
without believing” society (Davie 1994). Yet, in spite of wide secularization 
and an outward acceptance of diversity and religious pluralism, examinations 
demonstrate that religious pluralism and ethnic diversity can create suspicion. By 
and large, Norwegians consider immigration to be a positive aspect of society’s 
growth, but contacts between natives and migrants have never incresed in 
numbers over the last ten years (from 2001 to 2010, marriages between those two 
categories are even fewer – Statistics Norway: 2012). Meanwhile, the Progress 
Party (FrP), allied to the Conservative Party (Høyre, meaning “Right” – [H]), 
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became a major political formation and may even rise to power aft er the next 
election, on Sept. 9, 2013. 
In this period, the FrP leaders’ speeches and platforms have increasingly been 
marked by religious references, evolving from a very critical position to a clear 
acknowledgement of Christianity as democracy and individual freedom’s cultural 
matrix, as well as the Norwegian and Western cultures’ matrix. Now, the FrP is 
a “party for the people [whose] values are that of the Norwegian constitution, 
of the Norwegian and Western traditions: A cultural legacy inspired both by 
Christian and humanistic values”. Later, they clarifi ed their views, stating that 
“Christian culture and ethics [are the] fundamental values of the Norwegian 
society” (FrP party platform: 2005-2009). Yet, during the seventies and eighties, 
the FrP was very critical, even sceptical, of Christianity and the Church Of 
Norway: In order to fi ght for more individual freedom from the traditional 
social order, the party wanted to ban catechism in public schools, wanted to 
reduce the Church’s income and, last but not least, separate Church from State. 
Th e dominant denomination was seen as a threat to individuality and liberal 
freedom. But in 2008, as the debate about school law was becoming fact, the FrP 
made it clear that school teachings should be based upon humanist and Christian 
traditions and legacies (Harry 2006). 
Nevertheless, FrP supporters are among the less religious voters in Norway. 
Two accurate studies made about Norwegian voters aft er the parliamentary 
elections of 2001 and 2009 (Aardal, Valen, Karlsen and Normann 2001; 
Berglund, Reymert and Aardal 2009) show that they widely disapproved of 
the policies typically supported by Christian Norwegian parties in 2001 (i.e. 
restrictive alcohol and smoking policies). To boot, 43% of the FrP voters favoured 
abortion in cases when the infant might end up sick or disabled – the latter fi gure 
being the highest among all Norwegian parties. In 2009, 65% of the FrP voters 
considered themselves as being ‘religiously passive’ (61% in 1997 and 2001, 66% 
in 2005), the next highest score aft er that of the Socialist Left  Party (Sosialistisk 
Venstreparti – 74%). FrP supporters have no distinct religious behaviours and 
are among the most secular and passive. On the other hand, the range of FrP 
advocates considered as ‘religiously active’ (the latter classifi cation being based 
upon active membership of any given religious community) rose from 7% to 
14% over ten years (2001-2009). Th is fact may be viewed as coherent with the 
result of some studies concluding that xenophobic types pay more attention 
to religious affi  liation as an obligation and an attachment to a certain form of 
moral spirituality, while the more tolerant view religion as a personal choice 
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and preference, open to other religious traditions (Riis 2010). In other words, 
FrP voters are still among the less religious types, but they are more attracted to 
religious identity, and religious affi  liates in their midst are growing in numbers. 
Th e clear discrepancy between traditional religious and moral values and the use 
of a vague religious identity are quite consistent with the view that former leader 
(1978-2006) Carl I. Hagen expressed in 2004: It is more important to promote 
fundamental Christian values in society than that everyone turns into a faithful 
Christian. Yet, despite the gap between traditional Norwegian values and the 
opinions supported by most FrP voters, the party has now seized and polarized 
the general debate about religious identities in Norway. It is setting the tone and 
reinterpreting Christianity as a symbolic matrix for nationality and democracy, 
leading to secular humanism, gender equality and democratic values. Nothing 
new under the sun, the function attributed to religion focuses here on the role 
played by the legacy of identities due to the process of nation-building. 
From this perspective, the memorial identity function in the FrP’s speeches 
and platforms – and more generally in right-wing populism – is not on a par with 
a return of religion. Rather, it is a process of memorialization, as the notion of 
civil religion, a from-above structuring institution, departs more and more from 
the public sphere. It is more likely that this evolution is highlighting the fi nal 
– or at least one further – step on the secularization process, where the national-
memorial function works as a reminder of the past. All the same, it would be too 
simplistic to focus only on the memorial function as a reminder per se. It also plays 
a very discriminatory role when it separates the national/cultural community 
from supposedly allogeneic ones in a multipolar world. 
Th e essentialization of religion
Th e globalization of economic, political (Norway is not part of the European 
Union but does belong to the Schengen and European Economic Areas), social 
and cultural relationships has important consequences on our perceptions of 
the world and its communities. Globalization and the greater accessibility of 
the media and of new means of communication challenge historical borders 
and traditional identities. Th e current multipolar situation and the European 
follow-up construction further challenge the supremacy of nation states. Th e 
“disembedding of social systems” – characterized by the dissociation between 
social relationships and local contexts of interaction –, as well as the development 
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of a new interactivity in a dislocated time-and-space pattern (Giddens 1990) 
modify the defi nition of our identities as individuals and community members. 
Th e point here is not to discuss the way global mutations can concretely be 
measured, but merely to stress how we feel or perceive them. Th e sense of belonging 
is based not only upon defi nite rational and well recognizable frameworks, but 
also on the perceptions, beliefs and subjectivities which explain and organize (the 
cognitive function) and possess an aff ective and social function. Th e feeling of 
community happens to be both local and global, as the perception of being a part of 
a multi-layered, networked and geographically fl exible world grows in intensity. 
Th erefore, aff ections, feelings and emotions are “active ingredients” when it 
comes to defi ning new identities, even more so since the de-territorialization 
of religions in Europe has led to multicultural and reciprocal societies – shaped 
by constellated religious and ethnic communities. In this context, our rational 
understanding of electoral and political behaviours as well as platform narratives 
must then be reinforced by taking into account emotionality and subjectivity – 
so as to comprehend and rebuild the subjective and imagined constellations we 
live in. 
Th e FrP’s speeches and platforms and, even more importantly, Breivik’s 
manifesto view ethnic and religious identities as parts of an open and global world 
where religious identities are constellated into vague territorial entities. Here, 
religion is used to redefi ne borders, be it inside or outside national communities. 
Christianity serves as a transnational cultural segment destined to create a feeling 
of global sameness, allowing the exclusion of others in spite of a world open to 
all. Th ere is no trace of theological or metaphysical to be found in those theories, 
just the self-same postulate according to which secular Christianity created a 
habitus of democracy, equality and liberalism. Th ey evidently target Islam, the 
essence of which becomes viewed as irreconcilable with European culture – since 
Christianity is, in their opinion, the matrix in which the idea of Europe has its 
roots – and state an intrinsic impossibility for Islam and Muslims to promote 
democracy, gender equality and human rights. Per se, Islam is allogeneic to 
Norway and Europe. To illustrate this notion, let us quote former FrP leader Carl 
I. Hagen: In 2004, while visiting a Charismatic Parish in Norway, he publicly 
declaimed that the prophet Muhammad may never have said: “Let the little 
children come to me” (Matt. 19:14) unless, he added, he intended to use them to 
become soldiers for the Jihad. If one puts his political strategy aside, and considers 
that right-wing radicals and anti-immigration parties teach us something about 
the transformation of religious identities, the essentialist understanding of 
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religious consciousness in politics highlights a phenomenon some believed would 
disappear with modernity: religion rears its head as a collective identity marker 
even among non-religious people, so as to redefi ne borders in this new ‘post-
national constellation’ (Habermas 2000). It defi nes groups according to their 
religious identities and presents them as homogenous entities. In actuality, it is 
a mirror-like process based on the perception that Muslims form a homogenous 
cultural community. Consequently, it leads to the perception of a European 
Christian common and harmonious identity, although euroscepticism rates high 
among FrP supporters. 
Conclusion
Is the presence of religion in right-wing Norwegian politics no more than a cultural 
anachronism, or – quite the contrary – is this proximity the dawn of a larger swing? 
Th e “memorialization” of religion seemingly rests upon the national function 
formerly allotted to the Church. Yet, strikingly enough, this memorialization 
process occurs when the historical role of the Church dwindles. On the contrary, 
the ‘essentialization’ of religion seems to be a highly actual process. Communities 
are reduced to essentialist features as they become more and more dislocated from 
time and space, while religious identities are reduced to simplistic cultural codes 
and goods to support the thesis stating that the diff erences between Christianity 
and Islam as cultural and political matrices are insuperable. Breivik’s manifesto 
seems much more radical than the FrP’s platform or speeches, but is very close 
when he claims for “a European cultural conservative hegemony in Europe” 
and a “Church leadership who supports a future Crusade with the intention of 
liberating the Balkans, Anatolia and creating three Christian states in the Middle 
East” (in 2083), matching the perception according to which groups do exist 
throughout pluralized and globalized societies. Hence, the ethnic dimension 
of religion in right-wing politics seems to be progressively complemented by an 
essentialist/discriminative function more adeptly conform to the growing feeling 
of globality and the development of a non-racist transnational xenophobia. 
Ethno-diff erentialist narratives replace the racialist thesis by considering 
secularized Christianity as the matrix of the habitus of democracy, gender 
equality and freedom versus the fantasized habitus of dictatorship, inequality 
and totalitarism that Islam is held responsible for – emphasizing consequently 
the importance of religious identities even in highly secular times. 
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Chapter 9
Competing Forms of Identity and the 
Concept of Sovereignty in Europe
Murat Sevencan
Th ough a person may carry more than one group identity within the layers of 
self-perception, the eff ect of it upon his/her choices and decisions depends 
mostly on the salience of belongingness for that person. Moreover this salience 
is continuously and indefi nitely challenged by other possible and present group 
identities. Along with the putting on and off  the membership hat game, the 
national identity is not excluded either.
Even if in recent years, nationalism has been on the rise in Europe, it may be 
interpreted as a reaction to the decline in salience of national identity within the 
community of social belonging. If one takes this interpretation as a basis, then 
one must ask some closely related questions on the subject, such as: “What is 
challenging the salience of national identity?” and “Will such challenging of the 
salience of national identity be evenly successful if the people are concerned by 
the perception of international issues?” Th e purpose of this chapter is to search 
for the fi ve foreseeable answers to these questions in theory and quantitative 
data. World Values Survey Data will be used for the quantitative reasoning.
Introduction
Being more of a political hat, national identity fastens, or glues, a person to a 
family which sometimes consists of more than a billion members, which would 
be presented as imagined. As Anderson puts it, this family “is imagined because 
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the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion” (1991: 6).
Because of the stated imaginedness of this identity category, the eff ect of 
belonging, or rather mobilizing the power of it, would be dependable only if this 
so-called illusion were alive in the mind of a person convinced by it. From the 
rather recent history of nation building, despite the primordial connectedness 
assertions, one can assert that national identity bloomed over the mould of old 
identities, as a sovereignty transfer. Th is transformation of identity was from one 
that binds the person as the subject of God, or Godly sent patronage, to one that 
appoints the person as a citizen in charge of the maintenance and enjoyment of 
the homeland. Although this joyful duty seems to be accepted as natural, the 
theoretical model states that a national identity is reproduced through central 
education as a voice of other family members, and the state power of imposition 
is presented as a fatherly or as ‘uncle’s’ advice, and sometimes its violence as 
father’s belt. But although the classical paradigm of International Relations (IR) 
takes the nation-state as the single actor of the anarchic jungle of states, national 
citizenship has never been a unique identity in the mind of a person in his/her 
actions. As long as the modern paradigm continued, not the men’s but the citizen’s 
aspect of a person is taken in consideration to construct a national identity in 
state level aff airs. However, what about the other layers of self-perception in their 
relation to the national identity?
Identity and transfer of sovereignty
One can argue that national identity, as a modern concept, is constructed and 
sustained through tools of the modern world for each new member of society. 
Th ese are the standardized education of society, which must include national 
understanding of history on the primordial view of nationhood; social support or 
priority grant for certain values of the society, with the help of society networks, 
such as certain branches of sport or the arts; law enforcement regulating certain 
parts or functions of public life, such as the coordination and supervision of 
economic and legal processes; and lastly the use of certain rights on behalf of 
society, such as issuing a common currency, conscription.
Th ese modern tools are not just the tools with which to use the sovereignty 
of the modern nation state, but also those shaping the national identity of each 
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new member of society. But these tools forming the newcomer’s national identity 
are challenged by the changes in the Westphalian System by both the delegation 
of sovereignty and the eff ect of globalization. In other words, one can state 
that with the level of democracy and desacralization of the state, especially in 
the post-WW II era, the non-citizen side of a person became an eff ective factor, 
particularly in daily politics. One can also observe that the nonpareil existence 
of the nation-state has also started to be challenged by old powers of the game, 
such as imperial, local and religious fronts. Th e accumulation of sovereignty from 
local lords, clergy and emperors to the kings of states has been reversed by a new 
invention of the post-war European populi, the European Union.
As we all know, the transfer of sovereignty started with the delegation of 
the rights regarding the coal and steel industry of the six member states to the 
ECSC by the 1951 Treaty of Paris. Since the High Authority’s power overrode 
the member states’, the organization obtained its unique status of a hybrid case; 
it was neither an intergovernmental nor an economic cooperation, in which no 
authority can supersede the states’ decisions, nor a federal state-like situation, due 
to its limitation on coal and steel sectors (Rittberger 2003: 210). Th erefore it was 
called a sector-based federation. Although this phase of sovereignty delegation 
did not aff ect the national identities of the citizens of six, the further integration 
attempts started to bring both psychological and political shift s.
Th e fi rst type of shift  was faced with the foundation of the EEC by the 1957 
Treaty of Rome. Th e European Court of Justice, as the highest court and the 
interpreter of the European treaties since 1951, started to aff ect the perception 
of social relations among the status groups of societies by reinterpreting the 
articles of the treaties while giving fi nal decisions on cases. Th e reinterpretation 
of Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome, says: “Within the scope of application 
of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained 
therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited,” as 
also the prohibition of discrimination of gender, on the basis of equal pay, or 
discriminating against citizens of non-member countries, who came as guest-
workers onto EEC territory. Although these types of interventions may be taken 
as positive in the legal and social space of a nation, one should bear in mind that 
these types of extensions of the supra-national share of sovereignty will create 
increasingly stronger bonds with the supra-national power than the national one. 
Th e second type of shift  happens not because of an unapproved extension of 
sovereignty but is an extension through the limitation of room for manoeuvre 
for the nation state caused by harmonization. Nevertheless the eff ect of those 
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harmonization acts is brought into sharp focus in the newer eastern members of 
the Union, but it can also be observed incrementally in the historical evolutionary 
process in the old members as well. It also fi nds a place in scholars’ terminology 
as the transformative capacity of the Union (Tamás 2001: 6-8; Dyson and 
Featherstone 1996).
All these limitations on a state’s share of sovereignty do not cause a direct 
shift  in the national identity of the citizens, but they narrow the state’s space for 
reaction to the changes in the international and intellectual environment for 
‘convincing’ citizens to abide by the social contract signed between them and the 
state. Hence this can be called one of the indirect shift s.
Th e next type of shift  springs from the empowerment not of a supra-national 
actor, but of the sub-national actors. As is declared in Article 5 of the 1992 Treaty 
of Maastricht, though it’s put onto table with the 1985 European Charter of Local 
Self-Government, the principle of subsidiarity will be used in certain matters, 
which means simply leaving matters to the lowest level of government which 
we call the local authorities, due to their eff ectiveness and the ease of reaching 
tangible objectives effi  ciently. As is stated, or rather secured, in Article 9 of the 
same Treaty, the Union will continue to respect the state’s sovereignty and most 
of the time that is what happened.
However, the principle of subsidiarity brought the local authorities more 
power and fl exibility to function on behalf of the state. No one can insist on 
the diminishing power of the state’s authority here, but because of project based 
funding, one can accept that, if not the control, the functions themselves have 
become more uniform through European patterning.
Lastly, not because of the EU, but the increasing interdependence and 
uncontrollable means of communication which we call globalization created 
another psychological and political shift  in the national identities of Union 
citizens. Th is shift  manifests itself as a uniformity of choices, language and terms, 
use of body language, and, most importantly, value orientations. 
In conclusion, one can say that the sovereignty transfer of the EU states not 
only weakened their national sovereignty, but also the bond between their 
nationals and their capability to manoeuvre. Further, this weakening does not 
transfer these powers to a supra-national actor, but to sub-national actors, 
namely the local authorities. Figure 1 illustrates this by making an analogy with 
the feudal period.
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Especially with the further accepted subsidiary principle, the member-states 
are committing their sovereign rights to continental authority, which leases 
the use of it to local political entities. For example, the Italian Constitution of 
1947 has a specifi c clause on the limitations of national sovereignty, and the 
Germans, in their constitution of 1949, approved the transfer of powers to 
international organizations backing the ratifi cation of the EC founding treaties. 
Th e Netherlands also changed their constitution with an amendment in 1953 to 
make it compatible with the transfer of their sovereignty in the coal industry 
through ECSC membership (Hoff meister 2007: 62). Th is reverse fl ow has also 
supported another release of sovereignty to other international organizations, 
such as international courts. Hence, many things changed in the civitas so that 
even an indivisible concept such as sovereignty can be divided, or rather ‘shared,’ 
with other actors in the international arena, not by force but willingly as a “mutual 
limitation of sovereignty” (Habermas and Derrida 2003: 296).1
One can tell the story metaphorically with national identity as a mandatory 
single type of hat. When the dress code of public places is relaxed, individuals 
in the community see the melon hat, for example, as more and more of a choice 
amongst a spectrum of other hats. As a woman one may be feminist, or ethnic 
Scotch, or Christian or with a pious identity. But when that person is a Scottish 
lady who is a Roman Catholic and believes that the hat is not religion but man-
made, the female’s preference on political issues will be decided by her perception 
of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in relation to her hat or, in socio-psychological terms, her 
salient identity.
Figure 1 - Nation, EU and Local Identities on Transition to Post-Modern Era (Source: Sevencan, 
2006, p. 284)
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Th e purpose of this study is to analyse quantitatively the very existence of 
this multiple belongingness, that seems to surface politically, and the share of 
salience within the competing political identities. Aft er the preliminary analysis 
of the competing identities, these identity types will be profi led by means of a 
quantitative analysis. During this analysis the World Values Survey (WVS) 
Databases will be used.
Competing political identities
At this point, for the purpose of the study one should seek the forms of identity 
which may compete with the national one. However the purpose of this search is 
not to fi nd out how many diff erent group identities there are, nor to fi nd out the 
propria of possible identities, but rather how many diff erent forms of identities 
one can count.
As one looks at the recent literature on European identities, one may fi nd 
diff erent approaches to the subject. Morozov and Rumelili model the European 
Identity from a constructivist point and defi ne a continental identity with the 
help of others, such as Turkey and Russia. While defi ning this they create an elite, 
reactive and exclusive identity; they openly emphasize Europe’s Christianity and 
post-industrial values as western ones (2012: 42-43). Burity, in his comparative 
review article, while commenting on the eff ect of globalization on identities takes 
an intuitionalist approach and off ers a globalization of local connectedness. He 
praises the local identity over the national and personal identities of both Europe 
and Latin America (Burity 2012: 82-83). 
Subotic, on the other hand, from a purely realist perspective, in her analysis of 
the ‘Europeanization of Serbia and Croatia’ takes the national identity as the only 
identity and approaches the European Identity as another emerging national/
imperial identity (Subotic 2011). While defi ning the identity from the minimal 
group paradigm of Tajfel’s social identity theory, Ongur elaborates the European 
identity from the social psychology as counting each nation as a unit personality; 
hence, as with Subotic, the integrative analysis of European Identity again takes 
a classical realistic approach.
Gunther approached identity in Europe in the analysis of rapprochement 
between French and German identities as Françallemagne identity; he puts 
forward a mezzo identity which covers two national identities while not defi ning 
itself as a geographical one. On this amalgamation he refers to Ernest Renan’s 
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words on French unifi cation where the same strategic path is used; forgetting 
the diff erences and painful memories of the past but blurring the diff erences 
between two nations, as occurred among Burgundian, Alan, Taifale and Visigoth 
identities (Gunther 2011: 48).
Guibernau, in her chronological analysis of the European integration process, 
takes identity from the functional perspective and acknowledges the national 
identity with respect to ethnic/local and continental identity. She concludes 
that the process of competing identities is rather incremental due to hardship in 
the invention of ‘common causes and interests, symbols and rituals’ (Guibernau 
2011: 313). Dinç (2011) in his article approached the question of European 
Identity from a nomenclature perspective and referred the subject by comparing 
and contrasting national and religious identities while concentrating on the 
Europeanization process. 
Srimayee Dam’s (2011) analysis of national identity makes a distinction in 
identity construction between a civic/political and an ethnic/cultural one. For 
the civic/political one she refers to a mezzo-like national identity such as Gunter 
presents for the Franco-German case, but this resulted as a national identity, 
whereas the ethnic/cultural one refers to a rather ethnically and/or culturally 
homogenized national identity. While making this distinction, she refers to the 
former as part of Western and the latter as part of Eastern European culture 
(Dam 2011: 340).
On the other hand Kowalska, while she tries to defi ne regional identity in all 
micro and mezzo senses, approaches the geographical constructors of identity 
using all national, religious and personal identities as a comparing and contrasting 
tool (2010: 165-167). But Kowalska is not the only one who stresses region as 
an identity constructor. Baba insists, statistically supporting her argument, on 
regional identity as Italians’ personal identity constructor, by stating that regional 
or city identity is more salient in their defi nition of themselves than the national 
one (Baba 2010).
Lastly, Spohn, Fokas and Kurth stress religiosity identity as an identity 
constructor in Europe. Spohn’s argument is that religious identity is treated from 
an ethnic perspective, theorizing it with multiple modernities, whereas Fokas 
builds up the same issue with a discursive analysis of the philosophic side of it. 
Although both researchers stress the secular character of European Identity, while 
the former mentions it politically, the latter emphasizes it as a principle. On the 
other hand Kurth elaborates a comparative perspective to religious identity in 
Europe within a historical perspective (Kurth 2007; Spohn 2009; Fokas 2011).
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From the analysis of recent literature, one can conclude that there are mainly 
four diff erent types of identifi cation; fi rstly, as the main identity of modern 
politics, the national identity would be counted as a unit identity; the second 
one would be listed as a micro level identity, which includes a sub-national level 
of regional identities and ethnic identities; the third one could be observed as 
macro-level identity as this is mainly the one that transcends national borders 
both philosophically and physically; and the last one would be called a nano-
level identity, since it can only be formulated from Marx’s alienation concept, as 
a personal salient identity.
Quantitative basis: variables, sample and tests
In this analysis the WVS 5th wave data for surveyed Council of Europe member 
states’ respondents will be used in researching identity preferences in Europe. 
WWS is a survey output of an organized network of social scientists coordinated 
by a central body, the World Values Survey Association. Th e data cover a wide 
range of the world’s population, with fi ve waves of repeated survey (EVS and 
WVS, 2006). Th ere are more than 800 variables, sprung from survey questions, 
that exist in this database, whereas unfortunately, due to diff erent practices 
inside the international research consortium, not all variables are applicable to all 
countries and on all waves.
Even though the WVS data give a comparative insight into world population, 
because of this fact use of the database is confi ned to only some specifi c 
questions. For the purpose of our analysis six questions of the database will 
be used for salient identity preference of a respondent. Additionally, for the 
profi ling of salient identities in Europe the two dimensions of Ronald Inglehart 
(1997: 67-107)–later with Welzel (Inglehart and Welzel 2005)– to measure the 
modernization and post-modernity level of a person will be used, as they are 
present in the WVS data. Th e variables that will be used are listed in Table 1. 
Also, on the questionnaire, the questions that are coded with G are asked in the 
Likert-Scale of four, the last question is asked in categorical (nominal) level form. 
Th e answer codes and labels are listed in Table 2.
Inglehart and Welzel’s two-dimensional measure of social evolution, namely 
Traditional/Secular and Survival/Self-expression values, is extracted with factor 
analysis from the world values survey data. Inglehart, later with Welzel, modelled 
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a cultural change in a society using two basic parameters, the Traditional/Secular 
one represents the society’s stand on pre-industrial to industrial transformation, 
while the Survival/Self-expression one represents the society’s stand from 
industrial to post-industrial transformation.
Traditional/Rational (T/R) score: Th is factor score contains mainly the 
variables that are related to religion and authority among the values of the social 
group. If one needs a shortlist of names, the importance of family ties, obedience to 
authority (including the relative acceptance of military administration), and the 
acceptance of either challenge or compromise as a tool for avoiding a confl ict might 
be counted as primary factors. Also the degree of nationalism and national pride is 
measured in this score. One can also state that this score measures how far the group 
is modernized. Mainly one can take the fi rst score as
“the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and 
those in which it is not, but it also taps a rich variety of other concerns… 
Societies at the traditional pole emphasize religion, absolute standards, and 
Table 1. List of variables that is used from WVS data.
Variable Label
G019 I see myself as a world citizen
G020 I see myself as member of my local community
G021 I see myself as citizen of the [country] nation
G022C I see myself as citizen of the [European Union]
G023 I see myself as an autonomous individual
F034 Independently of whether you go to church or not, would 
you say you are…
tradrat5 TRADITIONAL/SECULAR RATIONAL VALUES
survself SURVIVAL/SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES
Table 2. List of variables response codes. 
Answer Code Answer Labels
For G019, G020, G021, 
G022C, G023
For F034
1 Strongly agree A religious person 
2 Agree Not a religious person 
3 Disagree A convinced atheist 
4 Strongly disagree Other answer 
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traditional family values; favor large families; reject divorce; and take a pro-
life stance on abortion, euthanasia, and suicide” (Inglehart, 2000: 83).
Survival/Self Expression (S/S) score: Th is factor score contains mainly the 
society’s transformation rate from a materialist to a post-materialist one. It also 
measures the importance of self-expression and the quality of life versus economic 
and physical security, etc. Th e second score is a characterization of
“tap[ping] an intergenerational shift  from emphasis on economic and 
physical security toward increasing emphasis on self-expression, subjective 
well-being, and quality of life… [Th e second score is] linked with the 
emergence of growing emphasis on environmental protection, the women’s 
movement, and rising demands for participation in decision making in 
economic and political life” (Inglehart 2000: 84).
When the European countries are extracted from WVS 5th data, there are 
20 countries that are found to have been surveyed (Table 3), but when counting 
the identity questions, we see that only 16 countries were surveyed for all six 
questions. Turkey is surveyed about all except EU membership. France, the 
Netherlands and the UK are only surveyed for religiosity. Since it is not the 
strong identifi cation but the salience over other identities that is our concern in 
this analysis, those countries are excluded from the set.
Table 3. List of Countries in the WVS 5th Data.
1 Andorra 8 Norway 15 Ukraine
2 Bulgaria 9 Poland 16 Serbia
3 Cyprus 10 Romania 17 Turkey
4 Finland 11 Slovenia 18 France
5 Germany 12 Spain 19 Netherlands
6 Italy 13 Sweden 20 Great Britain
7 Moldova 14 Switzerland
Also for the same reason, salience, only cases of respondents who strongly 
identify themselves with only one identity are included in the analysis; others 
–who strongly identify with more than one identity– are excluded. Th e result 
is listed in Table 4. Th is and further calculations are made through SPSS v.19 
programme outputs.





























































































































































































































































































































































































It would be statistically wrong if one were to interpret Table 4 as the actual 
dispersion of identity saliences, since the excluded cases –of multi-affi  liations–
and their distribution for the comparative measurement of salient identity 
cannot be foreseen. However it would be in accord with general expectations 
to say that local identity salience is more present in Spain, Germany and 
Sweden as expected. Since our objective is not to tally, but to profi le the types 
of salient identities, to use the elaborated data ‘as is’ will not be a scientifi c 
problem.
In order to profi le the types of salient identities with respect to modernity and 
post-modernity preferences, the best method would be the use of Multivariate 
Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) since we take the categorical variables of 
identity salience as treatment (input) and the T/R and S/S score as the response 
(outcome) scores.
“MANOVA uses the set of metric variables as dependent variables and the 
objective becomes fi nding groups of respondents that exhibit diff erences on 
the set of dependent variables. Th e groups of respondents are not specifi ed; 
instead, the researcher uses one or more independent variables (non-metric 
variables) to form groups” (Hair 2010: 446-447).
In the case of MANOVA, there are three assumptions of the analysis to be 
checked (Hair 2010: 458-460):
– Independence; although it is a crucial assumption for the analysis, this 
assumption is assured by the WVS Association, in the details of sampling and 
interviewing methodology.
– Equality of variance-covariance matrices; the Box’s M test indicates that 
there is no signifi cant diff erence across the groups’ covariance matrices. Table 5 
gives the test results from the package programme.
– Normality; as the last precondition of the MANOVA analysis, the normality of 
dependent variables (T/R and S/S) should be tested. When the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for normality is applied to the variables, unfortunately, the test 
result indicates that scores deviate signifi cantly from the normal distribution. 
However, when the extreme values of the scores are analysed, it is observed 
that there are no outliers in the data, i.e. the scores are within the [X
_
 ± 4.s] 
margins. From this, one can conclude that the non-normality of the data is due 
to kurtosis or skewness. And “[w]ith moderate sample sizes, modest violations 
[of normality assumption] can be accommodated as long as the diff erences 
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are due to skewness and not outliers” (Hair 2010: 460). Tables 6 and 7 are the 
results for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the descriptive statistics of the 
T/R and S/S values. 
Table 5. Test result for equivalence of covariance matrices across groups.
Test Results*





*Tests null hypothesis of equal population covariance matrices
Table 6. Results for Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality.
  Kolmogorov-Smirnov* Shapiro-Wilk










,053 4421 ,000 973 4421 ,000
*Lilliefors Signifi cance Correction
Aft er ensuring the applicability of the MANOVA, it is time to apply the analysis. 
As is stated above, the aim of the analysis is to reveal the diff erences among 
groups, from the perspective of dependent variables. But as the number of groups 
increases, the explanatory power of the analysis decreases exponentially, since 
the number of categories in each variable (treatment) is multiplied for possible 
inputs, which for our case is 26 = 64, and this brings more confusion to the 
analysis. Also since we are aiming at searching for salient identity, the multiple 
saliences are not an informative case for our purposes. Hence, instead of using six 
salience variables, it is more reasonable to use a single variable –salience– which 
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A MANOVA analysis that may be applied with salience as a marker, and with 
T/R and S/S as dependent variables shows: 
H0: (μ
T/R, μS/S) ordered pairs for all groups are equal, vs.
H1:  For at least one group, (μ
T/R, μS/S) pair is not equal to the other groups’ 
pairs.
When the analysis was applied, the test results rejected the initial hypothesis 
with an asymptotic signifi cance of 0 for all three of all four tests. Also the tests’ 
power was 1,00 as well, as is shown in Table 8.
Table 9 gives the mean T/R and S/S scores and their standard errors of each 
salient identity group; also Figure 2 shows the scores graphically by an ellipse 
with mean values pairs as the centre and standard errors as radii.
Since the test shows only that there is a grouping, but not the discriminating power 
of each category, we know for sure that at least one group mean pair is diff erent 
from the other, but cannot be sure that each group diff ers signifi cantly. A post 
hoc test needs to be done for further analysis. When Fisher’s Least Signifi cant 
Diff erence (LSD) test is applied to the dependent variables separately, there are 
some interesting results. Due to space economy, since SPSS result tables are too 
big, a summary table of signifi cance values for LSD test is supplied as Table 10.2 
Th e upper-triangular matrix of the table gives the results for inter-classes T/R 
comparison, whereas the lower-triangular gives them for S/S comparison. Gray 
scores statistical failure for group distinction, the non-shaded ones indicates 
distinction.
Statistical fi ndings
Although the MANOVA test results indicate that there are statistically signifi cant 
diff erences among groups of salient identities, post hoc tests of the T/R and S/S 
point out that the deeper analysis does not permit us to conclude more:
Modernity: Th e fi rst thing that strikes one about Table 10 is that the test 
results of S/S scores – lower triangular matrix – show almost a total failure except 
between the religious and national identities. Th ese results show that among the 
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religious identities, from the S/S scores point of view. Since the S/S score 
measures the person’s desire to be free (for example at level of physical/national 
security), one can state that this is not the case when it concerns personal freedoms.
Religious exclusiveness: As can also obviously be seen from Figure 2, the post 
hoc test results for the T/R scores indicate that there is a strong group diff erence 
(0,000 asymptotic signifi cance) between religious identity and other identities. 
Th is deduction indicates that although there are religious, at least religion 
denomination-based, diff erences among societies, religious identity diff ers 
structurally from other identities.
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68 per cent (± Error) boundaries of identities of Europe
95 per cent (±2 x Error) boundaries of identities of Europe




































































Figure 2 - Salient identity ellipses with centres of mean values and radii of standard errors of scores on 
coordinate plane















































































































































































































































European Inclusiveness: Th e European identity’s distinction test fails (at 0,05 
signifi cance level) all except for the religious and world identities. On T/R score 
it indicates that the boundaries of European identity are not strongly defi ned, 
and the group members that defi ne themselves as European come from diverse 
levels of the traditional-rational scale. However, the identity’s upper boundary 
is merely a stronger one. Statistical fi ndings show a diff erence when it concerns 
transcending identities and this fi nding is not consequent with general fi nding 
on the Continent. One can be more sceptical indeed if the religious-European 
distinction is coming from the exclusiveness of the religious identity, which can 
not be stated.
One for all = all for one: Another interesting deduction from post hoc test 
results is that there is a strong statistical clue to the structural similarity between 
individual identity and world citizenship. Th is result would be counted as the 
clue that, although the ethical and emotional brandings of the identities are 
diff erent, the practical results of them are observed to be the same. Since it is 
almost impossible to mobilize humanity, due to human nature, the actual 
practice of world citizenship is paradoxically nothing but individualism. 
Hence, the identity spectrum axis would seem to be a horse-shoe shaped one. 
(Figure 3).
Reassessment of unit identity: Last but not least, the failing asymptotic 
signifi cance (for α=0,05) of LSD test between national and local identities 
suggests that there is a strong structural correlation between the two identities, 
which suggests a stronger transitivity between them.
Figure 3 - Formation of identities in Europe
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Conclusion
Th e purpose of this study as stated at the beginning of this chapter was to answer 
two questions: ‘What is challenging the salience of national identity?’; and ‘Will 
it be evenly successful if one takes over its place by something else in the decision-
making process of populi when it concerns the perception of international issues?’ 
Although there is no certainty in social science, the deductions of a statistical 
survey can be used as an acceptable bearing for an answer.
As is stated in the statistical fi ndings, although there are six categorizations of 
identities built from four levels of identifi cation, socially there are three structures 
of life-views. Th e fi rst and the most solid life-view is, with its defi nite boundaries, 
the modern-pious one. Th is life-view identifi es itself with religious identity, 
which transcends geographical or political boundaries. While, one can sense a 
similarity between this and the old pre-modern super-identity of Christendom, 
one can believe that its ancestor is the Christendom understanding of life; it 
should be understood that this life-view is not the mere recurrence of the old 
one, but better accepts others in society. One can also say that this religious 
identity is a glocal one, and it formulates the identity categories in a post-secular 
philosophical sense. Th e higher mean S/S score agrees with this comment. Due 
to its discreteness from the other life views and its appreciation of the modern 
dichotomy of church and state, the mobilizing capacity and parameters of 
religious identity and national identity do not have collinearity. Hence, one can 
conclude that religious identity is not a challenge for national identity from a 
sovereignty perspective.
Th e second life-view can be called the modern-political life-view. Th is life-
view formulates the identity categories, in functional perspective, with respect to 
political perception. One can associate this structural life-view with both national 
and local identity. As has been mentioned, since national and local identities are 
fed from the same structural source, local identity is the nearest alternative to the 
national one. Th erefore, as an answer to our fi rst question, one can assert that the 
local identity is the more challenging one.
Th e last life-view is the hardest to put, since it concerns both nano and macro 
level identities, the individual and the world identity, within its boundaries. 
Although the meta-narratives of each identity in it diff er, the stand due to 
the meta-narratives includes a socio-political self-choice of inclusion. Hence 
unlike the other types of identities that are externally defi ned, this structure 
of life-view is constructed from internal reasoning; thus it may be called a 
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modern-intellectual life-view, and for positioning it with respect to the others 
they can be categorized as secular-glocal identities. Since the last life-view is not 
a political opinion but a rather philosophical stand, one can comment that the 
identities that are contained in this view do not constitute a challenge to national 
identity. Moreover, one can safely say that this secular-glocal identity also has a 
distance with the post-secular glocal one.
Although one may call the EU identity part of this last structural life-view, 
and in fact this is a reality from post-WW II on, because of its historical 
perspective this identity constitutes a hybrid one. Also since the offi  cial 
values that are constructed through reasoning ‘do not constitute a proprium,’ 
(Habermas and Derrida 2003: 294) it has scattered support from two 
diff erent structural life-views.
When we come to the attempt to answer the second question, one can comment 
that although the local identity cannot triumph over the national identity in the 
contemporary equilibrium, because of tidal waves of globalization and EU, the 
gluing factors of national unity ‘melt in the air,’ and the national identity is forced 
towards its local partitions. Even if the contemporary responses to the forces of 
partitioning are moving in a more reactive and pro-nationalist direction, the need 
for coordination against ambitious economic and technological competition 
will eventually give way more to tame the national identity.
Notes
1 For further discussion of sovereignty transfer see Sevencan M. (2008) Transformation of 
National Identities in EU and Turkish Identity. In: C. AC (ed) International conference on 
Social Sciences. Izmir: Th e Social Sciences Research Society, 119-133.
2 Actual SPSS test output can be accuired by contacting with the author via msevencan@ssu.
edu.tr mailing address.
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Chapter 10
Democratic Th eory and the Autonomy of 
Non-Christian Religious Courts in the UK
 
Ephraim Nimni
Th is chapter discusses the dilemmas of the relationship between religions of non-
Christian minorities and the state in Western liberal democracies. It also explores 
the potential way out of these dilemmas off ered by the limited autonomy granted 
in the UK to the Jewish orthodox Beth Din and, by implication, the autonomy of 
Islamic Shariah Courts, as sanctioned in the UK Parliament’s (Divorce) Religious 
Marriages Bill 2002. It is argued here that this legislation has implications that 
go beyond the specifi c needs of the Orthodox Jewish community, to constitute 
an example of an embryonic democratic pluralism that leads to the creation of 
supplementary jurisdictions for non-Christian minority communities in the 
UK, and the possible incorporation of both the Jewish Orthodox Beth Din and 




With the enactment of the Muslim Marriages Bill (South African Department 
of Justice and Constitutional Development: 2011: Muslim Marriages Bill), South 
Africa has taken the lead in the question of the relationship between religions of 
non-Christian minorities and the state. For a discussion see Amien (2006). Th is 
chapter will discuss the dilemmas of the relationship between religions of non-
Christian minorities and the state in Western liberal democracies.
Orthodox Jewish and Islamic courts have similar procedures on matters 
relating to religious marriages and, indeed, many other matters, including 
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male ritual circumcision and the defi nition of pork as ritually unclean and 
forbidden for consumption. A marker of diff erence between these religions and 
Christianity is that worshiping images is forbidden in both religions. Kasher and 
Halal dietary laws have some similarities, the orthodox Jewish Kasher being the 
more strict. Th e ritual slaughter of animals permitted for human consumption 
is very similar in both religions. Th ere are some diff erences in the consumption 
of alcohol, which is forbidden for Muslims and not for Jews, and in divorce 
procedures. Th ere cannot be any doubt that Islam and Orthodox Judaism are 
the closest Abrahamic religions. It is an undisputed historical fact that both 
fl ourished in close contact, a fact that is unbearably obscured by the tragic and 
most unfortunate circumstances of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict. In light of this, 
any jurisprudential procedure or recognition of the autonomy of religious courts, 
however limited, of one of these two religions in Western liberal democracies, in 
which both are minorities, will necessarily have an impact on the other.
Th is chapter will also discuss the landmark contribution of Dr Rowan 
Williams,  former Archbishop of Canterbury (Islam in English Law- civil and 
religious Marriages in England) to the creation of supplementary religious courts 
in the English Legal System, and thus allowing for the much better incorporation 
of religious Jews and Muslims into the British state.
 
Secularism and secular democracies
 
Th e concept of Democracy is inherently contested by diff erent and oft en 
contradictory approaches and interpretations. Th ese include the multiple, 
varied meanings that diff erent people attach to the word democracy (O’Donnell 
2007:6). Th ere cannot be a single defi nition of democracy which satisfi es 
all users and practitioners. It will be suffi  cient to recall that communist states 
defi ne themselves as “People’s Democracies” while western capitalist states 
usually adopt the name of “Liberal” or “Representative” democracies; the fi rst 
is incompatible with the second. In distinction from the two above, religious 
democracy is a form of government where the principles of a particular religion 
inspire the laws and rules that govern the demos. Religious democracy is one of 
the many examples of how democracy coexists in diff erent ethnic, cultural and 
religious contexts. Like their secular liberal counterparts, religious democracies 
can operate in accordance with accepted principles of popular representation, 
periodic elections, the accountability of offi  ce holders, and the rule of law. Th ere 
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is no reason to believe that a religious democracy that respects the egalitarian 
provisions of the democratic principles and rights of its minorities, either secular 
or religious, is less legitimate than a political system governed by secular liberal 
principles (Căbulea May 2009:169).
Unfortunately nowadays, the idea of religious democracies appears to clash 
with the early modern doctrine of an egalitarian “secular democracy”, the alleged 
child of the universal values of the Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Following 
the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which advocated 
government of the people by the people based on the rule of law originating on 
the values of universal secular reasoning, religion was eliminated from the public 
sphere (González, Lozano and Pérez 2009:254). Th is was advocated on two 
grounds. First, in order to avoid any form of coercion based on religious beliefs 
on the lives of citizens and, second and perhaps a more important normative 
justifi cation, in the need to homogenize the population in the foundational need 
to elevate reason to a privileged position and simultaneously debase ‘irrational’ 
religious and other non-rationalist beliefs which were deemed incompatible with 
secular modern reasoning. From this it appears that Christianity was removed 
from a privileged position with the advent of a “superior” form of secular 
reasoning. Many believe it was superseded by the democratic nation-state, with 
its aspiration to build a distinct national identity. However, this may not be 
entirely the case. Th e nation of the state was in turn built upon a common history, 
language, tradition and culture, and many secularists believe that nationalism and 
the nation state came to displace religious belief as the foundation for integration 
into the national polity. However, this may not be quite so. Th e formal removal 
of Christianity by the French Revolutionaries, for example, did not preclude its 
persistent survival as an implicit foundation engrained in the secular dominant 
nation’s tradition and culture. Since Europe has been Christian, even aft er the 
state had removed all or most Christian religious residues, it could well be that 
Christianity has endured by permeating the diff erent European national cultures 
and traditions (Mancini 2010:499). 
 
Secularism and diff erence blind equality
Diff erence-blind equality assumes that as long as no attention is paid to 
social diff erence, it will have no eff ect. In fact, as long as we pay no attention 
to diff erence, we will never overcome the inequalities that diff erence is used 
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to sustain (Longo 2001:272). An ingredient of the idea of ‘diff erence blind 
equality’ that haunts contemporary liberal democracies could perhaps be found 
in the French Revolution’s secularization of modern thinking.  Th e values that 
informed the French Revolution  were understood to be a form of superior 
secular rational thinking. Th is is, in a nutshell, a way of thinking that leads to 
the acceptance of the validity of propositions that are strongly supported by 
reasoned evidence and a rejection of propositions that are not (Kelly 2003:612). 
Religion is here disqualifi ed on the grounds that it is a body of beliefs that cannot 
be explained by ‘reasoned evidence’.  Likewise, human nature is understood in 
universal terms, adhering to the belief that all humans are transcendentally equal. 
Th is epistemic assumption prevents the recognition of constitutive cultural or 
religious diff erences. Th is requires a more detailed philosophical exposition and 
has implications for an older vision of human rights, but these discussions cannot 
be entertained here. In a succinct manner we have here the genesis of what Taylor 
calls “diff erence blind” liberalism. Th ese principles ignore their own temporality, 
in that they are themselves a refl ection of particular cultures and perceive 
themselves as transcendental and neutral forms of reasoning (Taylor 1994:44). In 
addition, as Taylor equally reminds us, Liberalism is also a fi ghting creed (Taylor 
1994:62). If this is the case, this particular kind of liberalism has no room for 
others in its proselytizing mission. Th is is, according to Taylor, “a particularism 
masquerading as universal” (Taylor 1994:43). Furthermore, this conveniently 
forgets that modern secular reasoning also has the propensity to be elevated to 
the category of dogma, and it is ardently sustained by actors who believe it is 
true (Gressgård 2012:20). Here too, there is, regrettably, a propensity to confuse 
liberal democracy with a kind of militant secularism (Macklem 2012:581). 
For centuries this type of liberalism was understood as a form of universal 
progressive thinking. As a result, a constitutional separation between religion 
and state has been implemented in many secular liberal democracies, confi ning 
religion to the private sphere with no role in the daily functioning of citizenship. 
As this separation is oft en enshrined in constitutions, secular republics fi nd it 
diffi  cult to recognize diff erence in the form of religious laws or jurisprudence. Th is 
egalitarian modus operandi, in which sameness and equality are oft en confused, 
results in a form of diff erence-blind liberalism, which provides each individual 
with a uniform set of rights and duties, regardless of culture, identity or beliefs 
(Laborde 2005:312). As will be shown in a moment, this modus operandi also 
aff ects some types of religious democracies, leading to the conclusion that it is not 
secularism per se that impedes the acceptance of minority religious jurisdictions, 
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but a pervasive diff erence blind liberalism that has also tainted some religious 
democracies. Th ese “diff erence blind” modalities of democratic government tend 
to alienate minorities, because decision making is done within the parameters of 
a dominant template, in disregard of the interests of an individual or minority 
group. Th ey also weaken democratic theory because it misses the opportunity to 
see that some religious political movements and ‘Political Islam’ are sometimes 
programmes for religious democracy (Esposito &Voll 2001:198-9).
 
Th e separation of religion from the state
 
In a stark rejection of the Peace of Augsburg’s famous slogan cuius regio, eius 
religio (whose region, his religion) which demanded that the religion of the 
ruler coincide with the religion of the ruled (Conversi 2007:378), most liberal 
democrats believe that freedom of worship is secured for all religions by 
separating religion from the aff airs of the state. Th is key normative assertion is 
not only held by liberals, but is also oft en held by religious writers, who argue 
that the separation of religion and the state contributes to enabling religion to be 
authentic and honest. Th e religious argument is that “Faith to be faith, prayer to 
be prayer, worship to be worship – all require a voluntary response, without the 
sanction of support of the state and without fear of coercion” (Wood 1991:229). 
In the United States, there is a deep-seated belief that religious freedom can 
exist only if there is a separation between church and state. For this reason, the 
constitutional fi rst amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving religious 
disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and praxis (Scott 1996:1157). 
In France, the concept of laïcité is inextricably linked with the Republican Ideal 
of liberté, égalité, fr aternité, and it represents an important element of French 
Political identity. Th e term laïcité denotes the non-confessional character of the 
French state. In a very curious way, the principle of laïcité is the precise inverted 
mirror of cuius regio, eius religio. If the latter is the tyranny of one religion, the 
former is surely the tyranny of secularism. But this is of no importance to France, 
and was until recently of no importance to successive Kamalist regimes in Turkey. 
Th ese principles were enshrined in the 1905 loi de Séparation des Eglises et de 
l’Etat and in the Fourth Republic’s Constitution (Chadwick 1997:47). In the 
name of freedom of religion, and hiding behind the mantle of a diff erence-blind 
liberalism, the secular state relegates religion entirely to the private domain; in 
other words, fi rmly outside the jurisdiction of the state. In diff erent shapes and 
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forms, secular liberal democracies exercise a kind of ‘benign neglect’ of religious 
jurisprudence, by negating direct assistance to religious communities unless it 
is available to all, and even more so in the refusal to recognize the jurisdictional 
autonomy of religious courts in family law for example, which are central to 
defi ning religious membership (Oestreich 1999:120-1). 
 
Coercion: religious or secular?
 
Th e French and US models come from diff erent normative directions. Th e 
United States gives primacy to religious liberty and the French republican model 
to equality of citizenship, which is understood to be secular. Yet, even if they come 
from opposing points of view, in their diff ering ways they converge in a common 
understanding of the need to separate religion from the state. While they diff er 
in their approach to religion, these two models converge in what are normatively 
understood to be the liberal and republican conceptions of secularism (Modood 
2009:72).
However, the relationship between freedom of religion and the separation of 
religion from the state is not as clear-cut as the high priests of secular modernity 
appear to indicate. 
To be sure, liberals and democrats are on fi rm ground in critiquing the slogan 
cuius regio, eius religio, but remain somewhat inconsistent if they do not criticize 
laïcité with equal force. Th e full institutionalization of a particular religion in 
the organs of the state is coercive and oppressive to other religions and to secular 
citizens, and the exclusion of religion from the public domain is oppressive to 
religious citizens. Consider, for example, the case of Israel. Th e imposition of 
aspects of Jewish orthodox behaviour on the institutions of the state (Kasher rules, 
no public transport on the Sabbath, a regime of religious marriages only, etc) shows 
religious coercion in diff erent areas of life. Among the many critics of the Israeli 
system is Haim H. Cohn, a distinguished judge of the Israeli Supreme Court, who 
called the religious coercion in Israel on matters of marriages and divorce a “Blot 
on Israel’s Democracy” (cited by Karayanni 2012:325, see also Cohn 1998:110).
All secular liberal democracies include law-abiding religious citizens who 
conduct their private and public lives according to the canons of their respective 
religions. Th ese religious citizens, as they experience a separation between religion 
and state in secular democracies, sometimes feel disadvantaged. In a paradoxical 
way, they fi nd themselves in a similar situation to that of Israel’s secular citizens, 
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for they are disadvantaged by their religiosity in similar ways to those in which 
secular Israelis are disadvantaged by their secularity. A common example is 
marriage and divorce. Israel’s secular citizens are disadvantaged because their 
state does not have recognized procedures for secular marriage and divorce. 
As will be explained in a moment, non-Christian religious citizens in secular 
liberal democracies are also disadvantaged in matters relating to marriage and 
divorce because the separation of religion and state impedes the recognition of 
religious rulings in such matters. Here, and in a perplexing and paradoxical way, 
it appears that the liberal democratic quest for a blind equality between citizens 
in secular procedures is the inverted mirror image of Israel’s theocratic quest for 
the blind equality of its Jewish citizens in accordance with the cannons of the 
Jewish religion. Th e central problem lies in the liberal democratic assumption 
that liberal equality requires that all citizens be treated as homogenous and 
homologous individuals. Th e liberal principle of equal respect requires the 
secular state to treat citizens in a diff erence-blind fashion, devoid of any kind 
of religious connotation. Th e Israeli state treats its Jewish citizens, religious or 
secular, in accordance with the religious canon in a diff erence-blind fashion, 
not considering whether they are secular or religious. Charles Taylor goes as far 
as to argue that this liberalism that is blind to diff erence is in an insidious and 
subtle way homogenizing and discriminatory (1994:43). Whether religious or 
secular, diff erence-blind equality defaults in the dominant practice and excludes 
and alienates minorities. Th e three Abrahamic religions develop explanations of 
human rights that are generally grounded in religious texts, and, furthermore, 
they oft en appeal to historical praxis to establish their normative justifi cations 
(Afsaruddin 2008:57). For that reason, the exclusion of religious justifi cations of 
human rights undermines the acceptance of those rights by faith communities.
 
Th e veil of ignorance
 
As argued before, the neutrality of the state is more apparent than real. Its 
sovereign, the demos, is always concretely inserted in time and space in an 
insulated localized history, ethnos and religious tradition. But in spite of this, 
in the famous phrase coined by John Rawls (1999:108), a liberal state is required 
normatively to hold a “veil of ignorance rule” (a “veil rule”). Th is is a rule that 
suppresses the knowledge of decision makers of the religious adherence of its 
citizens in the name of neutrality and anonymity. Th e justifi cation for this is 
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that if rulers and ruled do not know the allegiance of the elected ruler, they will 
choose fairly because otherwise they might inadvertently choose someone who is 
detrimental to their interests (Moghaddam 2012:318). Th e individuals in Rawls’ 
model are behind a veil of ignorance about their own culture or religion;  the 
underlying assumption is that principles of justice developed here are for a 
homogeneous society. Th ere is no recognition of the fact that humans diff er in 
religion, speech, and culture, forming kin groups with distinctive characteristics 
that they cherish and want to preserve (Van Dyke 2004:727). Following this 
point, a Feminist critique of the “veil of ignorance” doctrine persuasively argues 
that this theory fails because on its choice of an abstraction of a “human being” 
in the exemplary image of a “normal” male member of the dominant group. Th is 
abstraction invokes the characteristics of a male and a member of the dominant 
majority. Th e consensus it creates is thus achieved by fi at (Matsuda: 1986:613-14). 
Th is criticism particularly applies to the discussion of the values of non-Christian 
minorities in secular democracies. Th e abstractions of the “veil of ignorance” 
subsume non-Christian communities into what they are not.
While the United States and France and most (but not all) Western democracies 
have unambiguous constitutional provisions that separate religion from state, the 
United Kingdom has no separation between Church and State. Th e state supports 
one particular religious faith, Th e Church of England, and Th e Head of State, the 
Queen, is the Supreme Governor of the Church of England. In the European 
Union, only the UK, Denmark and Greece are religious democracies, although 
of very diff erent kinds. Religious democracies support a particular religion, and 
to some extent (it varies from case to case); religious values infl uence the political 
confi guration of that state. Th ere are some intermediate, ambiguous categories, 
for example, the Republic of Ireland’s constitution declares that the state may not 
endorse any particular religion and guarantees freedom of religion, but the values 
of the Catholic Church infl uence important Irish laws (Cosgrove et alii 2011:1). 
 
Religious autonomy and transformative accommodation
 
In part because of its multinational and religious pluralism, the UK does not 
hold a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”, and it is argued here that because of this, 
paradoxically, a section of its actually veiled citizens, orthodox Jewish and 
to some extent Islamic women, are granted a higher degree of autonomy and 
personal freedom than “veiled” liberal secularist democracies are able to aff ord. 
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In contrast to a doctrinaire secularist understanding of the rule of law, which 
demands full compliance with the established secular legal procedure, or non-
recognition and alienation by the legal system, Ayelet Shachar (2001) advances 
a case in favour of “joint governance” and “transformative accommodation” 
of minority non-Christian religious communities. Unlike the sovereign state, 
transformative accommodation does not grant jurisdiction in “an all or nothing” 
fashion (Shachar 2001:126). Shachar advances instead the idea of a limited 
form of autonomy for religious courts, which provides a way for politically 
accommodating the claims of religious groups without endorsing any ruling 
or potential ruling that may contravene internationally accepted principles 
of human rights. Religious courts are understood as a public space off ering 
a dialogical compromise of religious jurisprudence with the laws of the land 
and HR norms. Th e transformative character of the accommodation lies in 
the mutual adjustment between non-Christian minority religious courts and 
established principles of human rights. In this way, non- Christian minority 
religious courts realize that in order to remain relevant they must transform 
those practices that violate established norms of human rights. In other words, 
partnership and participation in the state system are possible only through 
mutual compromise between the state and the religious courts (Shachar 
2001:125).
‘Transformative accommodation’ implies a willingness on all sides to 
contemplate internal change to accommodate subjects who are simultaneously 
members of both civic and religious communities ( Jackson 2009:133).
Here the example is of Jewish Orthodox Religious courts, and the ongoing 
development of an Islamic Fiqh ( Jurisprudence that deals with the observance 
of rituals, morals and social legislation in Islam), attuned to the needs of Islamic 
minority communities in Western societies (Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat, the fi qh, or 
jurisprudence, of Muslim minorities). Th e argument is based on the premise 
that all individuals utilizsing these jurisprudential services voluntarily agree to 
them and subject themselves to their jurisdiction without coercion. As there 
are diff erences between a Muslim majority and Muslim minority context, 
European Muslims are likely to develop diff erent social and religious norms to 
regulate their lives. (Malik 2009:3) Th e “jurisprudence of Muslim minorities” 
(Fiqh al-Aqalliyat) attempts to present a strong Islamic foundation for a set of 
relationships of moral obligation and solidarity with non-Muslims (March 
2009:34-35). Th is is a powerful integrative tool, one that fi lls an important gap in 
the consolidation of plural societies. Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat (the fi qh, or jurisprudence, 
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of Muslim minorities) is a legal doctrine introduced by Shaykh Dr. Taha Jabir 
al-Alwani, and Shaykh Dr. Yusuf al-Qara-Dawi of Qatar. Th is fi qh maintains that 
Muslim minorities, especially those residing in the West, need a special type of 
Jurisprudence to take care of their religious needs, which diff er from those of 
other faiths, and from those of Muslims residing in Islamic countries. It tries to 
resolve diff erences with the culture and values of the host societies from within 
the framework of Islamic jurisprudence. Its goal is to reinterpret some Islamic 
concepts, while at the same time not being a religious reform movement that 
breaches orthodoxy (Fishman 2006). 
Veit Bader raises the question of the accommodation of non-Christian 
minorities in his model of associative democracy, which in many ways converges 
with the model of supplementary jurisdictions raised by Shachar Th e central idea 
of associative democracy is to encourage minority group representation that is 
compatible with the norms of democratic governance. Associative democracy, 
according to Bader, provides good institutional and policy opportunities to 
combine the protection of basic needs and rights of all and the protection of 
minimal liberal-democratic standards, as well as for accommodating divergent 
religious practices. Much like Shachar’s model, it encourages minorities 
to reinterpret their best interests to facilitate their representation and 
accommodation (Bader 2007:177).
Th e non-availability of these courts of religious law, attuned to the needs of 
non-Christian minorities residing in liberal democratic societies, constitutes 
a harmful stumbling block in the process of integration of these religious 
minorities, by increasing their segregation and alienation.
 
Rowan Williams’ model of transformative accommodation
 
Rowan Williams, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, relies on the conceptual 
argument of Shachar (a Feminist Jewish secular academic) in his plea for the 
incorporation of certain aspects of Shariah Law into English law. In an important 
homily he gave in 2008, he was subjected to the abuse and scorn of the rather 
limited tabloid press that plagues the UK, which completely misunderstood his 
argument. Fortunately, his argument was later published in a scholarly journal 
(Williams 2008). In his thought-provoking article, Williams attempts to advance 
Shachar’s overlapping jurisdictions to the arena of the recognition of religious 
law in a pluralist democratic state.
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Shachar’s Multicultural Jurisdictions envisages ‘joint governance’ as a dialogical 
mode of politics whereby some authority in personal matters can be shared 
collectively by diff erent non-Christian religious groups. She aims to transcend the 
dilemmas posed by secularism and the cruel binary understanding of secularist law 
encapsulated in the term “either-your-culture-or-your rights” (Shachar 2001:113). 
She off ers instead a model of joint governance for institutional arrangements that 
seek simultaneously to prevent intra-group and extra-group cultural domination.
Rowan Williams argues that with the imposition of secularism, a failure of 
secular legal systems is to remove from consideration religious motivations 
and practices of groups in plural societies. He further argues that the defence 
of secular legal monopoly in terms of the universal doctrine of human right 
misunderstands the circumstances in which this doctrine emerged (Williams 
2008:273).
In this he agrees that by ignoring minorities there is in Rawls’ principle of the 
‘veil of ignorance’ a biased abstraction harmful to the integration of minority 
communities.  If the law of the land, Williams argues, fails to take religious 
motivation as a serious constituting element of the individuals concerned, then it 
fails to engage and integrate an important segment of society (Williams 2008:262), 
and creates not only a sense of alienation among the minority community, but 
also real issues of power and imposition. Th e impact of all this is crucially to 
undermine the overall cohesion of the body of citizens. Following Charles Taylor 
(2004), Williams argues that to be part as a meaningful participant, you need to 
be recognized as what you are. He then rhetorically asks whether a monopolistic 
approach to a legal system is a satisfactory basis for a modern pluralistic and 
democratic state. Might there be room, he asks, for ‘overlapping jurisdictions’, 
in which individuals can choose in certain limited areas whether to seek justice 
under one system or another? (Williams 2008:262). 
Here the limited autonomy granted to the Orthodox Jewish courts becomes 
exemplary, and he invites the British state to act in accordance with this 
precedent, in relation to a religious community that exhibits many similarities 
with Orthodox Jews. To recognize Shariah, the former Archbishop argues, is to 
recognize a method of jurisprudence based on revealed texts, the interpretation of 
which varies with time, rather than to recognize a single system of jurisprudence 
(Williams 2008:264). He further argues that in the relations between Islam 
and English law, it is necessary to deconstruct crude binary oppositions and 
mythologies, and these refer the ignorance of the role and purpose of Shariah 
law or the domineering crude Manichean interpretation of the philosophy of the 
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Enlightenment (Williams 2008:262). He proposes as a criterion for recognizing 
religious communities whether a communal jurisdiction interferes with liberties 
granted to the wider society (Williams 2008:273).  Williams concludes by 
saying that to think intelligently about Islam and English law a fair amount of 
deconstruction of crude opposition and mythologies is necessary, whether about 
the nature of Shariah or the nature of the Philosophy of the Enlightenment 
(Williams 2008:274-5).
  Following this logic, it is reasonable to conclude that the UK Parliament’s 
legislation to create supplementary jurisdictions for non-Christian minorities is 
an important example of this.
Th e specifi c case discussed below is related to UK legislation that partially 
empowers religious tribunals of a non-Christian minority to pass specifi c rulings 
for their congregations. Th ese rulings have in some limited form the status of 
the law of the land. It is argued here that the lack of the militant secularism 
and one-sided understanding of the Philosophy of the Enlightenment that 
characterizes republican models (France for example), which constitutionally 
inhibit the granting of any minimal autonomy to religious courts, facilitates 
the acceptance of this limited autonomy on matters of religious importance 
to minority communities. Th is kind of religious legal pluralism encourages the 
integration and loyalty of minority religious communities, as their members fi nd 
in state mechanisms the recognition of their identity and way of life. In contrast, 
egalitarian secularist republics cannot employ such mechanisms and, contrary 
to their stated egalitarian aim, they increase the sense of alienation of religious 
minority communities.
 
Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002
 
In order to understand the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002, it is necessary 
fi rst to discuss the case of refusal of an orthodox Jewish divorce, the harm this 
creates for Jewish orthodox women refused divorce by recalcitrant husbands, and 
the remedial action taken in conjunction with the cannons of Jewish Halachaic 
law through the legislation enacted by the UK Parliament. Th is legislation was 
lobbied for by the Jewish community and enacted by Parliament in 2002. Th is 
legislation aims to resolve a human rights failure in Orthodox Jewish Law relating 
to discrimination against women in cases of religious divorce. What follows is a 
summary of the case and argument submitted to justify the passing of the Bill.
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But fi rst it is important to understand that this Act has implications only for 
a small minority of Jews, those who adhere to orthodox Jewish practice and live 
their lives in strict adherence to the principles of the Halacha, the Talmudic 
literature that deals with the interpretation of the laws of the Hebrew Scriptures. 
Th is is the collective body of religious laws for Jews, including Biblical law, and 
Talmudic and Rabbinic law, as well as customs and traditions. Like Islam, Judaism 
draws no distinction in its laws between religious and ostensibly non-religious 
life; it does not distinguish clearly between religious and civil law. In the Islamic 
faith, there is a similar codifi cation in the form of Shariah Law (the interpretation 
of the moral code and religious law of Islam). However, the majority of Jews 
do not adhere strictly to Halacha principles or they interpret them diff erently. 
Consequently, for this majority of Jews, the Act discussed below is irrelevant.
It has been also argued by Judge David Pearl that this Act deals exclusively 
with Orthodox Jewish Religious law. Th e object of the Act is to enable an English 
Court to order that a civil divorce be not fi nalized until both parties have taken 
such steps as are required to dissolve the marriage in accordance with Jewish 
Orthodox Law. However, there is a provision that this procedure can be extended 
to other religions. Judge Pearl argues that the position of Muslim women is 
diff erent from that of orthodox Jewish women. A Muslim woman denied divorce 
from her husband can obtain a faskh from the Shariah council (Pearl: 2003:14). 
Indeed, upon application by a Muslim wife, a Shariah Court can grant a decree 
of divorce, in the form of a faskh, on any ground which it recognizes as valid, and 
this is indeed diff erent from the Jewish Orthodox case. However, the important 
point of this Act and its relevance to the Islamic Community in the UK is that 
it establishes the precedent of the recognition of a religious tribunal (Th e Beth 
Din), and that this precedent can successfully be invoked for the recognition of 
an Islamic Religious Tribunal (Shariah court).
 
Th e mechanism of a Jewish Orthodox divorce
 
For a divorce to be eff ective in the Orthodox Jewish community (one that adheres 
literally to Halacha principles), a “get” must be obtained. A get is a consensual 
divorce in which mutual co-operation between the parties is required. Th e 
husband has to go before the Beth Din (Religious tribunal, akin to the Shariah 
Council in Islam) for a get and deliver it to his wife, and she is required to accept 
it. If he does not do so, the wife cannot remarry in Jewish law, although the 
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husband may be able to do so (monogamy is not consensual in Judaism; some 
Jewish traditions accept polygamy on similar terms to those of Islam). 
Sometimes a man will completely refuse to grant a divorce. Th is leaves his 
wife with no possibility of remarriage within Orthodox Judaism. Such a woman 
is called a mesorevet get (literally “refused a divorce”). A get refusal has very 
serious implications for a woman and it is tantamount to a serious violation of 
human rights. In Biblical times a woman who had sexual intercourse with a man 
other that her lawful husband or a man who could otherwise be her husband 
was deemed to be an adulteress (Noefet). Th e Biblical punishment for this was 
stoning to death at the place of public execution (Deut. xxii. 24). Fortunately 
Th e Talmudic Sages have soft ened this penalty, and contemporary Orthodox 
Judaism does not follow this procedure. Nevertheless, without a get, a woman 
who has a child by her subsequent partner is defi ned as a Noefet (adulteress under 
Jewish law), while the command in Deut. xxii 24 is not acted upon; her child 
becomes an illegitimate outcast (mamzer), which is a very serious stigma. S/he 
is not permitted to become a member of the Jewish body politic (Deut. xxiii. 3 
[A. V. 2]), and cannot intermarry with a Jew or Jewess ( Jewish Encyclopaedia: 
Entry on Adultery); her child becomes an illegitimate outcast (mamzer), which 
is a stigma that carries on into future generations. 
A woman who is trapped in a marriage that she seeks to end is called in 
Hebrew an “agunah” (a “chained” one), meaning one who is chained to a spouse 
against her will. If a wife refuses to accept her husband’s get, he is known as an 
“agun”. However, he does not suff er from the same disadvantages. A man who is 
refused a get by his wife has the option to seek an Hetermeahrabbanim (Hebrew: 
“permission by one hundred rabbis”) Th is is a term in Jewish law which means 
that one hundred Rabbis agree with a Rabbinical court that a particular situation 
warrants an exemption to permit a man to remarry even though his wife refuses 
to accept a get. As a result, a husband can eff ectively hold his wife to ransom, 
and can demand money, property or other rights concerning custody or child 
maintenance in return for a get. 
Th e Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 requires the dissolution of a 
religious marriage before a secular divorce is granted, empowering the Beth Din 
to grant this divorce, and in this way bringing equality to the situation, for the 
husband will not be able to remarry in a civil court if he does not grant his wife a 
get. Th e husband can also be coerced by the civil tribunal (using alimony, serious 
punitive costs, fi nancial damages, etc) to grant the religious divorce, something 
that the Beth Din is unable to do because the Halacha requires that the husband 
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concedes the Get of his own free will. (Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002) 
Th e Act also empowers the Lord Chancellor to extend its provisions to other 
faiths, particularly in similar cases in the Islamic community. Th is implies the 
recognition not only of the Beth Din, but also of the Islamic Shariah Council, 
which ultimately rules on the dissolution of a religious marriage.
While this is an example of limited autonomy for religious communities, it 
is nevertheless important, for it deals with issues that are central to the lives of 
members of these communities. Furthermore, by this kind of recognition of the 
authority of their religious law, these communities can feel respected in their 
values and better integrated into the wider society. 
Consider the opposing point of view, that of secular advice to a Jewish 
orthodox woman whose get has been refused. Simply go to a civil court and a 
judge will grant you the divorce you seek. Yes, sure, but, is it that simple? Is it 
not the case that such secular advice reveals a gigantic misrecognition, complete 
disregard and ignorance of the identity and lifestyle of this unfortunate woman? 
For in this case she will still be married in Jewish law, her orthodox father will 
throw ashes on his head, recite Kaddish, the Jewish prayer for the dead, tear his 
shirt, declare his daughter dead and sits Shiva, the Jewish period of mourning. 
No-one should be required to pay such a high price at the altar of monist and 
dogmatic Western secularism.
 
Shariah and the transformation of Islamic Law in the West
 
Other cases refer to the Islamic jurisprudential transformation of Shariah law 
through the adaptation of Western Islamic communities to their status as 
minorities, a central condition for acquiring a form of religious autonomy 
compatible with the values of human rights and the ethos of Western societies. 
Th is is another example of a dialogical mode of politics whereby autonomy can 
be shared among diff erent religious groups.
Th e expansion of this idea will allow Shariah Councils to develop 
jurisprudential roles that will not clash with accepted values of human rights. 
Th e argument, however, goes further than the specifi c case of Islamic minorities 
in Western liberal democracies. Supporters of Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat argue that the 
developments being articulated in the Fiqh al Aqalliyyat are also relevant to the 
rights of non-Muslims in Islamic states. In understanding that in international 
law the right to preach Islam peacefully is safeguarded, the spread of norms of 
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peaceful relations among states, religious freedom, the self-determination of 
peoples and the prohibition against aggressive war mean that the world has 
become the equivalent of one territorial jurisdiction, implying that law (at least 
public law) ought to be universal. 
Th ere is however controversy about these principles, not necessarily advocated 
by conservatives, but by others who see Islam as being suffi  ciently fl exible to adapt 
to the circumstances of Western democracies without the need for a specifi c Fiqh 
(Parray 2012:88-106). In particular, Hellyer and Ramadan remain somewhat 
skeptical, for they prefer a vision that sees Muslims in Europe, rather than 
Muslims as a minority in Europe (Hellyer 2009:94-5, Ramadan 2004). Such a 
debate cannot be entered into here, for it is a discussion that ought to be pursued 
by the followers of the faith. However, this discussion shows a lively debate taking 
place between Islamic scholars as to what is the best method of accommodation 
of Islamic minorities in Western Liberal democracies. Th is debate replicates 
similar discussions in Orthodox Judaism and among other minorities in Europe, 
and it is a sure sign of the willingness to accommodate and peacefully coexist in 
the West. Th is willingness gives ample justifi cation to Rowan Williams’ request 
for supplementary jurisdictions for British Muslims, and to his project on 
integrating Shariah into English law, following the successful experience of the 
autonomy granted to the Jewish Beth Din. As argued earlier, any jurisprudential 
procedure or recognition of the autonomy of religious Jewish and Islamic courts 
in Western liberal democracies will integrate these religious minorities into the 
legal system; it will necessarily have an impact the other community, will undo 
alienation and exclusion and will encourage dialogue, compromise, peace and 
integration.
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Islamophobia and the Crises 
of Europe’s Multiculturalism
Chris Allen
Th e manifesto of Anders Behring Breivik made clear who he saw as the ‘enemies’ 
of contemporary Europe: Islam and multiculturalism. Such views are not 
the preserve of Breivik and the far-right however; similar views are routinely 
expressed across Europe’s political landscape. Whilst Germany’s Angela Merkel, 
Britain’s David Cameron and France’s Nicolas Sarkozy explicitly declared that 
multiculturalism was dead, less explicit was the suggestion that Islam and Muslims 
were to blame. As Parekh puts it, the crisis of European multiculturalism depends 
upon answering the ‘Muslim Question’. Th is chapter explores some of these key 
issues in the British context before widening its focus to include Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. In conclusion, contemporary discourses about the 
crises of multiculturalism are evaluated as regards their potential to feed into 
and reinforce Islamophobic discourses in both the social and political spaces of 
Europe.
Islamophobia and the crises of Europe’s multiculturalism
As much as his actions were chilling, some of the points made by Anders Behring 
Breivik in his manifesto entitled, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence 
were undoubtedly timely and interesting enough to engage a whole range of 
diff erent audiences across Europe. Published shortly before he launched a bomb 
attack on government buildings in Oslo followed soon aft er by a mass shooting 
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at a youth camp on the island of Utøya, Breivik used the manifesto to set out 
his rationale for taking the lives of the 77 people many of whom were teenagers. 
Rooted in the ideologies of the far-right and neo-Nazism, Breivik’s remit was 
wide: endorsing extreme forms of Zionism, white nationalism and right-wing 
populism whilst simultaneously promoting Islamophobia, cultural conservatism 
and anti-feminism along the way. Underpinning all of this however were the 
issues that Breivik identifi ed as the enemies of modern Europe. For him, Islam, 
‘cultural Marxism’ and multiculturalism were the enemies; the enemies that 
would eventually combine to establish ‘Eurabia’. Only the violent and wholesale 
annihilation of multiculturalism would – in Breivik’s mind at least – preserve 
Christian Europe. 
It is not only Breivik and those on the extreme fringes of Europe’s political 
landscape that have identifi ed multiculturalism as being wholly problematic. 
Across the mainstream too, multiculturalism has come under attack in recent 
years. Germany’s Angela Merkel began the attacks in October 2010 explaining 
how in her country, “the approach [to build] a multicultural [society] and to live 
side-by-side and to enjoy each other... has failed, utterly failed”. Britain’s David 
Cameron joined the attack a few months later in February 2011:
“Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged diff erent 
cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the 
mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel 
they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities 
behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values…Frankly, we 
need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, 
muscular liberalism”
In the same week, France’s Nicolas Sarkozy continued, “We have been too 
concerned about the identity of the person who was arriving and not enough 
about the identity of the country that was receiving him…multiculturalism has 
been a failure”. For those in the political elites of Europe it would seem clear: 
despite the fact that multiculturalism is a physical and demographic reality across 
vast swathes of twenty fi rst century Europe, it is now a problem, a challenge 
and more potently, a threat. If Breivik is to be believed, this threat is to the very 
existence of Europe as we currently know it. But to what extent is this true? Given 
the factual reality of multicultural societies across the breadth of today’s Europe – 
multiple peoples of diff erent ethnicities, cultures, religions, languages and so on 
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living alongside each other – this chapter considers Europe’s multiculturalism, 
what might lie at the heart of the current ‘problem’ and more importantly, why 
this is important when considering the future of Europe.
Considering multiculturalism
Despite its widespread usage and adoption, ‘multiculturalism’ remains a 
relatively recent phenomenon in political and social theory. Standard works are 
little more than thirty years old (e.g. Kymlicka 1989; Young 1990). Following 
the demographic changes that have occurred in the past half century in much of 
Western Europe as a result of mass migration and other forms of immigration, 
‘multiculturalism’ is very much a fact of society in many states given the levels 
of diversity and group diff erence that currently exists. Despite this, it is worth 
noting that some European states might not necessarily or self-consciously 
declare themselves to be. As Kelly puts it, all modern Western European states 
face the ‘problems’ of multiculturalism even if they are far from endorsing 
multiculturalism as a policy agenda or political ideology (Kelly 2002). Most 
signifi cant is the fact that large minority communities live in relative socio-
economic deprivation and struggle culturally, politically and religiously against 
discrimination and in the need to be recognised. Kelly describes this as being 
consequential of the “circumstances of multiculturalism” of which two exist 
(Kelly 2002:3). Th e fi rst of Kelly’s circumstances is ‘factual multiculturalism’ 
where more than one culture exists within the public realm and is seen to be 
largely uncontroversial. Whilst true, there remains a dominant culture that 
the majority would identify with that has the potential to fetish, essentialise or 
reduce minority cultures in a variety of diff erent ways. Th e second circumstance 
is ‘prescribed multiculturalism’, a socio-political theory and model which seeks 
to apply egalitarian or libertarian principles of justice and rights as a means 
of trying to redress the ‘problems’: the consequences of group diff erence and 
confl ict for example, discrimination and racism. It is this latter understanding 
of multiculturalism – as a prescriptive socio-political theory and model – with 
which this chapter is primarily concerned with. 
Europe did not ‘invent’ the notion of multiculturalism. Drawing upon debates 
and political developments that were taking place in places such as Canada and 
the United States in the 1970s and 1980s (Kymlicka 1989; Young 1990; Taylor 
1994), a handful of Western European states began to follow suit. In countries 
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such as the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands and Sweden – states that 
self-consciously adopted what might best be termed prescriptive multicultural 
socio-political models albeit with some diff erences – concretised ‘solutions’ 
to the ‘problems’ were sought to guarantee equal rights and recognition for 
diff erent ethnically, culturally and religiously identifi ed communities. Extending 
debates around liberal democracy, for some such as Parekh, much more was 
needed: multicultural states needed to support minority communities to uphold 
their linguistic, cultural and religious needs and to outlaw the discrimination 
and disadvantage they experienced because of this (Parekh 2000). However, this 
form of multiculturalism was not without criticism. Some advocated that the 
promotion of individual rights rather than those of groups or communities as 
in the prescriptive multicultural model would be more benefi cial ( Joppke 1999; 
Barry 2002). For them because the emphasis is on groups and communities 
and the identities associated with them, multiculturalism gave greater credence 
to particularistic identities thereby not only focusing on cultural and religious 
diff erence but so too encouraging it (Scuzzarello 2010). As some argued, this 
approach legitimised the desire for self-separation within some communities. 
Advocates of multiculturalism will oft en forcefully counter this by stressing the 
benefi ts of recognising a plurality of identities, deeming it to be an overriding 
strength (Parekh 2000; Modood et al. 2006).
In the UK, Netherlands, Sweden and elsewhere in Europe, it has been this 
type of prescriptive socio-political model of multiculturalism that has been 
established. In the Netherlands, this emerged out of the Minderhedennota, a 
policy that was ratifi ed by Parliament in 1983 on the basis that Dutch society had 
become multiethnic and so both majority and minority communities should live 
together in harmony and mutual respect. Th e goals of this were: emancipation; 
equality; and equal opportunity (Carle 2005). In Sweden, the principles of 
jamlikhet (equality), valfr ihet (freedom of choice) and samverkan (partnership) 
were the key foundations upon which it built its immigrant policy, a policy that 
sought to distance and indeed reject the ‘guest worker’ strategy preferred in other 
Western European states especially Germany (Alund and Schierup: 1991). In the 
UK things were slightly diff erent with notions of multiculturalism emerging 
out of ideas and debates that followed the publication of the Swann report in 
the 1980s. It is this report that in the British context is seen to mark the formal 
beginning of a state endorsed multicultural model that required free choice 
for individuals, active support for the essential elements of the cultures and 
lifestyles of minority groups, and the acceptance of a framework of shared values 
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through which the interests of the greater good would be upheld (Bhattacharya 
1998). 
Whilst far from being European in its conception, the values underpinning 
multiculturalism undoubtedly resonated with those already present in various 
European liberal states and so it is unsurprising that multiculturalism was 
embraced across Western Europe in particular. Where individual states did adopt 
and individualise multiculturalism, the result was a range of diff erent concrete 
social and public policies being implemented which sought to guarantee a 
variety of diff erent rights and privileges for minority communities. In essence, 
each adopted an individualised version of ‘prescribed multiculturalism’. Whilst 
diff erent in policy and implementation, and indeed in the histories and heritages 
that shaped the respective journey towards multiculturalism – for instance some 
countries were former colonial powers, others were not – similarities were shown 
to exist. Th ese tended to include a general policy of ‘non-intervention’, where 
diff erent communities – shaped and determined by ethnic, national, religious, 
cultural or other identifi ers – are seen to deserve respect as do their diff erences. 
As Kymlicka put it, these diff erent models based upon “liberal view[s] required 
freedom within the minority group and equality between the minority and 
majority group” (Kymlicka 1995:117). However, Kymlicka was also quick to 
warn of the potential consequences of this type of approach: “In cases where the 
national minority is illiberal, this means that the majority will be unable to prevent 
the violation of individual rights within the minority community. Liberals in 
the majority group will have to learn to live with this” (Kymlicka 1995:168). 
To explore this in more detail and to try and better understand the crises of 
multiculturalism in today’s Europe, a case study on the crisis of multiculturalism 
in the UK is followed by a consideration of the same issues elsewhere in Europe.
Th e crisis of multiculturalism in the UK
In trying to understand the ‘crisis’ of multiculturalism in contemporary Britain, 
it is necessary to consider the debates that took place in both the public and 
political spaces following the London terror attacks in July 2005 (‘7/7’). Th e 
central tenet of the British ‘crisis’ focused on how 7/7 had not only catalysed 
but so too brought about the ‘death of multiculturalism’. As Modood noted, in 
the 12 weeks following the terrorist atrocities a signifi cant number of diff erent 
commentators used the events as a springboard from which to espouse their 
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arguments against multiculturalism (Modood 2005). Included amongst these 
were Gilles Kepel suggesting the bombers had smashed multiculturalism ‘to 
smithereens’ and Trevor Phillips – chair of the then national race equality 
watchdog, the Commission for Racial Equality – who questioned whether, in 
the context of an ‘anything goes’ multiculturalism, Britain had focused too much 
on the ‘multi’ and not enough on the ‘common’. Numerous other politicians, 
commentators and institutional voices entered the debate and suggested similar. 
But as Parekh noted, underpinning the attacks on multiculturalism – whether 
implied or simply assumed – were closely veiled attacks on Muslims and Islam. 
For him, the ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ debates that followed 7/7 were little 
more than a polite code for addressing what many saw was the ‘problem’ posed 
by Muslims and Islam in Britain (Parekh 2000). More recently and more widely, 
Breivik also made this connection albeit far more explicitly.
In the British setting, much of the debate around the crisis of multiculturalism 
became synonymous with soft er manifestations of Islamophobia, where 
discourses disproportionately focused on the perceived threat Muslims and 
Islam were seen to be posing to ‘our’ culture, ‘our’ values, ‘our’ institutions, 
and ‘our’ way of life (Allen 2005). Whether overt or covert, Muslims and Islam 
had become inculpably blamed for the ills of contemporary British society. 
Interestingly, from across the political spectrum, extremely similar arguments 
and justifi cations against Muslims and Islam emerged. Voices from across the 
political spectrum were beginning to perceive Muslims and Islam as making 
politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable and theologically alien demands 
on the state (Modood 2006). Following a series of highly publicised terror raids 
and an additional number of failed or thwarted terror attacks, debates about the 
role and responsibilities of Muslims and Islam intensifi ed. Consequently, this 
questioning has continued and has sought to ask whether Muslims can be – or 
indeed ever will be – an integrated part of a modern, egalitarian, society. Maybe 
the question that some had wanted to ask was whether Muslims can – or indeed 
ever will be – an integrated of a multicultural society?
Against this backdrop, two loosely defi ned and politically categorised anti-
Muslim, anti-Islam ideologies begun to emerge. Th e fi rst was more explicit, overt 
and formally structured from what might be termed the ‘far-right milieu’. In 
Britain, this has comprised organisations that traditionally sat on the extreme, 
nationalist end of the political spectrum. Seen for example in the British 
National Party (‘BNP’), its campaigns called for ‘Islam out of Britain’ and the 
need for a ‘referendum’ on the future of Islam in Britain. Making unprecedented 
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electoral gains at local, London and European levels in the aft ermath of 7/7, the 
BNP was extremely successful in fi nding political resonance with a signifi cant 
part of the population. Despite unprecedented success at the local and European 
levels, it failed to translate this success into national electoral gains and in the 
past few years has begun to fracture under the weight of responsibility and 
relative political respectability. Even more recently however, there are signs 
that the BNP is once more strengthening. Also within the ‘far-right milieu’ is 
the English Defence League (‘EDL’). Established around four years ago, it grew 
rapidly and at its zenith had the capability to mobilise up to 3,000 supporters to 
march through towns and cities in protest of the ‘Islamifi cation of Britain’. It is 
this group that Breivik is alleged to have been in dialogue with in relation to his 
views about Muslims, Islam and the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe. For the EDL, Islam 
and Muslim diff erence – ‘their’ innate diff erence from ‘us’ – is where the problem 
lies. As with the BNP, the EDL too has begun to fracture into, at times, more 
violent and more extreme splinter groups each of whom have a clear anti-Muslim, 
anti-Islam ideology at its core.
Th e second emergent ideology is far more implicit, and lacks the more formal 
structures and organisations of the far-right milieu. Linked by ideologically 
informed discourses and rhetoric, this might be termed ‘secular liberalist’. Possibly 
refl ecting Kymlicka’s dilemma facing liberals, of ‘learning to live with’ what they 
perceive to be illiberalism, the ideological messages and meanings of the secular 
liberalists are typically hidden behind or embedded within debates and arguments 
associated with other issues. Voices from within the secular liberalist have tended 
to associate the ‘crises’ of multiculturalism with other social and political issues, 
including those relating to immigration, integration, community cohesion and 
the erosion of liberal values especially freedom of speech and equality. Voices 
that one might be understood as operating within this category include the 
columnist Polly Toynbee and her suggestion that she was an ‘Islamophobe’ and 
proud (Allen 2010), the editor of left  leaning magazine David Goodhart and 
the inference of Muslims with ‘stranger citizens’ (Allen 2007), and those such as 
the former Home Secretary Jack Straw and his suggestion that the niqab – face 
veil – was a blanket barrier to integration (Allen 2010). Because the arguments 
and ideas put forward are typically far more implied, secular liberalist questions 
about Muslims and Islam are far more likely to go unnoticed or unrecognised 
in comparison to its far-right opposite (Allen 2007). More so, secular liberalist 
notions of the ‘problems’ of Muslims and Islam tend to be rooted in the values 
that sit at the heart of the modern liberal state and so tend to acquire a much 
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wider public and political support, including from those operating within the 
mainstream of the political state. Across Europe, other discourses which emerge 
from the secular liberalist perspective include those relating to the perceived 
notion of ‘Eurabia’ or the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe, both of which have a direct 
resonance with similar ideas emerging from the far-right. 
Beyond Britain
Th ese processes are far from limited to the British setting. In both the Netherlands 
and Sweden for instance, there are many similarities. At the political level in 
the Netherlands, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) made signifi cant political inroads. 
Pim Fortuyn, its assassinated leader, campaigned by calling Islam ‘a backward 
culture’ and stating that he would close Dutch borders to Muslim immigrants if 
it were legal. Fortuyn also spoke about the ‘Islamisation of Europe’. Interestingly 
though, Fortuyn would not have placed himself within the ‘far-right milieu’. 
Instead Fortuyn described himself as a ‘socialist’ and so might more appropriately 
sit within the secular liberalist ideologies. More typical of this ideological 
standpoint would be Somali-born Ayaan Hirsi Ali. A feminist who scripted the 
controversial fi lm ‘Submission’ by Th eo Van Gogh – who was himself murdered 
in protest of his fi lm – Hirsi Ali has argued that Islam is incompatible with 
democracy and Western culture. More recently, politician Geert Wilders – who 
courted controversy with his controversial fi lm, ‘Fitna’ – recently saw his Partij 
voor de Vrijheid (PVV) emerge as the third largest political party in the Dutch 
parliamentary elections in 2010, support that some have argued was on the back 
of his stance against Muslims and Islam. 
In Sweden, and as with the PVV in the Netherlands, the Sverigedemokraterna 
(SD) achieved unprecedented success in 2010 national elections in ways where the 
more traditional lines between the political right and left  were blurred. Being the 
fi rst time the SD or any political organisation from the right had attracted enough 
votes to cross the necessary threshold to gain parliamentary representation, the 
success of the SD is entirely new in the Swedish context. Campaigning that 
Sweden’s multiculturalism and multicultural policies had failed, the SD asserted 
that Sweden’s approach to immigration and integration had threatened national 
identity and had destroyed social cohesion. Its identifi cation of the ‘problem’ 
underlying the crisis of multiculturalism was clear: a banned advertisement for 
the SD showed a race between women in burqas with an elderly indigenous 
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Swedish woman for state benefi ts. As elsewhere, debates have also emerged from 
the centre and left  of the public and political spaces following a series of death 
threats – and subsequent arrests – made to Lars Vilks, a Swedish artist who 
produced a series of drawings of the Prophet Muhammad as a dog. Following the 
angry response from Muslims both in Sweden and elsewhere in the world, much 
was made of the need to stand up for freedom of expression not least because it is 
enshrined in the Swedish constitution. 
In other European countries too, similar has occurred. For instance in 
Denmark, a country placed under the international spotlight following the 
publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in January 2006, the Prime 
Minister has in the past publicly criticised Muslims for unnecessarily taking up 
to ‘four’ prayer breaks at work each day whilst the Dansk Folkeparti (Danish 
People’s Party) has been reported to the police for hate speech crimes. Danish 
political spaces are dominated by tests of loyalty: the requirement of Muslims to 
pledge their allegiance to the Danish constitution over and above the Qur’an; 
the establishment of legal criteria to restrict Danish citizens or residents from 
bringing spouses into the country from elsewhere in the world; and the need 
for all immigrants to show a stronger cultural connection to Denmark than any 
other country or entity. Without going into the debates about the publication 
of cartoons in the Jyllands-Posten, what is interesting is that one year aft er the 
original publication of the cartoons a video was aired in the Danish media 
that showed youth members of the Dansk Folkeparti engaged in a contest 
to draw pictures that insult Muhammad. Whilst the government roundly 
condemned the video’s contents, a group named ‘Defending Denmark’ claimed 
that they had made the video to expose the extreme right wing associations of 
the party and its ongoing vitriol against Muslims and Islam. More recently, 
Lars Loekke Rasmussen has joined in the debate about Muslims and Islam by 
asserting that the ‘face veil’ has no place in Denmark. Other similar assertions 
and ideas can be seen in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and Switzerland amongst 
others.
Inferring Islamophobia
In each of these settings, the prescriptive multicultural socio-political model is 
seen to be in crisis. Not just in crisis, but in each setting Muslims and Islam are 
implicated as agents for blame with debates and discussions ongoing in both 
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the left  and right of the political spectrum. For the right, it is easier for voices 
and organisations to elaborate on their thinking and ideologies. Not so however 
for the left . Historically, those from within the left  have been at the forefront of 
combating discrimination and prejudices and so are seemingly horrifi ed by the 
populism of the right’s what might be deemed racist ideologies. But as can be seen 
emerging across the European landscape, multicultural tolerance and the respect 
of diff erences has, as Kymlicka warned, its limits. As Slavoj Zizak recently put 
it, today’s tolerant liberal multiculturalism requires an experience of the Other 
that is deprived of its Otherness; describing it as the requiring of an experience 
of the decaff einated Other (Zizak 2011). Th is can be clearly seen in the consensus 
communicated by Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy. But so too can it be seen in the 
more overt and chilling rhetoric and discourses of the far-right, the neo-Nazis, 
of Breivik even. It would be nonsensical to imply that Merkel et al were the same 
as Breivik and his ilk, but what is evident is the notion that multiculturalism is 
presenting a threat to Europe and its individual states. At all levels, this is then 
impacting and infl uencing the political ideas and ideologies emerging from both 
the left  and right of the traditional political divides. 
Because of this, the social, political and policy trends emerging across the 
diff erent states is new and untested in Europe. Th e banning of the face veil in 
France and Belgium and the banning of the building of minarets in Switzerland 
are seeming evidence of this. Elsewhere, similar policy developments are either 
awaiting implementation or are under ongoing consideration. How these develop 
and what impact they might have on the social, political and policy spaces of 
these diff erent multicultural states – and on the notion of multiculturalism 
more widely – is as yet unknown. But what is clear is that underpinning the 
perceived crises of multiculturalism – and the ‘problems’ attributed with these 
– is that Muslims and Islam are being inculpably blamed and targeted. As the 
Commission on British Muslims & Islamophobia noted almost a decade and half 
ago, not only was the hostility and hatred towards Islam and Muslims becoming 
“more explicit, more extreme and more dangerous” (CBMI: p. 1) but so too were 
“organisations and individuals known for their liberalism and anti-racism [being 
seen to] express prejudice against Islam and Muslims” (CBMI: p. 15). It added: 
“…What is new [about Islamophobia] is the way it is articulated by those sections 
of society who claim the mantle of secularism, liberalism and tolerance…Th ey 
preach equality for all, yet turn a blind eye to the fact that this society off ers 
only unequal opportunities for Muslims” (CBMI: p. 15). Interestingly, this was 
being noted around the same time that Kymlicka was issuing his warning of the 
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possibility that liberals in the multicultural setting will have to ‘learn to live’ with 
what they might believe to be ‘illiberal’ cultures, practices, values and so on.
Understanding Islamophobia
Islamophobia is a relatively new word for a relatively new concept; it was fi rst 
used in print in its contemporary guise little more than twenty years ago. In 
this time, the term has been changed, manipulated, contested and dismissed 
in equal measure. Given its relative newness, some argue that Islamophobia – 
or any other form or manifestation of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam hatred – is 
little more than a legitimate and rational response to the events of 11 September 
2001 (9/11) and other similar events that have punctuated the decade of urgent 
history that has followed those tragic events. But as the landmark publication 
of the highly determinative and infl uential 1997 report from the Commission 
on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI) highlighted, Islamophobia was 
distinctly not a post-9/11 phenomenon. Islamophobia existed as much on the 
10 September 2001 as indeed it did on the 12 September 2001. As the European 
Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) noted in its report 
on Islamophobia across fi ft een European states following the attacks on New 
York and Washington, “Much of what occurred post-September 11 drew heavily 
upon pre-existent manifestations of widespread Islamophobic and xenophobic 
attitudes” (Allen and Nielsen 2002). It went on, 9/11 merely “gave a pre-existent 
prejudice a much greater credibility and validity” (Allen and Nielsen 2002: 42). 
Th ere can though be little doubt about the signifi cance and impact of 9/11 
and the way in which similar incidents since have continued to shape and 
determine how not just Islam and Muslims have been perceived, but more so 
the phenomenon of Islamophobia. At whatever level – national, political, 
institutional, community – the legacy of 9/11 is never far from view and this 
is true of the contemporary European landscape as also North America and 
elsewhere. So too is there little doubt about the way in which 9/11 and its legacy 
has fed the growing spectre of Islamophobia and with it, the rising incidence and 
proliferation of anti-Muslim hate crimes. Without the past decade – and not 
because of it, it has to be stressed – it is right to question whether the atrocities 
committed by Breivik would ever have taken place. Yet this same decade has been 
one where the very notion of Islamophobia – at times, even the merest recognition 
– has been routinely derided and dismissed, rarely if indeed ever being given the 
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credence and seriousness of concern that such a dangerous phenomenon clearly 
deserves. Perceiving Islamophobia in the way that it has for the past decade has 
allowed for detractors and those who simply do not care to make simplistic 
assumptions: stop the terrorism and the Islamophobia will stop also. Sadly, such 
simplistic views are far from helpful, not least because the thinking and rationale 
underpinning them is fl awed. 
It would be wrong to suggest that nothing has been done to try and counter 
Islamophobia. In some countries, diff erent legislative measures and policies 
have been implemented, various political debates have been undertaken and a 
number of Europe-wide reports have been commissioned amongst others. So 
too have other initiatives been established, by Muslim groups and organisations, 
by other faith groups and communities concerned by the rise in religious-driven 
hatred and hostility, and by those who campaign for greater equality and for 
the protection of human rights. Others too have been receptive to the threat 
of Islamophobia. Whichever way one refl ects upon the outcomes and events of 
what began with the publication of the CBMI report and duly accelerated by 
9/11, it cannot be argued that the language, discourse, notion and concept of 
Islamophobia has failed to acquire a contemporary British, European and global 
relevance: the latter emerging in particular following the debates around the 
‘Ground Zero’ mosque and the proposed burning of the Qur’an by the American 
Christian minister Terry Jones, both in 2010. 
Th ere would also appear to be a concurrent process being played out, where 
despite Islamophobia either discursively or conceptually becoming increasingly 
referenced, referred to and spoken about, there also appears to be a distinct lack 
of clarity and understanding about Islamophobia: about what it is, what it is not 
and what can be done about it. Th e asking of these questions so far has resulted 
in further contestation and confusion: about defi nition, usage, meaning and 
ownership. Th ere remains therefore a clear need for further investigation not 
least about what is ‘Islamophobia’. Improving understanding about Islamophobia 
cannot merely be a process of constructing simplistic defi nitions that allow easy 
criteria that hope to identify whether or not something is Islamophobic. If 
defi ned too broadly, then Islamophobia will escape censure where meaningless 
defi nitions and conceptualisations will become over-infl ated and remove any 
concretised or empirical grounding. If the defi nition is without grounding, then 
discourses that would otherwise be regarded as socially unacceptable will begin 
to attain social legitimacy as well as political agency. Th rough political agency, 
Islamophobia might then become implicitly shrouded beneath the cover of 
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nationalism and national belonging for instance, in preference of explicit or overt 
manifestations of racism or Islamophobia, even though the resultant consequence 
or impact might be very much the same. Likewise, if overly simple defi nitions 
and conceptualisations are put forward, overly simple – and overly inadequate – 
solutions will ensue, culminating in a similar situation to that which has already 
been established. In addition, both the defi nition and purported solution 
obscures the specifi city and complexity of the phenomenon; undermining, 
hindering and even negating the problem whilst supporting further contestation.
Recognising the complexity of this, recent research has put forward the 
suggestion that Islamophobia is a threefold ideological phenomenon, one where 
Islamophobia becomes conceived and evident in the form of systems of thought 
and meaning as well as through systems of signifi ers or symbols which pertain to 
infl uence, impact upon or inform the social consensus about ‘the Other’ (Allen 
2010). Employing this model, Islamophobia is not necessarily restricted to any 
specifi c action, practice, discrimination or prejudice but instead gives meaning 
to that which is widely accepted as natural and normative of Muslims, Islam 
or both. As Clarke explains in terms of the function of ideology, this “creates 
a form of order, who we are, or perhaps more precisely who we are not, by the 
stigmatisation, marginalisation and intolerance associated with this” (Clarke 
2003:15). On the basis of this ‘form of order’, so discrimination and prejudice can 
be duly founded upon inaccuracies, misunderstandings and misrepresentations 
as indeed it can upon accurate, correctly understood and true representations of 
Muslims or Islam: all become seen to be ‘normative truths’ whether that be the 
case or not (Allen 2010). If a ‘form of order’ is therefore created that establishes 
Muslims and Islam as being ‘who we are not’, it would appear that this would be 
Islamophobia.
If Islamophobia is ideological, and thereby the fi rst component of the broader 
phenomenon, then it must function as such, where ideological content – 
meaning about Muslims and Islam – must be disseminated to the public and 
private spaces: through a vast range of diff erent actions, utterances, images and 
texts that are recognised and digested as meaningful by its recipients. In this 
instance, both dissemination and reception are as equally important. To achieve 
this, the second component of Islamophobia is the ‘modes of operation’ through 
which meaning is sustained and perpetuated. It is imperative to stress though, 
that modes of operation are not equitable with the symbolic forms through which 
Muslims and Islam are either identifi ed or recognised. Th ese modes and strategies 
nor are neither concretised nor unchanging, and so new modes and strategies 
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may at some stage appear whilst others may similarly disappear, be replaced or 
substituted: this can occur also in diff erent geographical, cultural, social and 
so on settings. Neither the modes nor strategies are in themselves ideological: 
they only sustain ideological meaning, whether intentional or otherwise. Th e 
fi nal component of Islamophobia is exclusionary practices: practices that seek 
to disadvantage, prejudice or discriminate against Muslims and Islam in social, 
economic and political spheres. Exclusionary practices must also include the 
subjection to violence as a tool of exclusion. Interestingly, these are all things that 
prescribed multiculturalism sought to eradicate.
Making it ‘reasonable’
In many ways, the ideologies of Breivik and others from the far-right milieu are 
far from extraordinary. Th is is not to say that the atrocities committed by Breivik 
are not extraordinary: they are, and must serve as a timely reminder of the very 
real threat that the ‘lone wolf ’ extremist presents to our security in today’s Europe. 
What is extraordinary however is the resonance that the ideologies of the political 
mainstream – the centre left  and right – has in relation to multiculturalism with 
those on the far and extreme right. But even acknowledging this contributes 
towards the relative smokescreen that is being created by multiculturalism. In 
many ways, the crises of multiculturalism are mere smokescreens for what many 
are seeing as the ‘problems’ attributed to the presence and visibility of Islam 
and Muslims in Europe and the Islamophobia which underpins this. Zizak 
again provides some insight. Referencing the French fascist intellectual Robert 
Brasillach, Zizak refl ects on Brasillach’s ‘reasonable antisemitism’: 
“We don’t want to kill anyone, we don’t want to organise any pogrom. But 
we also think that the best way to hinder the always unpredictable actions 
of instinctual antisemitism is to organise a reasonable antisemitism” (Zizak 
2011).
In today’s Europe it might be argued that something similar is occurring but 
in terms of a ‘reasonable’ Islamophobia. Having upheld the need for minority 
rights, for equality, justice and welfare support as being necessary values of our 
European heritages and histories, increasingly we are moving away from these 
– rejecting them even – to endorse policies that are discriminatory, divisive and 
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damaging. To make them more palatable – to diff erentiate them from the less 
palatable versions of the far-right – the mainstream politicians and others speak 
about ‘problems’, implied enough for most to be able to understand and accept, 
to make them appear legitimate, rational and as Brasillach might have put it, 
‘reasonable’. 
If, as the discourses and rhetoric suggest, we are moving into an era that goes 
beyond multiculturalism – post-multiculturalism according to Steven Vertovec 
– then it is essential that we do not lose sight of the values that made Europe 
embrace multiculturalism and its politics. Reject multiculturalism and banish 
the ‘M-word’ from our lexicon if necessary; Europe can cope with that. But in 
doing so, let us not reject and banish the values that were behind why we once 
embraced multiculturalism and its socio-political policies and practices. More 
importantly, it is essential that this does not allow for a space to be created where 
the antithesis of multicultural values are allowed to ferment and manifest in 
the form of a ‘reasonable’ Islamophobia. Th e ‘crises’ of multiculturalism will not 
be solved by endorsing Islamophobia, whether from the right, left  or centre of 
the political spectrum. Despite the assertions of Breivik and others from within 
the far-right milieu, it is not the presence of Muslims and Islam in Europe that 
presents the greatest threat. Instead, it is the rejection and loss of the values that 
are at the very heart of multiculturalism that presents the greatest threat to the 
future of Europe: to who we are, what our values and culture might be.
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and New Multiculturalism 
 
Johan Leman, Erkan Toğuşlu and İsmail Mesut Sezgin 
Which place for religion in ‘new’ multiculturalism?
 
What we have learned from the chapters in this book is that in Europe today 
we have started living in an epoch in which the post-immigrant’s ‘new’ ethnicity 
expresses itself very oft en in religious emblems, and the indigenous ethnicity 
looks for an expression through regional nationalisms and ethnicized and 
culturally essentialized secular religion. In such situations, indigenous ethnicity 
may claim a fi rst-born’s right on a particular territory, underpinned by values and 
standards unlike that of the religiosity on which the post-migrant communities 
rely. In both cases this leads to all kinds of constructions, and it is here that the 
globalization has created a new context in the present. 
Comparing similarities and diff erences between indigenous and immigrant 
ethnogenesis, Leman predicted that “the development of the multi-ethnic (or 
multicultural) societies that arise from all kinds of immigration movements 
will, in the long run, be chiefl y determined by the way in which structures and 
sedimentations of diff erent religious institutions, which are imported by these 
movements, can continue to be used as a mobilisation factor” (1998: 160). 
In the three cases, immigrant, post-migrant and even non-migrant ethnic 
reactivity, “almost anything and everything is possible, as long as no falsehoods 
are told that are too obviously refuted by common knowledge and as long as 
the adversary is not too strong” (Roosens 1989: 161). From the 1990s on, global 
and trans-border embeddedness has had the consequence that there is more 
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trans-border streamlining, both in the post-migrantism, and in non-migrant 
identifi cation mobilizations, in thought and in practice. In our book we focussed 





Th e chapters in our Part I have shown a variety of answers and constructions 
among young new generations, nourished by the impact of the internet and 
social media, online practices which however are not in complete discontinuity 
with the offl  ine practices of young people. Being Muslim or not-Muslim 
fundamentally does not make any diff erence in the application of the practices, 
but the streamlining that follows from it may promote some emblems more than 
others related to cultural preferences and to culturally prescribed behaviour. 
From all the fi ndings in Part I we see how transborderly mainstreamed secular 
adaptation, loyalty to the practices of parents and grandparents, and genuine 
neo-fundamentalist glocal creativity can all be met in one locality in today’s 
Europe, in some cases with multiple expressions in one family or even in one 
person.
Drummond, at the beginning of the 1980s, discussed ‘creolization’ as a 
complex identity construction process which was not based solely on ‘double 
identifi cation’. He explained that the staying together of people from a variety 
of communities could be the beginning of all kinds of mixtures, most clearly 
though not exclusively, on the basis of mixed marriages. Th ese mixtures gradually 
lead to an ethno-cultural continuum. As Drummond argued, “Th e ‘elementary 
structure’ of such a cultural system is not an isolated proposition, but an 
intersystem – the pragmatic residue of persons seeking to defi ne their identity 
vis-à-vis one another. … A cultural continuum, like a linguistic continuum, may 
be identifi ed by inserting arbitrary boundaries within a transformational series” 
(1980: 370). As we see from our fi ndings, such a new style continuum as proposed 
by Drummond, be it in a completely diff erent context, is only one pattern in 
the complex cluster of practices that is made possible in today’s Europe. By 
the end of the 1990s, Aishe Caglar discovered a more general ‘European’ post-
migrant phenomenon when she discovered that “a growing number of people 
defi ne themselves in terms of multiple national attachments and feel at ease with 
subjectivities that encompass plural and fl uid cultural identities” (Caglar 1997: 
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169). Such ‘hyphenatization’ referred to the fact that the prevailing socio-cultural 
praxis of the host country exerts a clear infl uence over the immigrants’ view of 
their culture of origin. 
What we learned from such authors, and from many other researchers 
(Leman had already described the phenomenon by ending his research on 
Sicilian immigrants in Belgium on a similar note: see Leman 1987), was that 
the processes which fi nd their roots in migration are not unilinear ones and are 
at the beginning of many variegated creative practices. What has become more 
impressive nowadays than in earlier years is the impact of the global, the internet, 
the social media and various forms of more accessible mobility on the creation 
of current creative practices. Th at is what the authors in our Part I were able 
to illustrate perfectly, applying it in most cases (but not all) to post-migrant 
Muslims. 
During the 1990s, faith-based organizations created a strong foundation in 
most immigrant communities. Th e second generation young adults changed the 
dynamics of these organizations which, in former times, focussed on the countries 
and community cultures of the countries of origin a great deal more. Some new 
dynamics had begun to take shape which were coupled with a shift  in emphasis 
to the countries of destination. First, these faith-based organizations adopted a 
clearer profi le, profi ling those communities which changed from immigrants to 
citizens as the supporting axes of an internal pluralism inside the post-migrant 
communities. Secondly, and occurring simultaneously, they began much more 
intense cross-border relations with similar communities in other countries which 
adopted similar positions in the interpretation of their religion.
Networking geared towards easier and less expensive transport modalities, 
as well as the internet, has become a very typical characteristic of the current 
faith-based organizations. Th e impact on their members’ feelings of trans-border 
identifi cation is obvious, so also is its impact on glocal neo-fundamentalisms 
(cf. Robertson 1993: 174). 
 
Indigenous anti-migrant ethnic re-activity
 
Th e trans-border character of the faith-based communities and the strong 
visibility of glocal neo-fundamentalisms imply that some segments of the 
indigenous population perceive this presence to be highly invasive. One can 
observe the feeling of xenophobia that is latent therein. Some more militant 
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people attempt to sustain this sentiment by off ering it a megaphone. Th ey then 
present certain historical confl icts with the Muslim world, or confl icts elsewhere 
in the world, as a threat to a native population’s own country today. Islam 
becomes presented as an invader. Th is may lead for some, sometimes very secular 
people, to an aggressive, fundamentalist ethnic-cultural Christianity which not 
only needs to be protected but which off ers the ‘moral capital’ to pre-empt and 
cut off  the Islamic ‘other’. Th is is what some chapters in Part II developed, with a 
fi nal refl ection in Allen’s chapter 11.
In this logic, and in terms of ethnicity, a given society’s indigenous side must 
then be protected and preserved as a mixture of original local emblems and values, 
and even in terms of the idea of Western Christendom itself. For such militants, 
it is important therefore to attempt to understand where in other countries 
similar movements arise. But it is a fact however that the local ethnic colouring 
is diffi  cult to transfer into other cultural contexts in other countries. Still there 
remains an ethnic-cultural ‘Christian factor’ that one can appeal to, although it 
is mostly used among people who are no longer faithful to Christianity or are 
of a very secular set. So, such trans-border mobilization may be more diffi  cult 
than among ‘post-migrant faith-based communities’ where the religious glue is 
stronger, and it leads to initiatives of ‘lone wolf ’ militants and a variety of smaller 
transborderly organized co-operations with an anti-islamization and anti-
multiculturalism agenda. 
Th e non-migrant post-secular mobilizations at Europe’s surface are occupied 
mainly by nationally-known charismatic fi gures. Th ey do not associate easily 
among themselves in a common, more global transborder European anti-Islam 
project, but fi nd one another in a militant anti-Europe attitude. 
 
Post-secular and border widening processes 
(and counter-movements) 
 
Th e development that seems most striking is the tension between secular and 
post-secular. It is the ethnic-cultural and religious developments that interested 
us in our book. 
For a description of what constitutes the secular, we look to authors such 
as Habermas (2008) and Taylor (2007), while accepting the criticism that 
Asad (2003) expresses in mentioning how the particular power relations 
which undergird the communities oft en result in situations where there is no 
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objective, respectful dialogical space which is conducive to religious exchange. 
Continental Western Europe (i.e. most of the host countries in this book) has 
created a tradition of the secular, with gradated diff erences between the various 
countries, seen as a neutral, secular public space which remains separated from 
other areas, namely the pre-eminently private domain. People in public spaces, 
especially within certain prescribed roles and positions, should consider their 
private characteristics, which are framed in terms of religion, belief, gender, as 
something they should hide. 
Th e discussion that may follow on from this is that not everything in the 
public sphere can be experienced as being equally relevant, or that not everything 
everywhere is experienced in the same way in either the private or public sphere. In 
addition, some also defend pluralism and neutrality in a globalizing world which 
consists of group characteristics which may be expressed in terms of equivalents. 
Th ese last will claim that if these expressions are not accepted, the secular can be 
said to constitute itself as an ideology which displaces other ideologies. 
Today we see that the Continental Western European concept of the secular 
is being very heavily criticised by young post-migrant Muslims. In order to try 
to understand this criticism it is prudent to also take into consideration some 
processes that are related to the globalization. Th ese general processes may help 
to frame the processes. 
A fi rst consideration is that religion is seen by many post-secular feeling people 
as a buff er against new anxieties. According to Martin Riesebroth secularization 
and religious revival go hand in hand. Scientifi c advancements, especially 
deriving from medicine, have meant that today human control over its life 
span has increased. Th e welfare state has reduced the vulnerability experienced 
by people from lower class backgrounds. Political power has become closer to 
common human beings. However, with the rise of scientifi c power and of human 
autonomy a new powerlessness has arisen in the form of possible threats of 
ecological catastrophe or fears of the sudden rise of authoritarian regimes and 
irrational movements led by charismatic leaders. Many people also feel that their 
family life has become destabilized by the excessive pressures of social mobility. 
Th e “destabilizing eff ects of Western modernization have ... paved the way for a 
resurgence of religious modes of crisis prevention and management,” concludes 
Riesebrodt (2003: 108). Aft er all, “historically, it has mostly been through 
religions that the chaotic or potential crisis has been culturally transformed into 
the semblance of cosmos” (Riesebrodt 2003: 106). 
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Th is may be one of the elements that explain the omnipresence of religious 
loyalty, as developed by some authors in Part II.
And yet Riesebrodt follows the reasoning of Robertson (1992; 2003). He observes 
in these phenomena the origin of contemporary religious fundamentalisms. But 
the question is whether a reaction to these forces necessarily and invariably leads 
solely in the direction of local fundamentalism. Can one not imagine that there 
are people who do not want to rely on any fundamentalism, but prefer support 
in seeking a wider and more democratic religious and social network? Instead of 
highly localized smaller communities, of the fundamentalist type, one may also 
obtain translocal religious networks of such a magnitude that one can assume 
that they are not on the edge of society, but have the ability to act decisively 
to reshape the society in which the common people live. Th ey are looking to 
succeed through their own voices and deeds, to fi nd a form of recognition in a 
system of meaning that would otherwise be insuffi  cient or unrepresentative of 
their own social and cultural capital. Th is variety of processes brings us to some 
developments that we could read in Part II.
Th e theoretical refl ections, also in Part II,  may bring a second fi eld of 
considerations. Can religion not have become an alternative for economic 
dominance? Roland Robertson wrote that “there has, in eff ect, been a detachment 
of the economic from the other dimensions of globalization. ... Overwhelmingly 
globalization is now seen as a primarily economic phenomenon” (Robertson 
2003: 123). His reasoning is that originally this had been initiated as a corrective 
to include localized “anti-global” fundamentalisms, not least those of a religious 
nature, but that “anti-global movements have inexorably become part of the 
globalization process itself ” (Robertson 2003: 114). But Robertson also ended 
his statement by reinforcing the declarations made previously by Riesebrodt. 
What we perceive to be a normal attitude among religiously-minded people who 
fi nd a place in a world that is highly susceptible to processes from science and 
politics may also be seen as an inevitable behavioural non-science-based reaction 
of people who are, in fact, anti-global in the fi rst instance. But in the second 
instance, the trans-border and post-secular refl exes found in these religiously 
minded people may have become a form of participation from their part in the 
global arena. 
We might think, therefore, that the process of trans-border religions should be 
seen as a logical consequence of full participation in the global sphere. As Ninian 
Smart observed, it is “the present state of the world – one of intense globalization 
– [that] has its eff ect on religion” (Smart 2003: 124). Religion should not simply 
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be seen as a reactive agent, but as a co-constitutive one. “One of the great myths 
is that religion is always the same: that an evangelical from Missouri has the 
same values as the apostle Paul, for example” (Smart 2003: 124). But religions are 
constantly changing, and this becomes perhaps clearest in a globalizing world. 
Th is puts pressure upon secular values and creates openings to post-secular 
thought and to post-secular action being taken. 
What is already a process that has its sources in the post-migrant processes, 
mainly among post-migrants of Islamic provenance, may become reinforced by 
the input nowadays coming from new, even fi rst generation, migrations that 
support the trends of trans-border mobility and transnational belonging. Th e 
mobility, for example, of Indian religions is already quite well demonstrated, of 
Hinduism (Vertovec 2000), of Sikhs in Europe ( Jacobsen and Myrvold 2011) and 
of global Jain diaspora ( Jain 2011). It pushes policy makers to refl ect on ‘politics 
of diff erence’ (Modood 2007), which may accept some collective and public 
identities of religious groups and protect them against a too secularist bias towards 
them, or it opens the door for some ‘multidimensional pluralism’ (Connolly 
2005). We can use Fraser’s words: new migrations are transnationalizing the 
public sphere (Fraser 2007). Such questions were all treated in Part II of our book, 
where at the same time the question of multiculturalism and its tension between 
factual and ‘normative’ was treated. We will come back to the theoretical as well 
as to the practical refl ections. 
In all this, the WWW space has had more of an impact than any other 
element associated with globalization. “Web space leads to complex articulations 
in the possible identifi cation processes of the social selves, but it also creates 
new opportunities for ‘us-consciousness’, creating new loyalties and borders, 
and empowering the perceptions of the Self ” (Leman 2009: 195). Levy (1995) 
has pointed out that the three modalities important in this respect are: the 
de-territorialization of the here and now, the emergence of new spaces and new 
speeds which become mixed up with preceding ones, and a continuous interplay 
of the inside and outside. It is clear that the Web has streamlined and helped 
to foster the everyday lives of immigrant faith communities. It also promotes 
exchanges between anti-multiculturalist militants and members of such militant 
Islamophobic trans-border communities of non-immigrants whose contribution 
would normally be overlooked. Th e Web can be said to homogenize only in part, 
and even then mainly within each of their individual trans-border communities, 
while the antagonisms with the “Other” tend to strengthen, deepen and broaden 
fault lines rather than diminish them. Within each trans-border community, it 
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“centralises and structures information and is a tool of empowerment” (Leman 
2009: 200).
 
Th e process character in Europe’s new multiculturalism
 
Religion as well as ethnicity creates “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983). 
Both religion and ethnicity can create and develop a dynamic of an increasing 
sense of an all-encompassing global community in the context of globalization, 
but it is a slow process. A multicultural setting is not a ‘be all and end all’ 
panacea for a stabilized society. In such a complex multi-layered society people 
continuously have the capacity to be ‘aff ected’ (cf. Deleuze 1990: 93-95) from 
inside and outside. One may call it a process of diff erencing: ‘becoming diff erent’ 
as ‘deferred in time and space’ (Derrida 1982: 8-9). It may create a lot of new 
‘idealities’ (Derrida 1967), relating to always ‘new’ developments stemming 
from inside and outside one’s own community. Practices may remain partially 
integrated in a fi eld of former social-cultural practices and become extended to 
new practices coming from a diff erent proposed ‘ideality’, or even coming from 
other countries that are part of the trans-border realities. Group changes can 
lead to new identifi cations (Iborra 2005), and these changes may take several 
forms depending on the strength of the bond with the trans-border community. 
Vis-à-vis the processes of change and ‘diff erencing’ of cultural meanings, we 
should understand (and that is the sense of Mečiar’s refl ections in chapter 4 of 
Part I) that the challenge for future research will be that we cannot impose our 
ethno-centric Western categories on an understanding of the ‘emic’ content of 
immigrants’ narratives. It means that increasing religious diversity each time with 
its own diff erent internal dynamics brings us into a post-secular society frame. 
It does not invalid the secularization theory, but invites us  to understand that 
a tolerant coexistence between diff erent religious communities in a context of 
growing social inequality will become less obvious, since religion will become 
more important in shaping identities in some situations. 
From Murat Sevencan’s large-scale research (see chapter 9 in Part II), we 
learned that choices and decisions may be infl uenced by shift ing the salience of 
a particular identifi cation for a person. In Europe, religion, with its ethnic and 
identitary connotations, is present in most countries, as a culturescape biased 
by Christendom. Religion in general, not just Christendom, transcends as the 
fi rst and most solid life-view in Europe geographical and political boundaries, 
even for Muslims and other religions. We can indeed not conclude from the 
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data that religion will never have some mobilizing power. But currently, it 
does not mobilize vis-à-vis others in the sense of relations with other countries 
as a marker that is more important than nationality. So, we are somewhere in 
between an ‘it is not’ situation and an ‘it is not ruled out in the future’ one. Th ere 
is another important life-view, namely a modern-political life-view. Th is life-
view formulates the identity categories with respect to the political perception. 
One can associate this structural life-view with both national and local identity. 
Local identity is the nearest alternative to a national one. Nowadays in Europe, 
we see how local identities are the most challenging. Sub-national, nationalistic 
and regional, identifi cations are less present ‘overall’, but where they are they can 
become signifi cant rivals of national identities. Still diff erent from both former 
identifi cations is the very paradoxical situation that personal individualism, 
i.e. a modern-intellectual life-view constructed from internal reasoning, is also 
an overall present value. It can be personal as well as supra-national. It is not a 
challenge for national identity. Moreover, one can safely say that this secular-
glocal identity also has a distance from the post-secular religious glocal one as 
well. 
Th e above, with its three important life views that are all present in citizens’ 
lives, is the context that makes it understandable that in Europe, a territory with 
multiple identifi cations for one and the same individual, there may be moments 
and places where nationalisms, religious transnational fundamentalisms, 
personal individualisms are present when national identifi cations also remain 
very strong. It is the source of a continuous uprising of new social-cultural and 
ethnic-religious processes that interfere with the already existing ones.
Practical political challenges
Th e processes as described here above off er some practical challenges for the state. 
It is the mission of a democratic state not to reduce the sources for the shaping 
of identities by limiting the diversity of voices and opinions within the public 
discourse, so some solution should be found to reconcile this need for religious self-
expression with respect for the secular. But it is also true that it does not mean that 
religion should be over-emphasized or over-politicized as a source of identity as if 
it may be the principal reason for immigrants’ actions. What should be found in 
European societies, in the logic of these refl ections, is a new sane balance between 
ethnic and religious belongings and the secular common space.
In chapter 10 (Part II), we read about a plea for a ‘transformative 
accommodation’. As Nimni writes, whether religious or secular, diff erence-blind 
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equality defaults in the dominant practice and excludes and alienates minorities. 
Th e exemplary image of a “normal” member of the dominant group may remain 
blind for acceptable, democratic expressions coming from minority people. Very 
probably, this can no longer be legitimized. A failure of secular legal systems is 
to remove from consideration religious motivations and practices of groups in 
plural societies that do not belong to the dominant cultural-religious, even secular 
majority. If we want minority people, with a diff erent religious background, to 
see themselves as recognized in their identity and way of life, there is a step to be 
taken in the direction of some religious legal pluralism for private matters that 
do not change the existing secular compromise. Th e debate that opens with such 
refl ections is about factual versus prescribed multiculturalism.
We presented our book under the title ‘Europe’s New Multicultural Identities’. 
In the fi rst Part we presented research fi ndings that showed what these new 
multicultural identities are about in various places at the European Continent. 
Post-migrant and re-active anti-migrant identifi cations and belongings had an 
important place in the second Part. We approached all these phenomena as 
manifestations of identities in a plural post-secular Europe. In our concluding 
chapter, we see these manifestations of identities as processes framed by ethnic-
religious intersections, and call it Europe’s new multiculturalism. It is not the end 
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